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Introduction 
Congress enacted the Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act (“JVCA”) 
on December 7, 2011,
1
 amending numerous removal and venue statutes 
within the Judicial Code. The JVCA has been described as the “the most 
far-reaching package of revisions to the Judicial Code since the Judicial 
Improvements Act of 1990.”
2
 The JVCA was intended to “bring[] more 
clarity to the operation of Federal jurisdictional statutes”
3
 and to decrease 
the amount of time wasted “determining jurisdictional issues at the expense 
of adjudicating underlying litigation.”
4
 
The JVCA’s provisions dealing with removal and remand of civil cases 
are likely to be critically important because they will affect everyday 
practice in state and federal courts. In light of the widespread and 
prominent nature of removal/remand litigation in contemporary civil 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-
63, 125 Stat. 758 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.). The House 
Report candidly admits that due to more pressing agenda items in 2010, no hearings were 
held to evaluate House Bill 4113. Instead of going through the formal vetting process, major 
stakeholder groups were given the opportunity to identify controversial provisions, which 
were then reportedly deleted. See H.R. REP. NO. 112–10, at 2 (2011). Although a hearing 
was held in 2005 with respect to an earlier version of the bill, the plaintiffs’ bar did not have 
representation at the hearing. See Arthur D. Hellman, Another Voice for the “Dialogue”: 
Federal Courts as a Litigation Course, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 761, 772 (2009) [hereinafter 
Hellman, Another Voice].  
 2. Arthur Hellman, The Federal Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act Is Now Law, 
JURIST-FORUM (Dec. 30, 2011, 5:00 PM), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/12/arthur-hellman-
jvca.php [hereinafter Hellman, JVCA Is Now Law].  
 3. H.R. REP. NO. 112–10, at 1. 
 4. Id. at 2. 
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litigation, the provisions will affect everything from run-of-the-mill torts 
cases to complex products liability cases and insurance litigation.
5
 Although 
many commentators agree that the JVCA clarifies certain aspects of 
removal law and resolves some circuit court splits over removal issues,
6
 
others have criticized certain JVCA provisions for adopting bad policies or 
failing to adequately clarify critical aspects of removal law.
7
 Of the various 
                                                                                                                 
 5. See John E. Goodman, The Route to Federal Court Clarified: Congress Amends 
Removal Statutes, CORP. COUNS. (Law Journal Newsletters, Philadelphia, Pa.), Mar. 2012, 
at 3, http://media.lockelord.com/files/Uploads/Documents/LJN_NLCOR_2012_03_01.pdf 
(describing the JVCA’s removal provisions as the most significant); E. Farish Percy, The 
Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016: Moving the Law in the Wrong Direction , 62 
VILL. L. REV. 213, 213 n.1 (2017) [hereinafter Percy, Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act] 
(citing statistics indicating that 466 federal district court opinions in 2015, 461 federal 
district court opinions in 2014, and 509 federal district court opinions in 2013 referenced 
“fraudulent joinder” and likely involved the district court’s ruling on the plaintiff’s motion 
to remand); E. Farish Percy, Making a Federal Case of It: Removing Cases to Federal 
Court Based upon Fraudulent Joinder, 91 IOWA L. REV. 189, 191-93 (2005) (discussing 
the dramatic increase in removal/remand litigation concerning fraudulent joinder) 
[hereinafter Percy, Making a Federal Case of It]; E. Farish Percy, The Tedford Equitable 
Exception Permitting Removal of Diversity Cases After One Year: A Welcome 
Development or the Opening of Pandora’s Box?, 63 BAYLOR L. REV. 146, 147-48 (2011) 
(discussing the increasing frequency of intense forum selection battles in civil litigation) 
[hereinafter Percy, The Tedford Equitable Exception]; Hellman, JVCA Is Now Law, supra 
note 2 (discussing the centrality of removal/remand litigation and concluding that “[f]rom 
a litigation perspective, the most important elements of the JVCA are those relating to 
removal jurisdiction and procedure”).  
 6. See, e.g., Goodman, supra note 5, at 1; (concluding that the JVCA resolved some 
circuit court splits over removal issues); Stephen Plitt & Joshua D. Rogers, Delay, 
Manipulation, and Controversy: The Impact of the 2012 Amendments to 28 U.S.C. § 1446 on 
the Battles for Removal of Cases to Federal Court, 6 PHOENIX L. REV. 633, 656 (2013) 
(concluding that the amendments address certain types of forum manipulation by plaintiffs 
and add greater structure to removal/remand law). 
 7. See, e.g., William Baude, Clarification Needed: Fixing the Jurisdiction and Venue 
Clarification Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. 33, 35-36 (2012) (critiquing the Act because it does 
not: (i) provide a rule when state law permits but does not require the plaintiff to demand a 
specific amount of damage in the complaint; (ii) define or explain the preponderance of the 
evidence standard for demonstrating the amount in controversy; or (iii) address the fact that 
it is difficult to know whether and when a case is removable, making it hard to comply with 
the removal deadlines); Paul E. Lund, The Timeliness of Removal and Multiple-Defendant 
Lawsuits, 64 BAYLOR L. REV. 50, 95-112 (2012) (criticizing the codification of the last-
served defendant rule and arguing that the rule was adopted in response to an overstated fear 
of forum manipulation by plaintiffs); Jayne S. Ressler, Removing Removal’s Unanimity 
Rule, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1391, 1430-31 (2013) (criticizing the codification of the rule of 
unanimity because it provides an opportunity for forum manipulation by plaintiffs); Nathan 
A. Lennon, Note, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back: Congress Has Codified the Tedford 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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JVCA provisions revising removal/remand procedure,
8
 this Article focuses 
on the JVCA’s bad faith exception to the bar on removal of diversity cases 
more than one year after commencement in state court.  
Prior to the JVCA amendment, § 1446(b) prohibited removal of a case 
on the basis of diversity jurisdiction more than one year after 
commencement of the case in state court.
9
 The one-year bar was intended to 
minimize the inefficiency created when cases are removed after substantial 
progress in state courts, which requires a second judge to become familiar 
with the case and often results in delay of final resolution.
10
 In addition to 
curtailing the inefficiency caused by late removals, the one-year bar made it 
possible for some plaintiffs to prevent removal within the one-year period 
by manipulating removal jurisdiction. A plaintiff, for example, might 
conceal the true amount in controversy in a case involving complete 
diversity until expiration of the one-year period or sue a diverse defendant 
and join a non-diverse or in-state defendant and refuse to settle with or 
dismiss the jurisdictional spoiler until after expiration of the one-year 
period.
11
 Although some federal courts recognized an equitable exception to 
the one-year bar, most determined that the one-year bar was jurisdictional 
rather than procedural, and therefore not subject to an equitable exception.
12
  
In an effort to prevent or at least curtail plaintiffs’ forum manipulation 
and to reduce litigation over forum,
13
 Congress passed the JVCA and 
amended § 1446 to prohibit removal of a case on the basis of diversity 
jurisdiction more than one year after commencement “unless the district 
court finds that the plaintiff acted in bad faith in order to prevent a 
defendant from removing the action.”
14
 Ironically, and in keeping with the 
law of unintended consequences,
15
 the JVCA’s bad faith exception to the 
                                                                                                                 
Equitable Exception, but Will Inconsistent Applications of “Bad Faith” Swallow the Rules?, 
40 N. KY. L. REV. 233, 243 (2013) (pointing out that the statute does not define bad faith and 
that district courts will almost certainly apply the exception inconsistently). 
 8. See infra notes 97-106 and accompanying text discussing the various JVCA 
amendments in greater detail. 
 9. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (Supp. IV. 2010) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c) 
(2012)). 
 10. See infra notes 24-27 and accompanying text for a discussion of the legislative 
history of the one-year bar. 
 11. For a discussion of the manner in which plaintiffs have manipulated the one-year 
bar so as to prevent removal, see infra notes 129-58 and accompanying text. 
 12. See infra notes 35-50 and accompanying text. 
 13. See infra notes 60-90 and accompanying text. 
 14. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c) (2012). 
 15.  
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bar on removal of diversity cases more than one year after commencement 
has not reduced wasteful litigation over jurisdiction. Instead, it did just the 
opposite: it increased inefficient litigation over forum while only 
marginally preventing plaintiffs’ bad-faith forum manipulation. Moreover, 
it created a perverse incentive for defendants to manipulate the forum by 
wrongfully removing cases based upon the exception for the purpose of 
delaying the eventual resolution of the litigation in state court while forcing 
plaintiffs to expend greater resources.
16
 Of the 160 cases analyzed by the 
author that have been removed to federal district court based upon the 
JVCA’s bad faith exception, the district court found bad-faith forum 
manipulation by the plaintiff in only twenty-four cases.
17
 The other 136 
                                                                                                                 
The law of unintended consequences, often cited but rarely defined, is that 
actions of people—and especially of government—always have effects that are 
unanticipated or ‘unintended.’ Economists and other social scientists have 
heeded its power for centuries; for just as long, politicians and popular opinion 
have largely ignored it. 
Rob Norton, Unintended Consequences, LIBRARY OF ECON. & LIBERTY, http://www.econlib. 
org/library/Enc1/UnintendedConsequences.html (last visited July 6, 2018). 
 16. See Theodore Eisenberg and Trevor W. Morrison, Overlooked in the Tort Reform 
Debate: The Growth of Erroneous Removal, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 551, 553 (2005) 
(observing that defendants may remove cases to force their less well-financed opponents to 
incur additional litigation expense); Christopher Terranova, Erroneous Removal as a Tool 
for Silent Tort Reform: An Empirical Analysis of Fee Awards and Fraudulent Joinder, 44 
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 799, 799-800 (2008) (discussing a study which indicated that 
defendants are much more likely to remove cases involving individual plaintiffs rather than 
corporate plaintiffs, “perhaps because such plaintiffs suffer more from delay and added 
cost”). Defendants also benefit from delays in the resolution of tort litigation because they 
are generally not required to pay interest on non-economic damages. 
 17. The author conducted a Westlaw search on August 8, 2018, of all federal district 
court opinions: (i) containing the terms “bad faith” and “1446(c)”; and (ii) decided between 
January 7, 2013 and June 30, 2018. The search yielded 634 cases. Table A includes 136 
opinions in which the district court remanded the case back to state court after finding 
insufficient evidence that the plaintiff manipulated removal jurisdiction in bad faith. The 136 
cases include cases in which the JVCA did not apply because the case was commenced 
before January 7, 2012; however, the district court applied the Tedford equitable exception 
(discussed at infra notes 35-50 and accompanying text) and made findings regarding the 
removing defendant’s allegation of plaintiff’s bad-faith forum manipulation. In addition, two 
of the 136 opinions involved multiple removals of separate mesh implant cases. In re Boston 
Sci. Corp., No. CV-15-06764 et al., 2015 WL 6456528, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2015) 
(remanding sixty-two separate cases) (Case No. 78 in Table A); In re Boston Sci. Corp., No. 
CV-15-6666-PA et al., 2015 WL 5822582, at *1, *5 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2015) (remanding 
102 separate cases) (Case No. 79 in Table A). Rather than treat these as 164 remanded cases, 
the author has treated them as two remanded cases for purposes of the statistical analysis. 
Table B includes twenty-four cases in which the district court denied the plaintiff’s motion 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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cases were remanded back to state court based upon insufficient evidence 
of plaintiff’s bad-faith forum manipulation. In other words, eighty-five 
percent of the cases removed based upon alleged bad faith were eventually 
remanded to state court.
18
  
Robert Merton, an American sociologist, first articulated the law of 
unintended consequences in his article entitled “The Unanticipated 
Consequences of Purposive Social Action.”
19
 Merton categorized 
unintended consequences as beneficial, merely detrimental, or perverse.
20
 
He further identified a desire for immediate action and ignorance as two 
causes of unintended consequences.
21
 A desire for an immediate response to 
a perceived problem may compel a person or a governing body to act or 
legislate based upon incomplete information.
22
 Acting upon incomplete 
information, ignorant to all of the facts, makes it difficult, if not impossible, 
to accurately predict and anticipate unintended consequences.
23
  
Congress, acting out of a desire to curtail plaintiffs’ manipulation of the 
one-year bar, and protect diverse defendants’ right to remove, enacted the 
bad faith exception to the one-year bar without fully considering or 
exploring its efficacy or the manner in which such an exception would 
                                                                                                                 
to remand based upon a finding of bad-faith forum manipulation. Table C includes 179 cases 
that were removed more than one year after commencement but were decided on grounds 
other than the bad-faith exception to the one-year bar. Table D includes 283 cases that did 
not involve removal based upon diversity jurisdiction more than one year after 
commencement. Table E includes twelve cases that did not fall into any of the above four 
categories. Of the 160 cases in which the district court made findings regarding the 
plaintiff’s bad-faith forum manipulation, the district courts found insufficient evidence of 
such manipulation in 136 cases. January 7, 2013 was the first possible date on which the 
bad-faith exception could be triggered because the JVCA applies to cases commenced in 
state court on or after January 7, 2012. See infra note 94. 
 18. Prior to the enactment of the one-year bar, this author conducted a similar study of 
cases removed based upon the Tedford equitable exception. That study indicated that more 
than eighty-three percent of cases removed based upon the exception were remanded back to 
state court. See Percy, The Tedford Equitable Exception, supra note 5, at 178-83. 
 19. Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive Social Action, 1 
AM. SOC. REV. 894 (1936); see also Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Need for Truly Systemic 
Analysis of Proposals for the Reform of Both Pretrial Practice and Evidentiary Rules: The 
Role of the Law of Unintended Consequences in "Litigation" Reform, 32 REV. LITIG. 201, 
214 (2013); Norton, supra note 15. 
 20. Merton, supra note 19, at 895; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 19, at 214; Norton, 
supra note 15. 
 21. Merton, supra note 19, at 900; see also Imwinkelried, supra note 19, at 214-15; 
Norton, supra note 15. 
 22. See Imwinkelried, supra note 19, at 214-15. 
 23. Id. 
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encourage defendants to engage in improper forum manipulation by 
wrongfully removing cases based upon the exception. Now that the bad 
faith exception has been in effect for more than six years, it is possible and 
prudent to evaluate its effectiveness. Part I of this Article examines the 
legislative history of the one-year bar and the JVCA’s bad faith exception 
to the one-year bar. Part II reviews removal/remand law and explores the 
primary methods by which plaintiffs manipulate jurisdiction in order to 
improperly prevent removal. Part III reviews the manner in which courts 
have interpreted and applied the bad faith exception to the various types of 
plaintiff forum manipulation. Part IV critiques the bad faith exception and 
considers whether it effectively prevents plaintiffs’ bad-faith forum 
manipulation. The Article concludes by arguing that Congress should 
eliminate the bad faith exception because: (1) it increases inefficient 
litigation over forum; (2) it only marginally protects diverse defendants’ 
right to remove; (3) it creates perverse incentives for plaintiffs to retain 
jurisdictional spoilers past the one-year mark and engage in meaningless 
discovery for the sole purpose of satisfying the inquiry into whether they 
have actively litigated the claim against the spoiler; (4) it lacks definitional 
clarity and so invites defendants to erroneously remove for strategic gain; 
(5) it creates perverse incentives for defendants to engage in bad-faith 
forum manipulation by removing based upon frivolous allegations that the 
exception applies; (6) it allows defendants to strategically remove once 
litigation in state court takes an unfavorable turn; and (7) it is largely 
unnecessary given that most plaintiff forum manipulation is either evident 
from the outset of litigation or can be discovered within the one-year 
period.  
I. The Origins of the One-Year Bar and the Bad Faith Exception 
A. The One-Year Bar 
The bar on removal of diversity cases more than one year after 
commencement in state court was added to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) in 1988 
when Congress enacted the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice 
Act.
24
 The one-year bar was part of an overall effort to reduce the federal 
caseload and to prohibit removal “after substantial progress has been made 
in state court.”
25
 The amendment sought to curb the inefficiency of 
                                                                                                                 
 24. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988). 
 25. H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 44-45, 72 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5982, 
6005, 6033. Although the Judicial Conference originally proposed abolishing diversity 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
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requiring a second judge to become familiar with a case after a state court 
judge’s significant involvement and to avoid the wasteful “delay and 
disruption” that late removals cause, particularly removals of cases nearing 
or in the midst of trial.
26
 At the time of enactment, Congress was aware that 
the one-year bar would invite plaintiffs to engage in tactical gamesmanship 
in an effort to defeat removal but determined that the administrative and 




B. Gamesmanship by Plaintiffs 
In contemporary civil litigation, whether a federal district court may 
properly exercise jurisdiction over a case that has been removed from state 
court based upon diversity is “[o]ne the most hotly contested procedural 
issues,”
28
 as evidenced by the extent of removal/remand litigation in federal 
district courts.
29
 The intensity with which plaintiffs and defendants litigate 
the issue of forum is due to the actual and perceived benefits plaintiffs can 
derive by keeping their case in state court and defendants can derive by 
successfully removing to federal court.
30
 Given the stakes at issue, it is not 
                                                                                                                 
jurisdiction, the 1988 Act curtailed diversity jurisdiction by raising the jurisdictional amount 
from $10,000 to $50,000. Id. at 25, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5985-86. 
 26. Id. at 44-45, 72, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 6005, 6033. 
The amendment addresses problems that arise from a change of parties as an 
action progresses toward trial in state court. The elimination of parties may 
create for the first time a party alignment that supports diversity jurisdiction. 
Under section 1446(b), removal is possible whenever this event occurs, so long 
as the change of parties was voluntary as to the plaintiff. Settlement with a 
diversity-destroying defendant on the eve of trial, for example, may permit the 
remaining defendants to remove. 
Id. at 72, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6032-33; see Percy, The Tedford Equitable 
Exception, supra note 5, at 156. 
 27. See Burns v. Windsor Ins., 31 F.3d 1092, 1097 n.12 (11th Cir. 1994) (“Congress has 
recognized and accepted that, in some circumstances, plaintiff[s] can and will intentionally 
avoid federal jurisdiction.”). 
 28. Michael W. Lewis, Comedy or Tragedy: The Tale of Diversity Jurisdiction Removal 
and the One-Year Bar, 62 SMU L. REV. 201, 206 (2009). 
 29. See Percy, Making a Federal Case of It, supra note 5, at 191-93; see also Hellman, 
Another Voice, supra note 1, at 768 (arguing that removal/remand litigation is so frequent 
that the “law and strategy of removal should be a pervasive part of a Federal Courts 
course”). 
 30. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal 
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. 
REV. 581, 599 (1998) (discussing empirical research indicating that defendants experience 
an actual benefit in cases removed based upon diversity in comparison to cases originally 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss3/2
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surprising that plaintiffs and defendants engage in various strategies to 
secure the more favorable forum. Plaintiffs will structure their cases in an 
attempt to avoid removal,
31
 and defendants will remove cases and oppose 
plaintiffs’ motions to remand, even when there is no basis for removal 
jurisdiction.
32
 Although forum shopping may be viewed as “tactical 
chicanery” by some,
33
 many argue that forum shopping in a manner 
consistent with governing law is not only permissible, but expected and 
responsible.
34
 The difficulty lies in drawing the line between permissible 
and responsible forum shopping versus impermissible and unfair forum 
shopping. 
C. The Tedford Equitable Exception 
In 2003, when deciding Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co.,
35
 the Fifth 
Circuit recognized an equitable exception to the one-year bar in cases 
                                                                                                                 
filed in federal court based upon diversity); Lewis, supra note 28, at 206 (“[B]oth the 
plaintiff and the defense sides of the bar generally believe that defendants derive a 
significant advantage by removing a case to federal court.”); Paul Rosenthal, Improper 
Joinder: Confronting Plaintiff’s Attempts to Destroy Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 59 
AM. U. L. REV. 49, 55 (2009) (“Forum selection is often the most important strategic 
decision a party makes in a lawsuit.”). Defendants’ and plaintiffs’ shared perception of a 
difference in outcome likely produces a real difference in outcome given that settlement 
agreements are influenced by perceived advantages or disadvantages of the forum. See 
Percy, Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act, supra note 5, at 213; Rosenthal, supra, at 50-51. 
 31. See Erik B. Walker, Keep Your Case in State Court, TRIAL, Sept. 2004, at 22 
(instructing plaintiffs’ lawyers regarding methods to resist removal and keep litigation in 
state court). 
 32. See Lewis, supra note 28, at 228-29 (acknowledging that defendants are 
incentivized to wrongfully remove cases “on the gamblers’ chance” that removal might be 
successful).  
 33. David D. Siegel, Commentary on 1988 Revision of Section 1446, 28 U.S.C.A. § 
1446 (West 1996) (commenting that the one-year bar may “invite tactical chicanery”). 
 34. See Rosenthal, supra note 30, at 56-57; see also Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? 
What’s Wrong with That?, 24 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 25, 25-26, 60 (2005) (arguing that lawyers 
should engage in permissible forum selection); Georgene M. Vairo, Is Selection Shopping?, 
NAT’L L.J., Sept. 18, 2000, at A16 (arguing that forum shopping is only improper when the 
choice of forum is “frivolous”); see also Forrest v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-01855-
JAR, 2017 WL 3087675, at *2 (E.D. Mo. July 20, 2017) (stating that even though 
“[p]laintiffs clearly sought to secure an advantageous forum in the state court and joined 
certain Plaintiffs for the very purpose of avoiding federal jurisdiction over this case,” such 
joinder was not in bad faith because it was permissible under existing law) (Case No. 25 in 
Table A); Aguayo v. AMCO Ins. Co., 59 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1273 (D.N.M. 2014) (“There is 
nothing wrong with plaintiffs having a preference for state court, nor is there anything 
invidious or ‘bad faith’ about using deliberate tactics to defeat federal jurisdiction.”). 
 35. 327 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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where the plaintiff manipulated removal jurisdiction.
36
 There, plaintiffs 
Jaretta Tedford and Maria Castro filed suit in Texas state court seeking to 
recover for injuries caused by their ingestion of the prescription drug, 
Rezulin.
37
 The plaintiffs named Warner-Lambert, the diverse drug 
manufacturer, and Dr. Johnson, a non-diverse and in-state physician who 
had treated Castro but not Tedford.
38
 Warner-Lambert moved to sever 
Tedford’s claims from Castro’s claims and to transfer Tedford’s claims to a 
court in her county of residence.
39
 Aware that Warner-Lambert intended to 
remove once the claims were severed, Tedford amended her complaint to 
add Dr. DeLuca, a non-diverse and in-state physician who had prescribed 
Rezulin to Tedford.
40
 The state court severed the claims and transferred 
Tedford’s claims to another state court.
41
 Upon transfer, and before 
expiration of the one-year period for removal, Warner-Lambert removed, 
arguing that Tedford had fraudulently joined DeLuca.
42
 The federal district 
court granted Tedford’s motion to remand, presumably finding that DeLuca 
had not been fraudulently joined.
43
  
Two days after the expiration of the one-year period, Tedford filed a 
Notice of Nonsuit of Dr. DeLuca, which she had executed and transmitted 
to DeLuca two days prior to the expiration of the one-year period.
44
 
Warner-Lambert removed the case to federal district court a second time, 
alleging that Tedford had wrongfully manipulated removal jurisdiction.
45
 
Tedford argued that the timing of her dismissal of DeLuca was due to 1) her 
desire to keep a preferential trial date to which Warner-Lambert had agreed 
but to which DeLuca had objected and 2) her counsel’s consultation with 
DeLuca’s counsel regarding DeLuca’s lack of moral culpability.
46
 The 
                                                                                                                 
 36. Id. at 428-29. 
 37. Id. at 424. 
 38. Id. at 424-25. 
 39. Id. at 425. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id.  
 42. Id. In order to determine whether a plaintiff has fraudulently joined a non-diverse 
defendant, district courts within the Fifth Circuit must determine whether the plaintiff has a 
reasonable possibility of recovering from the non-diverse defendant. Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. 
R.R., 385 F.3d 568, 573 (5th Cir. 2004). For a discussion of the different fraudulent joinder 
tests used by courts, see Percy, Making a Federal Case of It, supra note 5, at 220-24. 
 43. Tedford, 327 F.3d at 425. 
 44. Id. at 427-28. 
 45. Id. at 425.  
 46. See Brief of Appellant at 4-5, Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423 (5th 
Cir. 2003) (No. 02-1-582). Tedford also claimed that, although she had signed the nonsuit 
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district court denied Tedford’s motion to remand, finding an equitable 
exception to the one-year period.
47
  
On appeal, the Fifth Circuit observed that “[s]trict application of the one-
year limit would encourage plaintiffs to join non-diverse defendants for 366 
days simply to avoid federal court, thereby undermining the very purpose of 
diversity jurisdiction.”
48
 Noting that it had previously determined the one-
year bar was procedural rather than jurisdictional, the Fifth Circuit 
determined that legislative amendment was unnecessary and explicitly 
recognized an equitable exception to the one-year bar in cases where the 
“plaintiff has attempted to manipulate the statutory rules for determining 
federal removal jurisdiction.”
49
 Although the Fifth Circuit and other federal 
courts found the one-year bar procedural and subject to an equitable 
exception, the large majority of federal courts interpreted the one-year bar 
as jurisdictional, and therefore not subject to an equitable exception.
50
 
D. The ALI Proposal 
In 2004, the American Law Institute proposed numerous revisions to the 
Judicial Code.
51
 It concluded that the one-year bar “invites contrivance to 
frustrate defendants’ legitimate rights of removal by a variety of stratagems, 
and may operate unfairly even when the plaintiff has good-faith reasons to 
use litigation tactics that render an action temporarily nonremovable.”
52
 The 
ALI recommended that the one-year bar be completely removed from § 
1446(b) and that § 1447(b) be amended to provide that, if a case is removed 
based upon diversity more than one year after commencement, then “the 
district court may in the interest of justice remand the action to the State 
court from which it was removed.”
53
 The ALI proposal would have 
                                                                                                                 
before expiration of the one-year period, DeLuca did not immediately agree to sign it and 
did so only after negotiation. Id. at 22 & n.6. 
 47. Tedford, 327 F.3d at 424. The federal district court certified its order for 
interlocutory appeal. Id.  
 48. Id. at 427.  
 49. Id. at 428-29. The Fifth Circuit approvingly cited the American Law Institute’s draft 
proposal to amend the removal statutes so as to entirely eliminate the one-year limitation but 
grant district courts discretion to remand cases that are removed more than one year after 
commencement “in the ‘interest of justice.’” Id. (quoting FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION 
PROJECT 157–58 (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft No. 3 1999). For a discussion of the ALI’s 
final proposal, see infra notes 51-59 and accompanying text. 
 50. See Percy, The Tedford Equitable Exception, supra note 5, at 160-66. 
 51. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CODE REVISION PROJECT (AM. LAW INST. 2004) [hereinafter AM. 
LAW INST., JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT].  
 52. Id. at 466.  
 53. Id. at 463, 466. 
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required a plaintiff to file a motion to remand “in the interest of justice” 
within thirty days of removal.
54
 The ALI acknowledged that the “in the 
interest of justice” standard would grant district courts broad equitable 
discretion,
55
 but argued that district courts could look to cases construing 
the “in the interest of justice” standards in § 1404 and § 1406 of the venue 
transfer statutes for guidance on construing the proposed revision.
56
 District 
court opinions interpreting the “in the interest of justice” standard in the 
venue statutes, however, have failed to produce a uniform and predictable 
standard and have invited meritless motions to transfer venue that only 
serve to delay litigation on the merits.
57
 The ALI also suggested that district 
courts should consider “all the circumstances pertaining to the case,” 
including “federalism concerns and efficient judicial administration as well 
as the conduct and convenience interests of the parties.”
58
 The ALI proposal 
failed to indicate how such factors should be weighed and failed to 
articulate what conduct of the parties should be considered. Nor did it 
indicate whether the plaintiff’s conduct had to amount to bad-faith forum 
manipulation.
59
   
E. The Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act 
At the same time the ALI was working on its proposed revisions to the 
Judicial Code, the Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction of the Judicial 
Conference of the United States made recommendations to clarify existing 
law and “increase judicial efficiency.”
60
 The committee recommended 
seven specific revisions, including “creat[ing] an exception to the current 
one-year period for removal upon a showing of plaintiff’s deliberate non-
disclosure of the amount in controversy.”
61
 In November 2005, a House 
                                                                                                                 
 54. Id. at 463-64. 
 55. Id. at 471.  
 56. Id. at 467. Section 1404(a) authorizes a district court to transfer venue to any other 
district where the case could have been brought “for the convenience of the parties and 
witnesses” and “in the interest of justice.” 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2012). Section 1406(a) 
authorizes a district court to transfer a case lacking venue to a district where the case could 
have been brought “in the interest of justice.” Id. § 1406(a). 
 57. See Percy, The Tedford Equitable Exception, supra note 5, at 169. 
 58. AM. LAW INST., JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT, supra note 51, at 471. 
 59. For a more extensive critique of the ALI proposal, see Percy, The Tedford Equitable 
Exception, supra note 5, at 166-70. 
 60. ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, REPORT OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES 22 (2003).  
 61. Id. at 23. 
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Judiciary Subcommittee held a hearing on legislation that included the 
revisions proposed by the Judicial Conference.
62
 Three witnesses testified.  
In her prepared statement introduced into the record, Judge Janet C. Hall, 
a member of the Committee on Federal-State Jurisdiction, stated that the 
exception to the one-year bar would resolve the spilt among courts over 
whether the bar was jurisdictional or procedural and would allow courts to 
recognize an exception based upon equitable factors.
63
 When questioned 
whether the one-year bar should be abolished, Judge Hall responded that 
the one-year bar was desirable to avoid removal of cases well underway in 
state court and that recognizing an exception would best address forum 
manipulation.
64
 Getting to the salient issue, Representative Schiff asked 
whether there was any middle ground between recognizing an equitable 
exception that was likely to create satellite litigation over forum and the 
bright-line rule created by the one-year bar.
65
 Judge Hall responded that the 
contours of the equitable exception could be derived from existing case law, 
pointing to a similar exception to statutes of limitation.
66
 
Richard Samp, Chief Counsel of the Washington Legal Foundation, also 
testified about plaintiffs’ stratagems to improperly defeat removal 
jurisdiction but cautioned that an equitable exception to the one-year bar 
would “lead to innumerable fights over what constitutes equitable 
considerations” and advocated abolishing the one-year bar.
67
 
Law professor Arthur Hellman testified regarding the way the one-year 
bar encouraged gamesmanship but suggested that the best way to eliminate 
the gamesmanship was to completely do away with the one-year bar.
68
 He 
indicated that creating an exception to the one-year bar would only be a 
“modest improvement on current law.”
69
 In his prepared statement, 
Hellman indicated that an exception focusing on plaintiff’s bad-faith 
manipulation would encourage defendants to “paint plaintiffs’ litigation 
tactics in the blackest colors” and would require courts to assess the 
“blameworthiness of counsel’s actions.”
70
 He argued that neither exercise 
                                                                                                                 
 62. Federal Courts Jurisdiction Clarification Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Courts, the Internet, and Intellectual Property of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th 
Cong. (2005). 
 63. Id. at 12 (prepared statement of Judge Hall). 
 64. Id. at 59-60 (testimony of Judge Hall). 
 65. Id. at 67 (question of Rep. Schiff).  
 66. Id. (testimony of Judge Hall). 
 67. Id. at 50-51 (testimony of Richard Samp). 
 68. Id. at 16 (testimony of Professor Hellman). 
 69. Id.  
 70. Id. at 33 (prepared statement of Professor Hellman). 
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was a “good use of judicial resources nor a good way of starting a 
litigation.”
71
 Hellman predicted that the exception would create satellite 
litigation over forum.
72
 In addition, Hellman supported the use of 
declarations regarding the amount in controversy as one way to effectively 
reduce the gamesmanship encouraged by the one-year bar.
73
  
After the hearing, the Judicial Subcommittee promulgated an early 
version of the JVCA, but the bill was not reported out of committee.
74
 
Another version of the bill was introduced in the House in November 
2009.
75
 The bill was intended to “bring more clarity to the operation of 
jurisdictional statutes” because the current law forces judges “to waste time 
determining jurisdictional issues at the expense of adjudicating the 
underlying litigation.”
76
 The bill would have amended § 1446 to retain the 
one-year bar “unless equitable considerations warrant removal,” and to 
specify that “[s]uch equitable considerations include whether the plaintiff 
has acted in bad faith, whether the defendant has acted diligently in seeking 
to remove the action, and whether the case has progressed in State court to 
a point where removal would be disruptive.”
77
 The bill further provided that 
in diversity cases removed more than one year after commencement, “a 
finding is made that the plaintiff deliberately failed to disclose the actual 
amount in controversy to prevent removal . . . shall be deemed an equitable 
consideration . . . that warrants removal.”
78
  
The bill also attempted to alleviate some of the difficulty in determining 
the amount in controversy. The bill authorized the use of declarations.
79
 It 
provided that, if a plaintiff files a binding declaration in state court within 
the complaint or in addition to the complaint stipulating that the plaintiff 
will not seek or accept an award greater than $75,000, then the case should 
                                                                                                                 
 71. Id.  
 72. Id. at 35. 
 73. Id. at 43. 
 74. Federal Courts Jurisdiction Clarification Act of 2006, H.R. 5440, 109th Cong. (as 
introduced in House, May 22, 2006). 
 75. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2009, H.R. 4113, 111th 
Cong. (as introduced on Nov. 19, 2009). 
 76. 156 CONG. REC. H7163 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010) (statement by Rep. Smith, who 
sponsored the bill). 
 77. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2009, H.R. 4113, 111th 
Cong. § 105(b)(3)(D) (as introduced on Nov. 19, 2009).  
 78. Id. § 105(b)(5)(B).  
 79. Id. § 104(a). 
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not be removed as long as the plaintiff abides by the declaration.
80
 The bill 
further provided that, in cases where the plaintiff in good faith demands a 
specific sum below the amount in controversy requirement and state law 
forbids recovery of an amount greater than the amount demanded, “the 
[amount] demanded shall be deemed to be the amount in controversy.”
81
 In 
cases in which the plaintiff does not demand a specific sum or demands a 
specific sum but state law permits recovery of damages in excess of the 
amount demanded, the defendant may remove but will be required to prove 
the amount in controversy by a preponderance of the evidence.
82
  
The House Judiciary Committee held no hearings or mark-up sessions on 
the bill due to the “press of legislative business.”
83
 Instead, the committee 
“work[ed] closely with the judiciary and various stakeholders” to review 
and amend the bill informally.
84
 An amended version of the bill passed the 
House in September 2010,
85
 which limited removal after one year to cases 
in which the “plaintiff has acted in bad faith in order to prevent a defendant 
from removing the action.”
86
 The bill was then referred to the Senate 




The bill was reintroduced in January 2011 in largely the same form as 
had been approved by the House in 2010.
88
 Again, the Judiciary Committee 
did not conduct hearings or formally evaluate the bill, instead relying upon 
the informal vetting of the earlier bill.
89
 Although there was little debate, 
the three representatives who spoke prior to the vote each indicated that the 
bill was intended to reduce litigation over forum so that judges could focus 
                                                                                                                 
 80. Id. The bill also authorized a plaintiff to file a declaration in the federal district court 
within thirty days of removal. See id. § 104(b). 
 81. Id. § 105(b)(4). 
 82. Id. 
 83. 156 CONG. REC. H7163 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010) (statement by Rep. Smith, who 
sponsored the bill). 
 84. Id. 
 85. 156 CONG. REC. H7161-64 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010) (debate on and passage of bill 
by House).  
 86. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2010, H.R. 4113, 111th 
Cong. § 103(b)(2)(C) (as voted on by the House on Sept. 28, 2010). 
 87. 156 CONG. REC. S7783 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 2010) (receipt of bill in Senate and 
reference to Senate Judiciary Committee). 
 88. Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, H.R. 394, 112th 
Cong. (as introduced on Jan. 24, 2011). 
 89. See H.R. REP. NO. 112–10, at 2 (2011). 
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on the merits of the litigation.
90
 The Committee did not discuss the concern 
raised at the hearing on the earlier version of the bill that the exception 
would create satellite litigation over forum while only modestly curtailing 
forum manipulation.
91
 The bill was approved by the House in February 
2011,
92
 passed by the Senate in November 2011,
93
 and signed into law on 
December 7, 2011. The bad faith exception applies to cases commenced in 
state court on or after January 7, 2012.
94
 
As amended by the JVCA, § 1446(c)(1) provides that a case may not be 
removed based upon diversity more than one year after commencement 
“unless the district court finds that the plaintiff has acted in bad faith in 
order to prevent a defendant from removing the action.”
95
 Section 
1446(c)(3)(B) provides that, if “the district court finds that the plaintiff 
deliberately failed to disclose the actual amount in controversy to prevent 
removal, that finding shall be deemed bad faith.”
96
 In addition to creating 
the bad faith exception to the one-year bar, the JCVA also made other 
changes to removal/remand law.
97
 The JVCA amendments regarding the 
                                                                                                                 
 90. “The . . . Act brings more clarity to the operation of jurisdictional statutes and 
facilitates the identification of the appropriate State or Federal court where actions should be 
brought. Judges believe the current rules force them to waste time determining jurisdictional 
issues at the expense of adjudicating the underlying litigation.” 157 CONG. REC. H1369 
(daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010) (statement by Rep. Smith, who sponsored the bill). “The 
legislation addresses the inefficient rules which judges have identified [that require them to] 
spend considerable time deliberating jurisdictional issues instead of analyzing the case’s 
facts and applicable laws.” Id. at H1369 (statement by Rep. Johnson). Representative Lee 
also suggested that the “efficient administration of justice” would be facilitated by clear 
rules that require judges to spend less time determining jurisdictional issues so that they may 
focus on the merits of the case before them. Id. at H1369 (statement by Rep. Lee). 
 91. 157 CONG. REC. H1367-70 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010). See supra notes 67-73 and 
accompanying text for a discussion of the concerns about satellite litigation. 
 92. 157 CONG. REC. H1367 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011). 
 93. 157 CONG. REC. S8074 (daily ed. Nov. 30, 2011) (Senate approving bill after 
technical amendments).  
 94. See Federal Courts Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 
112-63, § 205(2)(B), 125 Stat. 758, 765. 
 95. Id. § 103(b)(3)(C), 125 Stat. at 760. 
 96. Id. 
 97. With respect to removal of civil cases, the JVCA revised the formerly problematic 
“separate and independent” claim provision of § 1441(c). Pursuant to the amended version 
of § 1441(c), a case involving a federal question claim and an unrelated state claim may be 
removed in its entirety, after which the district court shall sever and remand the state claim. 
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (2012). The JVCA also addressed removal of civil cases involving 
multiple defendants by codifying the rule of unanimity requiring all properly joined and 
served defendants to join in the removal and by adopting the “last-served defendant” rule for 
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amount in controversy are pertinent to an evaluation of the bad faith 
exception because the amendments impact the degree to which plaintiffs 
may manipulate the amount in controversy to prevent removal. As amended 
by the JVCA, § 1446(c)(2) provides that the sum demanded in good faith in 
the complaint establishes the amount in controversy unless: (i) the plaintiff 
also seeks nonmonetary relief; or (ii) the plaintiff seeks monetary relief but 
state law prohibits a plaintiff from demanding a specific sum or permits 
recovery of damages in excess of the amount demanded.
98
 In the case of 
either exception, the district court must find by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
99
  
Prior to the JVCA, district courts employed a variety of standards to 
assess whether the amount in controversy requirement had been met.
100
 
Some courts required the removing defendant to prove to “a legal certainty” 
that the amount was met.
101
 Others required the defendant to prove the 
amount by “some reasonable probability.”
102
 Still others only required that 
the defendant prove that it was “not legally certain” that the amount fell 
below the amount in controversy requirement.
103
 The majority of courts 
required defendants to prove that the damages sought exceeded the 
jurisdictional threshold “by a preponderance of the evidence.”
104
 In 
codifying the “preponderance of the evidence standard,” the JVCA not only 
clarified the burden but also made removal easier in those jurisdictions that 
had previously used the “legal certainty” test.  
The JVCA also clarified that in cases not initially removable because the 
amount in controversy is uncertain, the defendant may conduct discovery in 
state court and may, subject to the one-year bar, remove a case within thirty 
days of receipt of a “pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it 
may first be ascertained that the case is one which is or has become 
removable.”
105
 Specifically, the JVCA broadened the definition of “other 
paper” to include discovery responses and information in the state court 
                                                                                                                 
purposes of establishing the thirty-day deadline for removal of cases involving defendants 
who are served on different dates. Id. § 1446(b)(2). 
 98. Id. § 1446(c)(2). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See 14C CHARLIE ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 
3725.1 (4th ed.), Westlaw (database updated Apr. 2017). 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (2012). 
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record regarding the amount in controversy.
106
 Notably, the provision that 
would have allowed the use of declarations to establish the amount in 
controversy, which would have decreased litigation over forum, was 
deleted from the legislation as part of the informal vetting process designed 
to remove provisions considered controversial by advocacy groups.
107
 
II. Removal/Remand Law and Plaintiff Forum Manipulation 
In order to effectively critique the JVCA’s bad faith exception to the 
one-year bar, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of current 
removal/remand law as well as the primary methods by which plaintiffs 
attempt to manipulate removal jurisdiction.  
A. Removal and Remand Basics for Diversity Cases 
A case may be removed from state to federal court based upon diversity 
jurisdiction if the case is within the original diversity jurisdiction of the 
federal district court and there is no properly joined and served defendant 
who is a citizen of the forum state.
108
 Pursuant to § 1332 of the Judicial 
Code, federal district courts have original diversity jurisdiction over cases 
between citizens of different states where the amount in controversy 
exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs.
109
 The statute has long 
been interpreted to require complete diversity.
110
  
In order to effect removal, all properly joined and served defendants 
must join in the notice of removal.
111
 The notice is to be filed in the federal 
district court in the district in which the state court case is pending and must 
contain a short and plain statement of the grounds for removal and must be 
signed in accordance with Rule 11.
112
 The Supreme Court has held that a 
defendant’s notice of removal must only contain “a plausible allegation that 
the amount in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional threshold.”
113
 If the 
                                                                                                                 
 106. Id. § 1446(c)(3)(A); see also H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 16 (2011) (explaining that the 
JVCA clarifies that a defendant can pursue discovery in state court in order to establish the 
amount in controversy). 
 107. See H.R. REP. NO. 112–10, at 2-3; see also Baude, supra note 7, at 38 (stating that 
binding declarations would have been a “welcome reform”). 
 108. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), (b). 
 109. Id. § 1332. 
 110. See Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267, 267 (1806). 
 111. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A). 
 112. Id. § 1446(a). Pursuant to Rule 11, the attorney’s or party’s signature on the notice 
of removal certifies that there is some evidentiary and non-frivolous legal basis for the 
removal. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
 113. Dart Cherokee Basin Operating Co. v. Owens, 135 S. Ct. 547, 554 (2014). 
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plaintiff or the court challenges the defendant’s allegation regarding the 
amount in controversy, the defendant must submit evidence establishing 
that the threshold amount is met.
114
 After filing the notice of removal in the 
district court, the defendant(s) must file the notice with the state court clerk 
and serve the notice on adverse parties.
115
 Removal is effective upon the 
filing of the notice with the state court clerk, at which point the state court 
is deprived of jurisdiction.
116
  
If the case stated by the initial pleading is removable, then the 
defendant(s) shall file the notice of removal within thirty days of receipt of 
the initial pleading.
117
 If the case stated by the initial pleading is not 
removable, but the case later becomes removable, then the defendant(s) 
shall file the notice of removal within thirty days of receipt of the pleading, 
motion, order or other paper that reveals removability.
118
 The JVCA 
clarified that such “other papers” that might reveal removability include 
information in the state court record regarding the amount in controversy 
and discovery responses obtained while the case was pending in state 
court.
119
 Pursuant to the “voluntary/involuntary” rule, a case may become 
removable by a plaintiff’s voluntary act, such as dismissing the sole non-
diverse defendant.
120
 A case does not become removable if the non-diverse 




Plaintiffs may move for remand based upon lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction at any time before a final judgment but must move for remand 
based upon other defects, including procedural defects, within thirty days of 
the filing of the notice of removal.
122
 In recognizing the bad faith exception 
                                                                                                                 
 114. Id. Title 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2)(B) provides that removal is proper based upon a 
defendant’s assertion that the threshold amount is met “if the district court finds, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy [requirement is met].”  
 115. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d). 
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. § 1446(b)(1). 
 118. Id. § 1446(b)(3). 
 119. Id. § 1446(c)(3)(A); H.R. REP. NO. 112–10, at 16 (2011). 
 120. See Percy, Making a Federal Case of It, supra note 5, at 207 (discussing the origins, 
justifications for, and application of the “voluntary/involuntary” rule). 
 121. See id. at 210-11. Pursuant to the voluntary/involuntary rule, courts have remanded 
cases involving complete diversity created by involuntary dismissals, such as (i) summary 
judgment in favor of the jurisdictional spoiler; (ii) directed verdict in favor of the spoiler; 
(iii) dismissal of the spoiler for failure to state a claim; and (iv) dismissal of the spoiler based 
upon the statute of limitations. Id. 
 122. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). The requirement of complete diversity is jurisdictional. The 
requirement that the amount in controversy exceed $75,000, exclusive of interest and cost, is 
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to the one-year bar, Congress intended to clarify that the one-year bar was 
procedural rather than jurisdictional.
123
 
As the party invoking federal jurisdiction, the defendant bears the burden 
of proving jurisdiction.
124
 Given that federal courts are courts of limited 
jurisdiction and because of the federalism concerns that are raised when a 
federal court exercises removal jurisdiction based upon diversity, removal 
statutes are strictly construed.
125
 Based upon similar reasoning, many courts 
recognize a presumption against removal and hold that any doubt with 
respect to removal jurisdiction should result in remand.
126
 If a case is 
remanded, then the district court may order the removing defendant to pay 
the plaintiff’s attorney fees and costs upon finding that the defendant lacked 
an “objectively reasonable basis” for removal.
127
  
B. Forum Manipulation by Plaintiffs 
The primary methods by which plaintiffs manipulate removal 
jurisdiction are: (1) by improperly joining and retaining a non-diverse or in-
state defendant; and (2) by obfuscating or concealing the fact that the 
amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
128
 Admittedly, the absolute one-
year bar made it easier for plaintiffs to manipulate removal jurisdiction 
because plaintiffs could avoid removal as long as their manipulation was 
                                                                                                                 
jurisdictional. The requirement that all properly joined and served defendants join in the 
removal is procedural, as is the thirty-day period in which to remove.  
 123. See Aguayo v. AMCO Ins. Co., 59 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1256 (D.N.M. 2014); see also 
H.R. REP. NO. 112-10, at 15. 
 124. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (holding 
that the removing defendant must overcome the presumption against jurisdiction that arises 
because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction). 
 125. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09 (1941) (highlighting 
that federalism concerns and Congressional intent to restrict removal jurisdiction require 
strict construction of removal statutes); Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934) (holding 
that courts must strictly construe statutes conferring diversity jurisdiction in “[d]ue regard 
for the rightful independence of state governments”). Serious federalism concerns are raised 
when a federal court decides novel or ambiguous issues of state law. See Percy, The Tedford 
Equitable Exception, supra note 5, at 154-56 (arguing that diversity jurisdiction deprives 
states of their right to develop and define state common law and to apply and interpret state 
statutes and further arguing that federal courts often mis-predict state law when making Erie 
guesses).  
 126. See, e.g., Grancare, LLC v. Thrower ex rel. Mills, 889 F.3d 543, 550 (9th Cir. 
2018); Brazell v. Waite, 525 F. App’x 878, 881 (10th Cir. 2013); Russell Corp. v. Am. 
Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir. 2001). 
 127. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2012); see also Martin v. Franklin Capital Corp., 546 U.S. 
132, 141 (2005) (interpreting § 1447(c)). 
 128. Aguayo, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 1261. 
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not detected before expiration of the one-year period. For example, in cases 
having complete diversity where the true amount in controversy exceeded 
$75,000, plaintiffs could demand a sum less than the jurisdictional amount 
in the original pleading and conceal the true amount in controversy until 
after expiration of the one-year period.
129
 Likewise, plaintiffs could sue a 
diverse defendant and improperly join non-diverse or in-state defendants 
for the sole purpose of defeating removal jurisdiction and then dismiss such 
defendants after expiration of the one-year period.
130
 Plaintiffs engage in 
different types of improper joinder in an effort to defeat removal. This 
Article distinguishes between fraudulent joinder, fraudulent procedural 
misjoinder, and strategic joinder.  
1. Strategic Joinder 
Some courts have found that improper strategic joinder occurs when a 
plaintiff sues a diverse defendant and joins a non-frivolous claim against a 
non-diverse or in-state defendant without any intention of seriously 
pursuing the claim against the jurisdictional spoiler and for the sole purpose 
of defeating removal.
131 
The Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016, if 
it had passed, would have codified this type of strategic joinder as a type of 
fraudulent joinder if the district court were to find that “objective evidence 
clearly demonstrates that there is no good faith intention to prosecute the 
                                                                                                                 
 129. See, e.g., Brown v. Descheeny, No. 03:09-cv-21-HTW-LRA, 2010 WL 1141156, at 
*1 (S.D. Miss. Mar. 22, 2010) (noting the plaintiff in a collision case demanded only 
$74,000 from the defendant in the complaint, but more than two years after case was filed, 
plaintiff designated experts claiming the plaintiff had sustained permanent injuries and sent 
defendant a demand letter for $100,000); Brower v. Staley, Inc., No. 2:05CV212PA, 2006 
WL 839469, at *1-2 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 27, 2006), aff’d, 306 F. App’x 36 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(noting the plaintiff in a collision case demanded less than $75,000 from the defendant in the 
complaint but then amended the complaint more than one year after commencement to seek 
additional damages). 
 130. See, e.g., In re Propulsid Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1355, 2007 WL 1668752, at 
*1 (E.D. La. June 6, 2007) (noting that the plaintiff, without justifiable explanation, 
dismissed the non-diverse defendants more than three years after the case was filed in state 
court and had never propounded discovery to them, had not deposed them, and had not 
offered expert opinions against them); Brooks v. Am. Bankers Ins. Co. of Fla., No. 
401CV00008-PB, 2003 WL 22037730, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Aug. 20, 2003) (explaining that 
plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the non-diverse defendant more than two years after the case 
was filed in state court without having propounded any discovery and without having taken a 
default judgment against the non-diverse defendant). 
 131. See Katherine L. Floyd, The One-Year Limit on Removal: An Ace up the Sleeve of 
the Unscrupulous Litigant?, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1073, 1082 (2008).  
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When a plaintiff names a non-diverse defendant as a party to invoke 
enhanced discovery options, such joinder is not considered improper even if 
the plaintiff has no intention of obtaining a judgment against the non-
diverse defendant.
133
 In addition, most courts do not consider joinder 
improper simply because the non-diverse defendant is judgment-proof.
134
 
Prior to the JVCA, in those jurisdictions recognizing an equitable exception 
to the one-year bar, many courts found improper strategic joinder in cases 
where the plaintiff sued a diverse defendant, joined a non-frivolous claim 
against a non-diverse or an in-state defendant, and then dismissed the non-
diverse or in-state defendant after expiration of the one-year period without 
offering sufficient explanation for the conduct.
135
 In these cases, the courts 
essentially inferred that the plaintiff strategically joined the non-diverse 
defendant for the sole purpose of defeating removal. In determining 
whether the plaintiff strategically joined the spoiler and then dismissed the 
                                                                                                                 
 132. See Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act of 2016, H.R. 3624, 114th Cong. sec. 2, § 
1447(f)(2)(D).  
 133. See AM. LAW INST., JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT, supra note 52, at 466 (stating that it is 
not improper to join a non-diverse party in order to take of advantage of enhanced discovery 
options for parties as opposed to non-parties, even if the plaintiff has no interest in pursuing 
the claim against the non-diverse party); E. Kyle McNew, Note, Are Rules Just Meant to Be 
Broken: The One-Year Two-Step in Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 62 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 1315, 1363 (2005) (same). 
 134. See, e.g., Navarrette v. A.S. Horner, Inc., EP-16-CV-370-PRM, 2017 WL 1536086, 
at *3 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 31, 2017) (stating that if there is a reasonable basis for the claim 
against the spoiler, “the motive for joining such a defendant is immaterial, even when the 
defendant is judgment-proof”); Carter v. Interstate Realty Mgmt. Co., Civil Action No. 
209CV066-P-A, 2010 WL 324438, at *2 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 20, 2010) (same); Myers v. Air 
Serv. Corp., Civil Action No. 1:07CV911, 2008 WL 149136, at *2 (E.D. Va. Jan. 9, 2008) 
(same). 
 135. See, e.g., Tedford v. Warner-Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423, 425-26 n.4 (5th Cir. 2003). 
In Tedford, the Court concluded that the plaintiff had engaged in improper forum 
manipulation of this sort because the plaintiff did not pursue discovery from the in-state 
physician, dismissed the in-state physician immediately after the expiration of the one-year 
period, and did not reasonably explain the timing of the dismissal to the court’s satisfaction. 
Id. at 427. The court discredited the plaintiff’s explanation for the timing of her dismissal of 
the non-diverse doctor. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. Plaintiff claimed that 
she had non-suited the in-state physician in order to preserve a preferential trial date to 
which Warner-Lambert had agreed and because her lawyer had consulted with the 
physician’s attorney and had determined that the physician was not morally culpable. 
Appellant’s Brief at 4-5, Tedford v. Warner Lambert Co., 327 F.3d 423 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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spoiler after expiration of the one-year period without sufficient 
explanation, courts have considered: 
(i) the plaintiff’s failure to serve the jurisdictional spoiler, (ii) the 
plaintiff’s failure to obtain a default judgment against the 
jurisdictional spoiler, (iii) the plaintiff’s failure to propound 
written discovery requests to the spoiler, (iv) the plaintiff’s 
failure to depose the spoiler, (v) the plaintiff’s failure to 
designate an expert witness in support of the claim against the 
spoiler, and (vi) the plaintiff’s failure to respond in opposition to 
a dispositive motion made by the spoiler.
136
 




2. Fraudulent Joinder 
The Supreme Court has long held that a plaintiff’s fraudulent joinder of a 
non-diverse defendant will not defeat removal jurisdiction.
138
 Although 
defined in slightly different ways by the circuit courts, fraudulent joinder 
occurs when the plaintiff sues a diverse defendant and joins what is 
essentially a frivolous claim against a non-diverse or an in-state 
defendant.
139
 In cases involving fraudulent joinder, the diverse defendant 
may remove the case to federal court despite the lack of complete diversity, 
at which point the federal court then dismisses the fraudulently joined non-
diverse or in-state defendant, thereby creating removal jurisdiction based 
upon complete diversity. 
“Even though the term ‘fraudulent joinder’ suggests” a subjective 
standard focused on the plaintiff’s intent, “no circuit court has adopted a 
test” that turns on the plaintiff’s subjective intent
140
 and Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                 
 136. Percy, Fraudulent Joinder Prevention Act, supra note 5, at 249 (citing various 
cases) (footnotes omitted). 
 137. See, e.g., Lawson v. Parker Hannifin Corp., No. 4:13-cv-923-O, 2014 WL 1158880, 
at *4 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2014) (Case No. 19 in Table B); Forth v. Diversey Corp., No. 13-
CV-808-A, 2013 WL 6096528, at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2013) (Case No. 20 in Table B). 
 138. See Wecker v. Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 183 (1907). 
 139. See Percy, Making a Federal Case of It, supra note 5, at 216-20 (discussing the 
various circuit court standards used to define fraudulent joinder). The Fifth Circuit defines 
fraudulent joinder as joinder of a non-diverse or in-state defendant from whom the plaintiff 
has no reasonable possibility of recovery. See Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 385 F.3d 568, 
573 (5th Cir. 2004).  
 140. See AM. LAW INST., JUDICIAL CODE PROJECT, supra note 52, at 515; Percy, Making a 
Federal Case of It, supra note 5, at 217.  
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precedent indicates that the plaintiff’s motive for joining the non-diverse 
defendant is immaterial if there is a reasonable basis for the claim against 
the non-diverse defendant.
141
 Most courts use one of the following tests:  
(i) the “reasonable basis for the claim” test, requiring the 
removing defendant to prove there was no reasonable basis for 
the claim against the non-diverse defendant at the time it was 
filed; (ii) the “no possibility of recovery” test, requiring the 
removing defendant to prove there is no possibility the plaintiff 
will recover from the non-diverse defendant; (iii) the “no 
reasonable possibility of recovery” test, requiring the removing 
defendant to prove there is no reasonable possibility the plaintiff 
will recover from the non-diverse defendant; and (iv) the “failure 




In order to determine whether the non-diverse defendant has been 
fraudulently joined, most district courts will consider the pleadings and 
only pierce the pleadings to consider extrinsic evidence in limited 
circumstances to ensure that the jurisdictional inquiry does not subsume 
determination of the merits.
143
 For example, the Fifth Circuit held that it is 
only appropriate for a district court to pierce the pleadings when the 
plaintiff has omitted or misstated discrete facts (facts unrelated to the merits 
of the claim against the diverse defendant) that would determine whether 
the non-diverse defendant had been fraudulently joined.
144
 Similarly, the 
Third and Tenth Circuits limit piercing of the pleadings,
145
 and the Fourth 
                                                                                                                 
 141. Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Sheegog, 215 U.S. 308, 318 (1909) (holding that where there was a 
reasonable basis for the plaintiff’s claim against the non-diverse defendant, “no motive could 
make his choice a fraud”). For additional cases, see Percy, Making a Federal Case of It, 
supra note 5, at 213 n.177.  
 142. See Percy, Making a Federal Case of It, supra note 5, at 216 (footnotes omitted). 
 143. Id. at 224-29. 
 144. Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573. Instances in which piercing would be appropriate 
include when a plaintiff asserts a products liability claim against a diverse drug manufacturer 
and also names: (i) an in-state doctor who did not treat the plaintiff or prescribe the drug in 
question to the plaintiff; or (ii) an in-state pharmacist who did not fill the prescription at 
issue for the plaintiff. Id. at 574 n.12 (citing Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 648-49 (5th Cir. 
2003)). 
 145. See Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 112 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that if 
piercing is permissible, which the court did not decide, the piercing must be very limited); 
Smoot v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R., 378 F.2d 879, 882 (10th Cir. 1967) (“[T]he federal 
court will [not] pre-try, as a matter of course, doubtful issues of fact to determine 
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and Eleventh Circuits have cautioned against extensive piercing of the 
pleadings that would convert the jurisdictional inquiry into a substantive 
one.
146
 Since the JVCA’s adoption of the bad faith exception, courts have 
found bad faith justifying removal more than one year after commencement 
in cases where the plaintiff fraudulently joined the jurisdictional spoiler.
147
  
3. Fraudulent Procedural Misjoinder 
Fraudulent procedural misjoinder was first recognized by the Eleventh 
Circuit in Tapscott v. MS Dealer Service Corp.
148
 and occurs when a 
plaintiff asserts non-frivolous claims against a diverse and a non-diverse 
defendant in the same case in state court even though the state joinder rules 
provide no reasonable basis for joinder.
149
 For example, fraudulent 
misjoinder occurs when a plaintiff who has suffered injuries from two 
separate automobile accidents sues the diverse driver who caused the first 
accident and the non-diverse driver who caused the second accident in the 
same lawsuit even though the accidents are unrelated and joinder of the 
claims is unsupported by procedural rules. Similarly, fraudulent procedural 
misjoinder occurs when a plaintiff who is diverse from the defendant joins a 
plaintiff who is not diverse from the defendant, defeating complete 
diversity, when there is no reasonable basis for the plaintiffs to join in the 
same case under the state’s joinder rules.
150
 In cases involving fraudulent 
                                                                                                                 
removability; the issue must be [one] capable of summary determination and be proven with 
complete certainty.”). 
 146. See Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc. 187 F.3d 422, 425 (4th Cir. 1999); Crowe v. 
Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997).  
 147. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Lane Constr. Corp., No. 4:17-CV-780-A, 2017 WL 4481168 
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2017) (Case No. 1 in Table B); In re Asbestos Prod. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 
No. 16-cv-02408, 2016 WL 4264193 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2016) (Case No. 6 in Table B). 
 148. 77 F.3d 1353 (11th Cir. 1996), abrogated by Cohen v. Office Depot, Inc., 204 F.3d 
1069 (11th Cir. 2000). 
 149. See E. Farish Percy, Defining the Contours of the Emerging Fraudulent Misjoinder 
Doctrine, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569 (2006) [hereinafter Percy, Emerging Fraudulent 
Misjoinder Doctrine] (discussing the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine and arguing that the 
joinder rules of the forum state should be used to determine whether there has been 
fraudulent misjoinder). But see Laura J. Hines & Steven S. Gensler, Driving Misjoinder: The 
Improper Party Problem in Removal Jurisdiction, 57 ALA. L. REV. 779, 781 (2006) 
(discussing the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine and arguing that the federal joinder rules 
should be used to determine whether there has been fraudulent misjoinder).  
 150. For example, assume that plaintiff A, a Mississippi citizen, joins with plaintiff B, a 
New York citizen, in the same lawsuit in Mississippi state court. Further assume that each 
plaintiff asserts unrelated products liability/drug defect claims against the sole defendant, a 
drug manufacturer that is a citizen of New York. If the joinder of the plaintiffs in the same 
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procedural misjoinder, the diverse defendant may remove the case to 
federal court, at which point the district court will sever the misjoined 




If the defendants move to sever the case in state court based upon 
misjoinder and the severance in state court creates removability, then the 
voluntary/involuntary rule prevents removal in some jurisdictions because 
removal jurisdiction was not created by a voluntary act of the plaintiff.
152
 
Some jurisdictions, however, have distinguished between state-court orders 
severing claims and state-court orders dismissing claims and have found the 
voluntary/involuntary rule inapplicable to severance orders.
153
 In response 
to these cases, commentators have argued that courts should recognize the 
fraudulent procedural misjoinder doctrine rather than recognizing an 
exception to the voluntary/involuntary rule because a state court’s order 
severing claims does not equate to a finding of egregious procedural 
misjoinder as required by Tapscott.
154
 
As has been previously argued by this author and others, fraudulent 
procedural misjoinder is a variant of substantive fraudulent joinder that 
should be recognized by all federal courts in order to preserve diverse 
defendants’ right to remove.
155
 If fraudulent procedural misjoinder were 
widely recognized, it would obviate the need to recognize an exception to 
the voluntary/involuntary rule when a state court’s severance order creates 
diversity jurisdiction. The defendant would not have to move for severance 
in the state court because the defendant could simply remove the entire case 
                                                                                                                 
lawsuit is clearly prohibited by the existing Mississippi joinder rules, the plaintiffs have 
committed fraudulent procedural misjoinder.  
 151. Although the fraudulent misjoinder doctrine has yet to be recognized in all 
jurisdictions, it would effectively protect diverse defendants’ right to remove in cases 
involving egregiously misjoined parties. See Percy, Emerging Fraudulent Misjoinder 
Doctrine, supra note 149, at 588-90 (arguing that recognition of the fraudulent misjoinder 
doctrine is necessary to protect the right to remove). 
 152. See, e.g., Matteo v. Progressive Advanced Ins., Civil Action No. 2:12-cv-5012, 
2012 WL 13018245 (E.D. Penn. Sept. 27, 2012). 
 153. See, e.g., Crockett v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 436 F.3d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 2006); 
Hamilton v. Morehouse, Civil Action No. 3:10-CV-459-H, 2010 WL 3810190 (W.D. Ky. 
Sept. 23, 2010).  
 154. See, e.g., Jeff Fisher, Everybody Plays the Fool, Sometimes; There's No Exception 
to the Rule: Procedural Misjoinder Is Not an Exception to the Voluntary-Involuntary Rule, 
60 BAYLOR L. REV. 993, 1017-20 (2008). 
 155. See Percy, Emerging Fraudulent Misjoinder Doctrine, supra note 149; Hines & 
Gensler, supra note 149; Jason Harmon, Procedural Misjoinder: The Quest for a Uniform 
Standard, 62 U. KAN. L. REV. 1429 (2014). 
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to federal court based upon fraudulent procedural misjoinder. Widespread 
recognition of the doctrine would obviate the need for fraudulent procedural 
misjoinder to be considered bad-faith forum manipulation under the JVCA 
because removal based on fraudulent procedural misjoinder is almost 
always possible at the outset of litigation or within the one-year period.
156
  
4. Manipulation of the Amount in Controversy 
Applying the JVCA, courts have found bad faith in instances in which 
the plaintiff concealed the true amount in controversy. For example, in 
Calvary Baptist Church v. Church Mutual Insurance Co.,
157
 the district 
court found bad faith on the part of the plaintiff where the plaintiff 
indicated it was seeking less than $75,000, was unresponsive to defendant’s 
discovery requests regarding damages, and clarified that it was seeking 
damages of $90,503.66 more than one year after commencement.
158
 Given 
the myriad methods by which plaintiffs manipulate forum, it is necessary to 
consider whether the bad faith exception to the one-year bar is necessary to 
prevent each variant of manipulation and whether the exception will 
affectively do so. 
III. Statutory Meaning and Judicial Interpretation 
of the Bad Faith Exception 
The JVCA does not clearly or comprehensively define what constitutes 
bad faith.
159
 It simply provides that a district court must make two factual 
findings in order to find removal proper: (i) that the plaintiff acted in bad 
faith; and (ii) that the plaintiff’s bad faith was for the purpose of preventing 
removal.
160
 The legislative history indicates that the exception was intended 
to be limited in scope and to grant district courts discretion to allow 
                                                                                                                 
 156. See infra notes 237-39 and accompanying text. 
 157. No. CIV-15-1283-M, 2016 WL 543239 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 2016) (Case No. 9 in 
Table B). 
 158. Id. at *2; see also Taylor v. Foremost Ins. Co., No. 5:15-CV-00164(LJA), 2016 WL 
11083156, at *5 (M.D. Ga. June 24, 2016) (Case No. 7 in Table B) (finding bad faith where 
the plaintiff amended the complaint to increase the damages sought pursuant to a property 
insurance policy from $73,500 to $150,000 more than one year after commencement in state 
court).  
 159. See McAdam Props., LLC v. Dunkin’ Donuts Franchising, LLC, 290 F. Supp. 2d 
1279 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (Case No. 9 in Table A) (“There is very little authority on what ‘bad 
faith’ means in the context of the statute.”); Johnson v. HCR Manorcare LLC, No. 1:15-cv-
00189, 2015 WL 6511301, at *4 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 28, 2015) (Case No. 77 in Table A) 
(“The contours of the bad faith exception are murky in the Fourth Circuit.”). 
 160. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(1) (2012)  
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removal after one year based upon sufficient findings.
161
 Notably, the 
JVCA amended § 1446(c)(3)(B) to provide that if “the district court finds 
that the plaintiff deliberately failed to disclose the actual amount in 
controversy to prevent removal, that finding shall be deemed bad faith.” 
The Act provides no more guidance regarding what constitutes bad faith. It 
does not indicate whether fraudulent joinder or fraudulent procedural 
misjoinder may constitute bad faith. Given that the JVCA was meant to 
codify the exception recognized in Tedford, presumably improper strategic 
joinder may constitute bad faith.  
Not only does the JVCA suffer from definitional omissions, but also its 
sole definition of bad faith is problematic because it equates a plaintiff’s 
deliberate failure to disclose the actual amount in controversy with bad 
faith. Many states do not require plaintiffs to demand a specific sum in the 
complaint.
162
 Some states even forbid plaintiffs from demanding a sum 
certain.
163
 Absent an obligation or duty under state law to reveal the true 
amount in controversy, it is difficult to see how a plaintiff’s deliberate 
failure to disclose an amount constitutes bad faith. Such a duty might be 
triggered by serving discovery requests on the plaintiff or state court rules 
requiring the plaintiff to file a disclosure regarding the amount of damages 
sought. 
In addition to definitional lack of clarity, the JVCA amendments also 
create procedural confusion. The Act provides that a case may not be 
removed more than one year after commencement unless the federal district 
court finds the plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal. The Act’s bad 
faith exception fails to recognize that the district court cannot make such 
findings until the case has been removed. Removal is accomplished by 
filing the notice of removal in federal district court, providing written notice 
to all adverse parties, and filing a copy of the notice with the state court.
164
 
At that point, the state court is deprived of jurisdiction.
165
 Thus, in reality, 
the statute does not limit removal to those cases in which bad faith actually 
occurred. Instead, it invites removal in any case in which the defendant is 
willing to allege bad-faith forum manipulation by the plaintiff. Defendants 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See H.R. REP. NO. 112–10, at 15 (2011). 
 162. See Baude, supra note 7, at 34; Lewis, supra note 28, at 225-26 (discussing the 
various state pleading rules and noting that, in the large majority of state courts, plaintiffs are 
not required to allege an amount in controversy that would satisfy the federal threshold). 
 163. See Lewis, supra note 29, at 225-26. 
 164. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(d) (2012). 
 165. Id. 
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have every incentive to remove based upon alleged bad faith,
166
 even if they 
think the case will eventually be remanded to state court because removing 
delays eventual resolution,
167
 forces the plaintiff to expend resources 
litigating the issue of proper forum, and creates only minimal exposure to 
sanctions for improper removal.
168
 As one court concluded, “the bad faith 
exception is a recipe for many more improper removals” that will “produce 




The JVCA does not indicate whether a plaintiff’s bad faith may be 
inferred from objective evidence, whether the bad faith must be egregious, 
whether the court may consider the motives of plaintiff’s counsel,
170
 what 
evidentiary standard applies to the bad faith finding, or what evidence the 
district court may consider when determining bad faith. Given the 
numerous issues left unresolved by the JVCA itself, court interpretation of 
the various provisions will have significant impact.  
A. Circuit Court Opinions Applying the Exception 
Only two circuit courts have addressed the JVCA’s bad faith exception. 
In Chavez v. Time Warner Cable, LLC,
171
 the Ninth Circuit affirmed the 
                                                                                                                 
 166. In many of the analyzed cases, the defendant(s) removed the case multiple times. 
See Case Nos. 12, 19, 32, 34, 40, 61, 75, 76, 79, 81, 89, 90, 94, 97, 103, 107, 110, 113 and 
132 in Table A (nineteen of the 136 cases that were remanded—fourteen percent).  
 167. In many of the cases that were remanded, the case had been pending in federal 
district court for more than six months after removal. See Case Nos. 2, 4, 5, 11, 16, 18, 37, 
42, 43, 45, 46, 48, 50, 52, 54, 55, 62, 69, 81, 84, 85, 100, 101, 110, 111, 125, 127, 134 and 
136 in Table A. 
 168. See Emily L. Buchanan, A Comity of Errors: Treading on State Court Jurisdiction 
in the Name of Federalism, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 1, 19-20 (2013) (noting the payoff to a 
defendant for improper removal “can be well worth the risk” because sanctions are rarely 
imposed); Eisenberg & Morrison, supra note 16, at 553; Percy, The Tedford Equitable 
Exception, supra note 5, at 182; see also Aguayo v. AMCO Ins. Co., 59 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 
1263, 1282 (D.N.M. 2014) (observing that it will be difficult for defendants to prevail on a 
bad-faith removal but relatively easy for defendants to concoct a bad faith argument and 
escape sanctions upon remand, and noting that the vague and nebulous bad faith standard 
invites and encourages improper removals). In the cases that were remanded to state court 
after the defendant improperly removed based upon alleged bad faith, the district court 
sanctioned the removing defendant in only thirteen of 136 cases (less than ten percent of the 
remanded cases). See Case Nos. 6, 14, 21, 45, 58, 59, 65, 69, 86, 92, 123, 133 & 134 in 
Table A; see also sources cited supra note 16. 
 169. Aguayo, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 1263. 
 170. Inquiry into motives of plaintiff’s counsel would intrude into their “work product 
and private litigation strategy.” Id. 
 171. 728 F. App’x 645 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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lower court’s finding of bad faith, holding that the “district court did not 
clearly err in determining that Chavez’s counsel acted in bad faith” by 
asserting PAGA claims in state court, deleting the PAGA claims after the 
first removal (thereby securing remand back to state court because the 
damages fell below the jurisdictional threshold), and then adding the PAGA 
claim once back in state court after expiration of the one-year period.
172
 The 
court did not define or explicate the bad faith exception.  
In Hill v. Allianz Life Insurance Co.,
173
 the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s finding of bad faith, noting that “[the plaintiff], in bad faith, 
concealed information about his alleged damages.”
174
 The district court 
found no reasonable or plausible explanation for the plaintiff’s delay in 
amending the complaint to seek damages above the jurisdictional 
threshold.
175
 The district court noted that plaintiff’s original complaint 
demanded more than $15,000 but less than $75,000.
176
 It rejected plaintiff’s 
explanation that some of the additional damages were only discovered in 
response to a subpoena issued after the one-year period, concluding that 
“any amount of reasonable diligence” by the plaintiff would have 
uncovered the basis for plaintiff’s amended complaint seeking damages 
above the jurisdictional threshold.
177
 The Eleventh Circuit did not discuss 
this aspect of the district court’s holding nor did it explain or clarify the bad 
faith standard. Future elucidating guidance from appellate courts is unlikely 
because remand orders based upon a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction or 




                                                                                                                 
 172. Id. at 647. The district court held:  
Th[e] sequence of events suspiciously resembles a ploy to evade removal by 
waiting out the clock. Compounding matters further, Plaintiff failed to provide 
any explanation for the suspicious timing of his amendments or the decision to 
omit the PAGA claim until just after the one-year limitation had expired. Based 
on these facts, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s bad faith equitably tolls the one-
year limitation, rendering Defendants’ removal timely. 
Chavez v. Time Warner Cable LLC, CV 12-5291-RGK (RZX), 2016 WL 7647559, at *8 
(C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2016) (Case No. 10 in Table B). 
 173. 693 F. App’x 855 (11th Cir. 2017). 
 174. Id. at 856. 
 175. Hill v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 51 F. Supp. 3d 1277, 1282 (M.D. Fla. 2014). 
 176. Id. at 1278. 
 177. Id. at 1283. 
 178. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (2012).  
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B. District Court Opinions Applying the Exception 
1. Evidentiary Standard 
 The JVCA does not indicate the evidentiary standard by which the 
removing defendant must prove plaintiff’s bad-faith forum manipulation. In 
Iqbal v. Normandin Transit, Inc.,
179
 the court held that the removing 
defendant must prove plaintiff’s bad faith by clear and convincing 
evidence.
180
 Other courts have held: (i) that to prove bad faith, a defendant 
must “bear[ ] an arduous burden that requires evidence of forum 
manipulation;”
181
 (ii) that defendants’ “‘bad faith’ arguments [must] meet 
the heavy burden [] required to overcome a motion to remand;”
182
 and (iii) 
that the “[d]efendant ‘carries a heavy burden of persuasion in making this 
showing’ that Plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal.”
183
 Other 
courts generally hold that the removing defendant bears the burden of 
proving removal jurisdiction and that removal statutes should be strictly 
construed due to the federalism concerns raised by the exercise of removal 
jurisdiction based upon diversity.
184
 At least one court, however, has 
questioned “how aggressively the presumption against removal should be 
applied” given that the exception was intended to “protect access to a 
federal forum.”
185
 The court concluded that the “defendant must present 
strong, relatively compelling evidence, direct or circumstantial, of the 
plaintiff’s subjective intent.”
186
 Given this incongruity, Congress should, at 
a minimum, clarify the applicable evidentiary standard. 
  
                                                                                                                 
 179. No. 15-CV-746-A, 2016 WL 3563218 (W.D.N.Y. July 1, 2016) (Case No. 63 in 
Table A); see also Forth v. Diversey Corp., No. 13-CV-808-A, 2013 WL 6096528, at *2 
(W.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2013) (Case No. 20 in Table B).  
 180. Iqbal, 2016 WL 3563218, at *1. 
 181. Ramirez v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:15-CV-09131, 2015 WL 4665809, at *3 
(S.D.W. Va. Aug. 6, 2015) (Case No. 82 in Table A). 
 182. Williams v. 3M Co., No. 7:18-CV-63-KKC, 2018 WL 3084710, at *5 (E.D. Ky. 
June 22, 2018) (emphasis omitted) (Case No. 1 in Table A). 
 183. Hart v. Target Corp., No. CV 17-11267 (SRC), 2018 WL 447616, at *1 (D.N.J. Jan. 
17, 2018) (quoting Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 (3d Cir. 1992)) (Case 
No. 10 in Table A). 
 184. See, e.g., Mahaffey v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys. Ltd., No. 3:13CV150 DPJ-FKB, 
2013 WL 7863752 (S.D. Miss. May 2, 2013) (Case No. 130 in Table A). 
 185. Holman v. Coventry Health & Life Ins., No. CIV-17-0886-HE, 2017 WL 5514177, 
at *2 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 17, 2017) (Case No. 12 in Table A). 
 186. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019
626 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:595 
 
 
2. Strategic Joinder 
The district courts that have applied the bad faith exception to strategic 
joinder have done so in varied methods, but “two prevailing standards have 
emerged.”
187
 The district court’s decision in Aguayo v. AMCO Insurance 
Co.
188
 is by far the most detailed opinion addressing the exception’s 
application to strategic joinder. There, a murder victim’s family sued the 
non-diverse murderer and other non-diverse defendants allegedly 
responsible for the murder along with a diverse insurer that had provided 
uninsured motorist coverage on the vehicle used by the murderer 
immediately before he shot the victim.
189
 Almost two years after the case 
was filed in state court and just six days before the case was set for trial 
there, the plaintiff dismissed the murderer, who was the sole remaining 
non-diverse defendant.
190
 Two days prior to trial, the diverse insurer 
removed, alleging that the plaintiffs acted in bad faith because they did not 
actively pursue the claims against the non-diverse defendants.
191
  
Noting that the JVCA is silent with respect to what constitutes improper 
strategic joinder, the district court adopted a two-pronged standard. First, 
“the [c]ourt inquires whether the plaintiff actively litigated [the claim] 
against the [jurisdictional] spoiler.”
192
 Failure to actively litigate constitutes 
bad faith.
193
 Active litigation against the spoiler raises a presumption of 
good faith that may be rebutted by direct evidence of plaintiff’s bad faith 
already within the removing defendant’s possession.
194
 
The court acknowledged “that [the] active litigation inquiry is a proxy 
for” the plaintiff’s subjective intent.
195
 The inquiry is over-inclusive 
because plaintiffs may have legitimate reasons to keep a non-diverse 
defendant in the case even though the plaintiff is not actively litigating 
against that defendant.
196
 It is also under-inclusive because a plaintiff can 
prevent removal by actively litigating against a jurisdictional spoiler even if 
                                                                                                                 
 187. Williams, 2018 WL 3084710, at *3 (Case No. 1 in Table A). 
 188. 59 F. Supp. 3d 1225 (D.N.M. 2014). 
 189. Id. at 1229-31. 
 190. Id. at 1231. 
 191. Id. at 1231-32. 
 192. Id. at 1262. 
 193. Id. 
 194. Id. at 1262-63 (indicating that no discovery regarding bad faith would be permitted 
after removal). 
 195. Id. at 1274. 
 196. Id. at 1276. 
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the plaintiff’s sole goal is to prevent removal.
197
 With respect to the second 
part of the test, the court noted that the subjective inquiry into whether the 
plaintiff acted in bad faith “is a difficult test for courts to apply and runs the 
risk of putting the plaintiffs’ attorneys on the stand and asking them about 
their litigation strategy.”
198
 The court then found that the plaintiffs had 
actively litigated the case against the murderer and other non-diverse 
defendants well past the one-year mark.
199
 The court further found that the 




The Aguayo court acknowledged that, in response to the active-litigation 
proxy for bad faith, plaintiffs will simply retain the non-diverse defendant, 
“jump[] through the hoops of actively litigating in state court,”
201
 and will 
almost always be able to justify such retention on grounds other than forum 
manipulation.
202
 The court also expressed concern that the amorphous bad 




While several district courts have adopted Aguayo’s two-pronged 
inquiry,
204
 others have rejected the Aguayo framework for public-policy 
reasons, concerned that the active-litigation proxy will force plaintiffs to 
                                                                                                                 
 197. Id. at 1274. 
 198. Id. at 1264. 
 199. Id. at 1263. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 1274. 
 202. Id. at 1264. Justifications might include: (i) “leveraging the claims against the [non-
diverse] defendant to encourage the defendant to testify on the plaintiff’s behalf;” (ii) 
obtaining greater discovery by virtue of the non-diverse defendant’s status as a party rather 
than a non-party; and (iii) preventing the diverse defendant from raising an “empty chair” 
defense by attempting to shift blame to an absent non-diverse tortfeasor. Id. at 1265; see also 
Plaxe v. Fiegura, No. 17-1055, 2018 WL 2010025, at *5 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2018) (“The 
empty-chair defense is a well-recognized ‘trial tactic in a multi-party case whereby one 
defendant attempts to put all the fault on a defendant who . . . settled before trial or on a 
person who was . . . no[t] named as a party.’” (quoting Empty-Chair Defense, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY 484 (9th ed. 2009))) (Case No. 4 in Table A). 
 203. Aguayo, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 1263.  
 204. See, e.g., Massey v. 21st Century Centennial Ins., No. 2:17-CV-01922, 2017 WL 
3261419, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. July 31, 2017) (Case No. 3 in Table B); Bristol v. Ford Motor 
Co., No. 4:16-CV-01649-JAR, 2016 WL 6277198, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 27, 2016) (Case No. 
57 in Table A). 
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retain non-diverse defendants needlessly and engage in meaningless 
discovery with respect to their liability.
205
 One district court held that 
the Aguayo test has the potential to deter plaintiffs from 
dismissing defendants they realize are not necessary, as well as 
force plaintiffs to request meaningless discovery to avoid the 
exception being exercised. Both risks increase the cost of 
litigation and could prolong and complicate the litigation 
process. Limiting the availability of the exception, rather than 
expanding it, would alleviate these concerns. The exception 
should only be afforded to those defendants who were helplessly 
stuck in state court because of the demonstrable bad faith 
conduct of the plaintiffs.
206
 
Rather than follow Aguayo’s two-pronged test, some district courts have 
inquired whether the plaintiff engaged in intentional conduct (action or 
inaction) to deprive the defendant of the right to remove.
207
 In two such 
cases, there was direct evidence that the plaintiff kept the spoiler in the case 
past the one-year period for the express purpose of defeating jurisdiction. In 
Comer v. Schmitt, counsel for the non-diverse defendant had informed 
counsel for the diverse defendant that plaintiff would not consummate the 
settlement agreement until after the one-year period because plaintiff did 
not want the diverse defendant to remove.
208
 Similarly, in Hiser v. Seay, 
plaintiffs’ counsel admitted that he did not finalize the settlement terms 
with the jurisdictional spoiler until after expiration of the one-year period in 
an effort to keep the case in state court.
209
 It is unlikely that direct evidence 
of plaintiffs’ expressed intent will be available in many cases.  
The bad faith exception is unlikely to be very effective in curtailing bad-
faith strategic joinder because plaintiffs will simply maintain their claims 
against the jurisdictional spoiler and engage in the minimal effort necessary 
to actively litigate the case against the spoiler until a global settlement is 
reached or the state court dismisses the spoiler, triggering the operation of 
                                                                                                                 
 205. See, e.g., Dutchmaid Logistics, Inc. v. Navistar, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-857, 2017 WL 
1324610 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2017) (Case No. 43 in Table A). 
 206. Id. at *3. 
 207. See, e.g., Comer v. Schmitt, No. 2:15-CV-2599, 2015 WL 5954589, at * 4 (S.D. 
Ohio Oct. 14, 2015) (Case No. 12 in Table B); Hiser v. Seay, No. 5:14-CV-170, 2014 WL 
6885433, at *4 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 5, 2014) (Case No. 16 in Table B). 
 208. Comer, 2015 WL 5954589, at *4. 
 209. Hiser, 2014 WL 6885433, at *3. 
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the voluntary/involuntary rule preventing removal.
210
 Thus, the exception 
will have the deleterious effect of forcing plaintiffs to refuse to settle with 
the spoiler when they otherwise might do so, imposing additional costs “on 
the plaintiff, the spoiler, and the state court.”
211
 If the plaintiff agrees to 
settle with a spoiler after one year, the plaintiff might exact a settlement 
premium from the spoiler, given that the settlement value of the plaintiff’s 
claim against the diverse defendant will likely decrease upon removal.  
3. Fraudulent Joinder 
Many courts have held that fraudulent joinder does not constitute bad 
faith because fraudulent joinder is usually resolved by analyzing whether 
there is a reasonable basis for the claim against the spoiler without 
reference to the plaintiff’s subjective intent, whereas the statutory bad faith 
exception requires some kind of intentional conduct by the plaintiff.
212
 
Although some courts have recognized the plaintiff’s fraudulent joinder as 
bad-faith prevention of removal, they did so without addressing whether the 
plaintiff took any intentional action that prevented the defendant from 
removing within the one-year period, given that fraudulent joinder rests 
upon the obvious deficiency in the plaintiff’s claim against the spoiler.
213
 
As courts have recognized, if fraudulent joinder alone constitutes bad-
faith prevention of removal under the statute, the purpose of the statute 
would be defeated because defendants could strategically manipulate 
jurisdiction by waiting to see how things in state court develop and then 
removing based on fraudulent joinder when the state court litigation takes 
                                                                                                                 
 210. See Aguayo v. AMCO Ins., 59 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1277 (D.N.M. 2014); Percy, The 
Tedford Equitable Exception, supra note 5, at 185-86.  
 211. Aguayo, 59 F. Supp. 3d at 1277. 
 212. See McAdam Props., LLC v. Dunkin’ Donuts Franchising, LLC, 290 F. Supp. 3d 
1279, 1291 (N.D. Ala. 2018) (“[S]tatutory bad faith requires some sort of intentional 
misconduct by the plaintiff, not just fraudulent joinder.”) (emphasis omitted) (Case No. 9 in 
Table A); Ramirez v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:15-CV-09131, 2015 WL 4665809, at *4 n.3 
(S.D.W. Va. Aug. 6, 2015) (observing that “the bad faith standard under [§] 1446(c)(1) 
differs from the standard for proving fraudulent joinder, which can be satisfied where ‘there 
is no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the in-
state defendant in state court’” and that “[a]n unsuccessful claim is not necessarily brought 
in bad faith.” (quoting Hartley v. CSX Transp., Inc. 187 F.3d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1999)) (Case 
No. 82 in Table A); Ehrenreich v. Black, 994 F. Supp. 2d 284, 288-89 (E.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(Case No. 120 in Table A). 
 213. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Lane Constr. Corp., No. 4:17-CV-780-A, 2017 WL 4481168 
(N.D. Tex. Oct. 5, 2017) (Case No. 1 in Table B); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. 
VI), No. 16-cv-02408, 2016 WL 4264193 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2016) (Case No. 6 in Table B). 
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 That is just what happened in Godoy v. WinCo 
Holding, Inc.
215
 On the eve of trial and just after having lost its motion for 
summary judgment in state court, the defendant removed the case more 
than one year after commencement.
216
 The district court granted plaintiff’s 
motion to remand, finding that plaintiff had acted in bad faith by naming a 
jurisdictional spoiler as a defendant even though the claim against the 
spoiler was administratively time-barred.
217
 Although the court observed 
that defendant could have removed based upon fraudulent joinder within 




Contrary to the court’s assertion, the thirty-day time period for removal 
of cases that are initially removable and the thirty-day time period for those 
cases that later become removable triggers the defendant’s duty to remove 
based on fraudulent joinder.
219
 If fraudulent joinder can be ascertained from 
the complaint, the defendant must remove within thirty days of service or 
receipt of the complaint.
220
 Otherwise, if fraudulent joinder is not evident 
based on the complaint, the defendant must remove “within thirty days after 
the defendant” receives “an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper 
from which [fraudulent joinder] may first be ascertained.”
221
  
In Fruge v. Burlington Resources Oil & Gas Co. LP,
222
 the court rejected 
defendant’s claim of strategic joinder, noting that the plaintiff had ardently 
pursued the claims against the non-diverse defendants and had kept those 
defendants in the case well after the one-year period expired.
223
 The court 
also noted that if the non-diverse defendants had been fraudulently joined, 
                                                                                                                 
 214. See, e.g., McAdam Props., LLC, 290 F. Supp. 3d at 1291.  
 215. No. 5:15-CV-01397-ODW-SP, 2015 WL 6394474 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2015) (Case 
No. 11 in Table B).  
 216. Id. at *1.  
 217. Id. at *3-4.  
 218. Id. at *3. 
 219. See Taylor Newman Cabinetry, Inc. v. Classic Soft Trim, Inc., 436 F. App’x 888 
(11th Cir. 2011) (finding defendant’s removal based upon fraudulent joinder six months 
after commencement untimely because defendant did not remove within thirty days of the 
date on which fraudulent joinder could have been first ascertained). 
 220. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(1) (2012). 
 221. Id. § 1446(b)(3). 
 222. No. 2:14-CV-2382, 2015 WL 4134992 (W.D. La. July 7, 2015) (Case No. 85 in 
Table A).  
 223. Id. at *3. 
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as argued by the removing defendant, then the defendant should have 
removed the case within the one-year period.
224
  
In Hall v. Leisure Time Products, Inc.,
225
 plaintiff sued several 
defendants, including one non-diverse LLC, for injuries allegedly caused by 
hardware used to support a child’s swing set.
226
 During a deposition 
conducted after the expiration of the one-year period, the non-diverse 
LLC’s designated representative testified that it had no responsibility for 
the product at issue and, in response, the plaintiff non-suited the non-
diverse defendant.
227
 The diverse defendants removed. The district court 
remanded, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith on the part of the 
plaintiff.
228
 The court noted that the plaintiff had not strategically withheld 
any information from the defendants and that the defendants could have 
alleged fraudulent joinder as a basis for removal from the outset.
229
 The 
court further noted that the diverse defendants had ample opportunity to 
engage in discovery prior to the expiration of the one-year period in order 
to establish that the non-diverse LLC had been fraudulently joined.
230
 
In Steele v. Pro-Tech Foundation Repair and Leveling, LLC,
231
 the 
district court remanded the case after finding that the plaintiff’s agreement 
to dismiss the non-diverse defendant nine years after commencement was 
not bad faith.
232
 It also rejected the removing defendant’s argument that the 
non-diverse defendant had been fraudulently joined.
233
 Moreover, it held 
that if the plaintiff had fraudulently joined the non-diverse defendant, then 
the diverse defendant should have removed at the outset of litigation.
234
 It 
held that the “bad faith [exception] is not intended to allow a defendant to 
sit on its hands waiting for a plaintiff to dismiss a non-diverse party, even if 
                                                                                                                 
 224. Id. 
 225. No. 3:14-CV-465, 2014 WL 5019687 (E.D. Va. Oct. 7, 2014) (Case No. 103 in 
Table A). 
 226. Id. at *1. 
 227. Id. at *4-5. 
 228. Id. at *6. 
 229. Id. at *5. 
 230. Id. at *6. 
 231. No. 18-542, 2018 WL 1603506 (E.D. La. Apr. 2, 2018) (Case No. 6 in Table A).  
 232. Id. at *3 (“If the Court found that Plaintiff acted in bad faith by dismissing a non-
diverse party at this stage of the litigation, it would open the floodgates to allow for removal 
of every case where a non-diverse defendant is dismissed.”). 
 233. Id. at *4. 
 234. Id. at *3. 
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the defendant had been allegedly fraudulently joined, or as Defendant put it, 
joined in bad faith.”
235
  
Given that, in the large majority of cases, fraudulent joinder is either 
evident from the face of the complaint or easily discoverable within the 
one-year period, fraudulent joinder alone should not constitute bad-faith 
forum manipulation.
236
 Equating fraudulent joinder with bad-faith forum 
manipulation ignores the statutory requirement of subjective intent and also 
makes it possible for defendants to remove strategically after the one-year 
period when the litigation in state court takes a negative turn. 
4. Fraudulent Procedural Misjoinder 
Some courts have entertained arguments that plaintiffs’ fraudulent 
procedural misjoinder constitutes bad-faith forum manipulation.
237
 
However, such arguments do not comport with the logic behind fraudulent 
joinder rules. While fraudulent joinder is usually evident from the outset of 
a case, fraudulent procedural misjoinder is more regularly apparent from 
the face of the complaint; it does not require any evaluation of the merits of 
the plaintiff’s claims against the spoiler and instead only considers whether 
procedural joinder is proper pursuant to court joinder rules and existing law 
regarding personal jurisdiction and venue. Widespread recognition of the 
fraudulent procedural misjoinder doctrine would serve to protect diverse 
defendants’ right to remove.
238
 Just as with fraudulent joinder, though, 
notice of removal based upon fraudulent procedural misjoinder must be 
filed within thirty days after receipt of the complaint if fraudulent 
procedural misjoinder is evident from the face of the complaint or within 
thirty days after receipt of an amended pleading, motion, order, or other 
paper from which it first may be ascertained that the case involves 
fraudulent procedural misjoinder.
239
 Given that fraudulent procedural 
                                                                                                                 
 235. Id. at *4. The court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to plaintiff pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1447(c). Id. at *5. 
 236. See Floyd, supra note 131, at 1093-94 (observing that “fraudulent joinder does not 
prevent removal” and arguing that “fraudulent joinder is discoverable within one year”). 
 237. See, e.g., Moody v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., No. 4:17CV2029 HEA, 2018 WL 1397534 
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 20, 2018) (remanding the case after finding that plaintiff’s joinder of non-
diverse plaintiffs was not bad faith and was not frivolous under existing law predating 
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017)) (Case No. 
8 in Table A); Johnson v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., No. 4:17-CV-2007-SNLJ, 2017 WL 
4356900 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2017) (same) (Case No. 15 in Table A); see also Case Nos. 20, 
22 and 25-31 in Table A (holding the same).  
 238. See supra notes 155-56 and accompanying text. 
 239. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (2012). 
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misjoinder will almost always be discernable based on the complaint or 
easily discoverable within the one-year period, fraudulent procedural 
misjoinder should not constitute bad-faith forum manipulation under the 
JVCA. 
5. Manipulation of the Amount in Controversy 
District courts have found that plaintiffs have improperly manipulated 
removal jurisdiction by failing to disclose the true amount in controversy in 
ten cases since the enactment of the bad faith exception.
240
 In some of these 
cases, the district court found bad faith because the plaintiff amended the 
complaint to seek damages above the threshold amount after expiration of 




Some of the cases, however, appear to be wrongly decided because: (i) 
the plaintiff revealed information indicating that the threshold amount was 
met prior to expiration of the one-year period, (ii) the plaintiff had no duty 
in state court to disclose the amount in controversy, or (iii) the plaintiff had 
a reasonable explanation for the increased demand for damages after 
expiration of the one-year period. In Cameron v. Teeberry Logistics, 
LLC,
242
 a plaintiff who had been injured in a collision sued diverse 
defendants in state court and alleged that the damages at issue were less 
than $50,000.
243
 The plaintiff sought damages for pain and suffering, lost 
wages, and medical expenses.
244
 Within the one-year period, the plaintiff 
supplemented her discovery responses to indicate medical expenses of more 
than $91,000, past lost wages in an unspecified amount, and the need for 
future surgery at an unspecified cost.
245
 After expiration of the one-year 
period, plaintiff’s counsel sent a settlement-demand letter for $575,000.
246
 
The parties unsuccessfully mediated the case.
247
 The day after the failed 
mediation, the defendants removed.
248
 Even though the plaintiff disclosed 
damages exceeding the threshold amount during discovery within the one-
                                                                                                                 
 240. See Case Nos. 2, 4, 7, 9, 10, 14, 21, 22, 23, & 24 in Table B. 
 241. See, e.g., Hill v. Allianz Life Ins. of N. Am., 51 F. Supp. 3d 1277 (M.D. Fla. 2014) 
(Case No. 17 In Table B), aff’d, 693 F. App’x 855 (11th Cir. 2017); Carey v. Allstate Ins., 
No. 2:13-CV-2293, 2013 WL 5970487 (W.D. La. Nov. 7, 2013) (Case No. 22 in Table). 
 242. 920 F. Supp. 2d 1309 (N.D. Ga. 2013) (Case No. 24 in Table B).  
 243. Id. at 1310. 
 244. Id. 
 245. Id. at 1310-11. 
 246. Id. at 1311. 
 247. Id. 
 248. Id. 
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year period, the district court found that the plaintiff acted in bad faith in 
failing to amend her complaint to allege greater damages.
249
 The court cited 
no state law or rule requiring the plaintiff to amend the complaint. 
In Patel v. Kroger Co.,
250
 the court found that the plaintiff acted in bad 
faith by failing to respond to the defendant’s request for a settlement 
demand within the one-year period.
251
 The court did not articulate why the 
plaintiff had a duty to respond to the defendant’s request. Nor did the court 
find that the plaintiff had provided inaccurate information in response to 
interrogatories regarding incurred medical expenses.
252
 Instead, the court 
held that the defendant had no duty to investigate the amount in controversy 
until receipt of a pleading, motion, or other paper indicating that the 
threshold requirement had been met.
253
  
Given that state law often imposes no duty on the plaintiff to reveal the 
true amount in controversy, many courts have held that defendants have an 
obligation to engage in discovery, triggering a duty on the part of the 
plaintiff to respond accurately. In Alvarez v. Areas USA LAX, LLC,
254
 the 
plaintiff sued the defendant for wrongful termination, alleged that the 
amount in controversy exceeded $25,000, and “sought back pay, front pay, 
damages for emotional distress, punitive damages, . . . attorneys’ fees,” and 
statutory penalties.
255
 The court found no bad faith on the part of the 
plaintiff, holding instead that the defendant should have conducted 
discovery regarding damages. 
Defendant was certainly on notice that there was a very strong 
likelihood that Plaintiff’s damages would exceed $75,000. 
Despite this notice and for some unknown reason, Defendant 
never specifically asked Plaintiff whether he sought more than 
$75,000 in damages, never asked Plaintiff to stipulate that he 
                                                                                                                 
 249. Id. at 1316. 
 250. No. 1:13-CV-02901-JOF, 2013 WL 12068988 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 12, 2013) (Case No. 
21 in Table B).  
 251. Id. at *3-4. 
 252. The court noted that Defendant’s Interrogatory No. 3 triggered plaintiff’s response 
regarding medical expense to date. The court further noted that the record did not contain a 
copy of the interrogatory. Id. at *3 n.1. The court did not find that plaintiff failed to respond 
adequately to the interrogatory. Nor could it have so found in the absence of knowing the 
exact information requested by the interrogatory. 
 253. Id. at *3.  
 254. No. CV 15-5033-JFW, 2015 WL 5050520 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2015) (Case No. 80 
in Table A). 
 255. Id. at *3.  
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sought less than $75,000 in damages, and never directly raised 
the issue of removal with Plaintiff.
256
 
The court further held that if the defendant believed that the plaintiff’s 
discovery responses were insufficient, then the defendant “could have and 
should have filed a motion to compel discovery well within a year of the 
commencement of this action.”
257
  
Similarly, in Lujan v. Alorica, Inc.,
258
 the district court remanded the 
case, finding that the plaintiff did not act in bad faith because the plaintiff’s 
claim for damages (lost wages) at the time the case was filed could not have 
exceeded $75,000.
259
 The court also noted that the defendant failed to 
attempt to discover the amount in controversy until well after one year had 




Likewise, in Huffman v. Draghici,
261
 the court rejected the defendant’s 
argument that the plaintiff concealed the true amount in controversy.
262
 It 
explained that the “[d]efendants [did] not present evidence that they 
specifically asked Plaintiff about the amount in controversy or about 
removal, nor [did] they show[] that Plaintiff declined to furnish them with 
that information upon request.”
263
 
In Vallecillo v. Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Financial, Inc.,
264
 the 
plaintiffs sued a diverse bank for fraud, negligence, abuse of the elderly, 
and misrepresentation.
265
 In response to discovery conducted within the 
one-year period, the “[p]laintiffs admitted that the amount in controversy 
did not exceed $75,000.”
266
 The plaintiffs offered to settle the case for less 
than $75,000 during the initial phase of litigation.
267
 More than two years 
after commencement, the plaintiffs revealed they were seeking $175,000 in 
                                                                                                                 
 256. Id. 
 257. Id. 
 258. EP-15-CV-355-KC, 2016 WL 8857008 (W.D. Tex. May 24, 2016) (Case No. 65 in 
Table A).  
 259. Id. at *7. 
 260. Id. at *9. 
 261. No. 2:16-CV-446, 2017 WL 4296966 (N.D. Ind. Sept. 28, 2017) (Case No. 16 in 
Table A).  
 262. Id. at *3. 
 263. Id. 
 264. No. 5:16-CV-935-DAE, 2017 WL 9935522 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2017) (Case No. 2 
in Table B).  
 265. Id. at *1. 
 266. Id. at *3. 
 267. Id. 
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 The defendant removed.
269
 The district court found bad faith 
on the part of the plaintiffs.
270
 It rejected the plaintiffs’ explanation for the 
timing of their increased demand, finding the explanation that they had 
erred in acting pro se insufficient to negate the inference of bad faith that 
arises from an increased demand outside of the one-year period.
271
 In so 
ruling, the court cited no precedent for its holding that an inference of bad 
faith arises when the plaintiff increases his or her demand more than one 
year after the commencement of proceedings. Given that there are 
numerous legitimate reasons to amend a complaint to seek greater damages 
after expiration of the one-year period, presuming bad faith from such an 
amendment seems contrary to the statute’s requirement that a district court 
find the plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal.
272
 
Labelling a plaintiff’s manipulation of the amount-in-controversy 
requirement as bad faith under the JVCA is not warranted given that few 
cases have been successfully removed on this basis.
273
 Additionally, 
diligent defendants should be able to discover the amount of damages at 
issue within the one-year period, particularly given that the JVCA clarified 
that “other paper” includes discovery materials in state court.
274
 Although 
plaintiffs may evade removal in some instances by intentionally concealing 
the true amount in controversy when they have an obligation to disclose it, 
the cases are few in number and do not warrant the excessive litigation 
caused by recognition of the exception. 
IV. Critique of the Bad Faith Exception  
A. Bright-Line Rule Versus Case-by-Case Analysis 
As with any rule that is not clearly defined and requires an in-depth, 
factual inquiry into a party’s motive on a case-by-case basis, a critical issue 
is whether the additional litigation and unpredictability that will be created 
by such a standard achieves sufficient benefits to warrant foregoing a 
                                                                                                                 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. at *1. 
 270. Id. at *3. 
 271. Id. 
 272. In some cases, for example, a plaintiff’s future medical expenses may increase 
based upon new information. In addition, damages may increase as a result of the delay in 
litigation. 
 273. Of the 160 cases analyzed In Tables A & B, only twelve were successfully removed 
based upon bad faith manipulation of the amunt-in-controversy. See Case Nos. 2, 4, 5, 7, 9, 
10, 14, 17, 21, 22, 23, and 24 in Table B. 
 274. See Plitt & Rogers, supra note 6, at 655-56. 
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bright-line rule. As demonstrated by this author’s analysis of the 160 cases 
applying the bad faith exception, the exception has created a significant 
amount of litigation while only marginally protecting defendants’ right to 
remove. Although an absolute one-year bar would inevitably permit 
plaintiffs to engage in some instances of bad-faith forum manipulation, its 
efficiency and predictability outweigh the marginal benefit achieved by the 
bad faith exception to the one-year bar, given that, in the large majority of 
cases, the defendant should able to discover the plaintiff’s manipulation 
within the one-year period and remove the case.  
The large number of erroneous removals based on plaintiffs’ alleged 
bad-faith forum manipulation has created an eighty-five percent remand 
rate, which increases the overall cost of litigation and imposes substantial 
and unnecessary costs on state court systems due to the disruption of state-
court proceedings. This author’s case analysis legitimizes Congressman 
Schiff’s concern that the absolute one-year bar might be preferable to the 
bad faith exception, given that the bad faith exception has dramatically 
increased litigation over forum and requires detailed factual inquiry into the 
plaintiff’s subjective motive in every case.
275
 
B. Relative Value of Litigation over Jurisdiction Versus the Merits 
The JVCA’s bad faith exception has increased litigation over forum, an 
unintended consequence that runs counter to the JVCA’s central purpose of 
decreasing litigation over forum so that judges can focus on the substantive 
merits of the case.
276
 Extended litigation over forum does not only subject 
the parties to additional cost and delay; it also exacts a “toll on the judicial 
system” by requiring additional judicial resources and time, potentially 
impacting parties in other cases before the same court.
277
 Removal after 
                                                                                                                 
 275. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. 
 276. Congress clearly expressed a preference for a bright-line rule that would decrease 
litigation over forum even though it might not perfectly prevent a defendant’s right to 
remove. In 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), Congress prohibited appellate review of most district court 
orders remanding a removed case back to state court. Similarly, in 1988, Congress enacted 
the requirement that a plaintiff file a motion to remand based on a procedural defect within 
thirty days of removal to avoid “shuttling a case between two courts that each have . . . 
jurisdiction.” H.R. REP. NO. 100-889, at 72 (1988); see also Percy, The Tedford Equitable 
Exception, supra note 5, at 159-60. 
 277. See Christopher A. Whytock & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Forum Non 
Conveniens and the Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1444, 1488-89 
(2011). 
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C. Bad-Faith Removals by Defendants 
One of the JVCA’s perverse unintended consequences is that it has 
encouraged bad-faith removals by defendants. Although some of the 136 
cases that were remanded based on insufficient evidence of bad-faith forum 
manipulation involved non-frivolous allegations that the plaintiff engaged 
in bad-faith forum manipulation, many of the remanded cases actually 
involved bad-faith forum manipulation by defendants who had no 
reasonable basis to allege bad-faith forum manipulation by the plaintiff. 
 In Brown v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,
279
 the plaintiff sued a diverse 
employer and a non-diverse employee and the employer urged the plaintiff 
to dismiss the non-diverse employee after expiration of the one-year 
period.
280
 The employer conceded that all actions by the employee were 
within the scope of employment, assured the plaintiff that the employee 
would cooperate and would not need to be subpoenaed, and represented that 
“the case has now been pending for more than one year [and] cannot be 
removed even if there is complete diversity.”
281
 In other words, the 
defendant deceived the plaintiff into dismissing the spoiler after the one-
year period and then argued that plaintiff’s dismissal was in bad faith. 
In Angus v. John Crane Inc.,
282
 the plaintiffs sued a diverse defendant 
and joined non-diverse defendants.
283
 Plaintiffs dismissed the last remaining 
non-diverse defendant upon reaching a $10,000 settlement agreement with 
that defendant more than one year after commencement of the case.
284
 The 
diverse defendant removed, arguing the plaintiffs had acted in bad faith by 
fraudulently joining the non-diverse defendants.
285
 The district court found 
no evidence that plaintiffs acted in bad faith by joining the non-diverse 
defendants. Instead, the court found that defendant’s removal was 
“objectively unreasonable” and apparently in bad faith, given that defendant 
                                                                                                                 
 278. Id. at 1488. 
 279. No. A-17-CA-00733-SS, 2017 WL 4316104 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2017) (Case No. 
17 in Table A).  
 280. Id. at *1.  
 281. Id. 
 282. No. 16-cv-03532-JST, 2016 WL 4423379 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2016) (Case No. 58 
in Table A). 
 283. Id. at *1-2. 
 284. Id. at *2. 
 285. Id.  
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removed the case four days prior to trial.
286
 The court ordered the defendant 




Likewise, in Johnson v. HCR Manocare LLC,
288
 the defendant removed 
the case approximately one week before trial, alleging that the plaintiff had 
fraudulently joined the non-diverse nursing home administrator in a case 
against the diverse nursing home.
289
 Although the court found no fraudulent 
joinder, denied the administrator’s motion for summary judgment, and 
remanded the case,
290
 resolution by trial or settlement was delayed because 
trial dates drive settlement negotiations and, presumably, the case had to be 
reset for trial at a later date.
291
 Defendants in other cases have improperly 
removed shortly before trial, thereby securing strategic delay.
292
 
Similarly, the bad faith exception allows defendants to remove 
strategically after an unfavorable ruling in state court. In Mintz & Gold LLP 
v. Daibes,
293
 a law firm sued its former client in state court, seeking more 
than $75,000 in damages.
294
 More than four years later, the appellate court 
entered an order directing the trial court to enter partial summary judgment 
in favor of the plaintiff.
295
 Two days later, the defendant removed based on 
diversity jurisdiction and asserted bad faith on the part of the plaintiff.
296
 
                                                                                                                 
 286. Id.  
 287. Id. at *3. 
 288. No. 1:15CV189, 2015 WL 6511301 (N.D.W. Va. Oct. 28, 2015) (Case No. 77 in 
Table A). 
 289. Id. at *1. 
 290. Id. at *1, *5. 
 291. Michael A. Hamilton & Claudia McCarron, Helping Clients Meet Challenges in a 
New Environment, in INSURANCE LAW 2010: TOP LAWYERS ON TRENDS AND KEY STRATEGIES 
FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR (Aspatore Books 2010), 2010 WL 561458, at *6 (observing that 
firm trial dates cause parties to settle); Carrie E. Johnson, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay 
in Federal Civil Litigation, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 225, 240 (1997) (observing that an 
approaching firm trial date encourages settlement). 
 292. See, e.g., Aguayo v. AMCO Ins., 59 F. Supp. 3d 1225, 1231 (D.N.M. 2014) 
(remanding upon insufficient evidence of plaintiff’s bad faith after defendant removed just 
two days prior to trial); Kuepper v. Terragroup Corp., No. CV 13-00264-RGK(MRWx), 
2013 WL 12205042 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2013) (remanding upon insufficient evidence of 
plaintiff’s bad faith after defendant removed just three weeks before trial) (Case No. 132 in 
Table A). Ellen Bloomer Mitchell, Improper Use of Removal and Its Disruptive Effective on 
State Court Proceedings, 21 ST. MARY’S L.J. 59, 106 (1989). 
 293. No. 15 CIV 1218(PAE), 2015 WL 2130935 (S.D.N.Y. May 6, 2015) (Case No. 92 
in Table A). 
 294. Id. at *1. 
 295. Id. at *2. 
 296. Id. 
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The district court remanded, finding no evidence that the plaintiff acted in 
bad faith because the case was removable based on the original 
complaint.
297
 The court further noted that the defendant was apparently 
engaged in improper forum shopping, given that it removed the case 
immediately after the trial court was ordered to enter summary judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff.
298
 Similarly, in Godoy v. WinCo Holding, Inc.,
299
 the 
defendant could have removed within the one-year period based on 
fraudulent joinder but instead waited until it lost its motion for summary 
judgment.
300
 It then removed on the eve of trial and after the expiration of 
the one-year period, arguing that the plaintiff’s fraudulent joinder of the 
spoiler constituted bad-faith forum manipulation.
301
  
D. Litigation Costs Incurred to Meet the “Actively-Litigating” Proxy  
Another unintended and perverse consequence of the JVCA’s bad faith 
exception is that it encourages plaintiffs to engage in unnecessary 
discovery, motion practice, and consultation with experts in an attempt to 
actively litigate claims against jurisdictional spoilers in an effort to avoid 
removal after expiration of the one-year period. Even if the plaintiff can 
reach a reasonable settlement with the jurisdictional spoiler after one year, 
the plaintiff may still forego the settlement simply to preserve the state 
court forum. Not only does this increase overall litigation costs, but also it 
unfairly subjects the spoiler who otherwise might be dismissed to prolonged 
prosecution of the claims against it. 
Conclusion 
The JVCA’s bad faith exception to the bar on removal of diversity cases 
more than one year after commencement in state court has generated 
unintended and undesirable consequences. Although the exception was 
intended to protect defendants’ right to remove while also decreasing 
litigation over forum, it has had the exact opposite effect. The exception has 
escalated litigation over forum while only marginally protecting removal 
                                                                                                                 
 297. Id. at *4, *16. 
 298. Id. at *8. Although the district court awarded plaintiff costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1447(c) and sanctioned defendant’s lawyer pursuant to Rule 11, these sanctions are rare and 
do not adequately deter defendants from wrongfully removing cases to federal court. See 
supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 299. No. 5:15-CV-01397-ODW-SP, 2015 WL 6394474 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2015) (Case 
No. 11 in Table B).  
 300. Id. at *1. 
 301. Id. at *1, *3. 
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rights. Moreover, it has created perverse incentives (i) for plaintiffs to 
actively litigate claims against spoilers simply to preserve jurisdiction in 
state court and (ii) for defendants to wrongfully remove in cases where 
there is no reasonable basis to allege that the plaintiff engaged in bad-faith 
forum manipulation and to strategically remove once the state-court 
litigation becomes ill-fated.  
In the case of fraudulent joinder and fraudulent procedural misjoinder, 
the bad faith exception is unnecessary because the forum manipulation is 
obvious at the outset or easily discoverable within one year. In the case of 
improper strategic joinder, the bad faith exception has little efficacy 
because plaintiffs will simply retain the spoiler and continue to engage in 
the minimal conduct necessary to satisfy the active-litigation inquiry, 
causing the deleterious effect of increased litigation cost. Finally, in cases 
where plaintiffs manipulate the amount in controversy, the exception may 
effectively protect defendants’ right to remove in a handful of cases where 
the defendant is not able to discover the extent of plaintiff’s damages. 
However, the protection comes at a high, and arguably intolerable, cost. For 
these reasons, Congress should abolish the bad faith exception and return to 
an absolute bar on removal more than one year after the commencement of 
proceedings in state court. 
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Table A  
Cases in Which the District Court Found Insufficient Evidence 







Williams v. 3M Co., No. 7:18-CV-63-KKC, 2018 WL 3084710 (E.D. Ky. 
June 22, 2018).   
  
The district court remanded, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith. It noted 
that much of the delay in the case was due to the discovery deadline falling 
after the expiration of the one-year period. [1]  
  





Podolski v. First Transit, Inc., No. 1:17-cv-7045, 2018 WL 3031940 (D. N.J. 
June 19, 2018).   
  
The district court remanded the case after finding insufficient evidence of bad 
faith on the part of the plaintiff. The court noted that the plaintiff did not act in 
bad faith by naming the non-diverse driver of the vehicle who struck plaintiff, 
even though the diverse defendant had admitted that the driver was acting 
within the scope of employment and even though the plaintiff might not 
recover from the driver. [2]  
  





RJO Invs., Inc. v. Crown Fin., LLC, No. 5:18-CV-05015, 2018 WL 2050165 
(W.D. Ark. May 2, 2018).   
  
The district court remanded. It noted that plaintiff’s claims against the non-
diverse defendants were dismissed after plaintiff was unable to timely serve 
the defendants. “In the instant case, Crown Financial has failed to put forth any 
evidence of intentional conduct by the Plaintiffs designed solely to defeat 
diversity jurisdiction.” Id. at *7. [16]  
  
Filed Sept. 29, 2016; removed Jan. 29, 2018; remanded May 2, 2018.  
  
                                                                                                                 
302. Tables A-E are based on the author’s Westlaw search described in supra note 17.  
The numbers in brackets indicates the number the case was on the list of 634 cases (starting 
with the most recent).  
*   Indicates that the case was removed more than once.   
** Indicates that the district court awarded attorneys’ fees and/or costs to the plaintiff 
pursuant to Section 1447(c).  
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Plaxe v. Fiegura, No. 17-1055, 2018 WL 2010025 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 27, 2018).   
  
The district court remanded, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith. It noted 
that the plaintiff’s explanation for not finalizing the settlement agreement with 
the nondiverse defendant until the plaintiff settled with the diverse defendant 
or the trial date was plausible. The plaintiff indicated that it maintained the 
claim against the non-diverse defendant to avoid an “empty-chair” defense. 
“The empty-chair defense is a well-recognized ‘trial tactic in a multi-party case 
whereby one defendant attempts to put all the fault on a defendant who . . . 
settled before trial or on a person who was . . . no[t] named as a party.’ Black’s 
Law Dictionary 484 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “empty-chair defense”).” Id. at 
*5. [18]  
  





Crosby v. Neuman, No. 2:17-cv-02474-JCM-PAL, 2018 WL 1831322 (D. 
Nev. Apr. 17, 2018).   
  
The district court remanded. It held that the “[d]efendant ha[d] not 
demonstrated that [the] plaintiff acted in bad faith in order to prevent defendant 
from removing the action.”  Id. at *1. [21]  
  








Steele v. Pro-Tech Found. Repair & Leveling, LLC, No. 18-542, 2018 WL 
1603506 (E.D. La. Apr. 2, 2018).   
  
The district court remanded the case. It found that the plaintiff’s agreement to 
dismiss the non-diverse defendant nine years after commencement was not bad 
faith. It also rejected the removing-defendant’s argument that the non-diverse 
defendant had been fraudulently joined. It held that the bad-faith exception “is 
not intended to allow a defendant to sit on its hands waiting for a plaintiff to 
dismiss a non-diverse party, even if the defendant had been allegedly 
fraudulently joined, or as Defendant put it, joined in bad faith.” Id. at *4. The 
court awarded sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). [24]  
  
Filed Jan. 20, 2009; removed Jan. 17, 2018, remanded Apr. 2, 2018.  
  
Note: Although the case was filed in 2009, the district court applied the JVCA 
amendments.  
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Herrera v. Wood, No. 2:18-CV55 JCM (PAL), 2018 WL 1419878 (D. Nev. 
Mar. 22, 2018).   
  
The district court remanded, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith. It 
rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff acted in bad faith by 
delaying surgery. The court observed that “[t]here are a potentially endless 
number of reasons for which plaintiff could have delayed surgery that do not 
constitute bad faith.” Id. at *3. [25]  
  





Moody v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., No. 4:17CV2029 HEA, 2018 WL 1397534 
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 20, 2018).   
  
The district court remanded the case finding that the plaintiff’s joinder of 
non-diverse plaintiffs was not bad faith and was not frivolous under existing 
law predating Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 
S. Ct. 1773 (2017). [26]  
  
Filed June 13, 2016; removed after one-year period; remanded Mar. 20, 2018.  
  
 
 9.  
  
McAdam Props., LLC v. Dunkin’ Donuts Franchising, LLC, 290 F. 
Supp. 2d 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2018).   
  
Diverse defendant removed more than one year after commencement after 
the plaintiff dismissed the non-diverse defendant. The diverse defendant 
alleged that the plaintiff had fraudulently joined the non-diverse defendant. 
The district court found that the removing defendant failed to demonstrate 
bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. The court held that fraudulent joinder 
does not constitute bad faith absent some other intentional conduct by the 
plaintiff. [32]  
  
Filed May 25, 2016; removed Dec. 13, 2017; remanded Feb. 21, 2018.  
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Hart v. Target Corp.,  No. 17-11267 (SRC), 2018 WL 447616 (D. N.J. 
Jan. 17, 2018).   
  
The case was removed more than year one year after commencement, after 
the state court granted summary judgment to the non-diverse defendant store 
manager in a slip-and- fall case. The diverse defendant argued that the 
plaintiff fraudulently joined the manager and that the plaintiff did not 
prosecute the claim against the manager in good faith because the plaintiff 
did not notice the manager’s deposition until after the manager moved for 
summary judgment. The district court remanded the case, finding that the 
plaintiff had not fraudulently joined the manager and that the plaintiff’s 
failure to depose the manager until after the manager moved for summary 
judgment did not constitute a lack of good faith prosecution. [39]  
  





Klotz v. La. Citizens Prop. Ins. Corp., No. 17-3776, 2017 WL 5899248 
(E.D. La. Nov. 30, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded, finding that the “[d]efendant fail[ed] to meet its 
burden to show that Plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent the removal of the 
action.” Id. at *9. [44]  
  
Filed Jan. 5, 2012; removed Apr. 21, 2017; remanded Nov. 30, 2017.  
  
Note: Although the case was commenced before Jan. 7, 2012, the district 








Holman v. Coventry Health & Life Ins. Co., No. CIV-17-0886-HE, 2017 
WL 5514177 (W.D. Okla. Nov. 17, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded the case, finding that the defendant failed to 
demonstrate that the plaintiff acted in bad faith. The court noted there was 
some evidence that the plaintiffs intended to seek damages from the non-
diverse defendant and also noted that it could not “say that the basis for 
dismissal of [the non-diverse defendant] was clear or obvious at a point 
significantly prior to the date of dismissal.” Id. at *3. [46]  
  
No dates regarding filing and removal. this was the second removal. The 
diverse defendant removed the first time based upon fraudulent joinder. The 
district court remanded the case, finding that the non-diverse defendant had 
not been fraudulently joined.  
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Miller v. Wal-Mart Stores E., LP, No. 17-0344-WS-N, 2017 WL 5496357 
(S.D. Ala. Nov. 16, 2017).  
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded the case, finding no bad-faith manipulation of the 
amount-in-controversy by the plaintiff, and noting that the plaintiff 
responded to discovery requests prior to expiration of the one-year period 
indicating that she claimed more than $100,000 in damages. [47]  
  







Bank of N.Y. v. Consiglio, No. 3:17-cv-01408 (CSH), 2017 WL 4948069 
(D. Conn. Nov. 1, 2017).   
  
Pro se defendant removed more than nine years after commencement in 
state court. The district court remanded, finding that the defendant failed to 
demonstrate that the plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal. The 
district court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to plaintiff pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §1447(c). [52]  
  
Filed Mar. 2008; removed Aug. 18, 2017; remanded Nov. 1, 2017.  
  
Note: Although the case was commenced in 2008, the district court applied 





Johnson v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., No. 4:17-CV-2007-SNLJ, 2017 WL 
4356900 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 2, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded the case, finding “no evidence of bad faith that 
would satisfy the exception to the one-year rule.” Id. at *2. The court found 
that plaintiff’s joinder of non-diverse plaintiffs was not bad faith and was 
not frivolous under existing law predating Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. 
Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). [58]  
  
Filed May 8, 2015; removed Jul. 19, 2017; remanded Oct. 2, 2017.  
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Huffman v. Draghici, No. 2:16-CV-446, 2017 WL 4296966 (N.D. Ind. 
Sept. 26, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded the case, finding no evidence that the plaintiff acted 
in bad faith by concealing the amount-in-controversy. The court noted that 
the plaintiff made a settlement demand of $350,000 prior to expiration of the 
one-year period. The court held that “Defendants [did] not present evidence 
that they specifically asked Plaintiff about the amount in controversy or 
about removal, nor have they shown that Plaintiff declined to furnish them  
with that information upon request.” Id. at * 3. [62]  
  





Brown v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. A-17-CA-00733-SS, 2017 WL 
4316104 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 28, 2017).  
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded, finding no evidence of bad faith. Plaintiff sued 
Home Depot and a nondiverse Home Depot employee, alleging that the 
defendant employee and other employees assaulted him and falsely 
imprisoned him on suspicion of shoplifting. The district court rejected the 
defendant’s argument that the plaintiff never intended to prosecute the case 
against the non-diverse defendant employee, noting that the plaintiff had 
deposed the employee and further noting that the employee remained a 
defendant when the case was first called to trial in state court. The court was 
unable to empanel a jury, so the case was reset for a later date. The court 
noted that the defendant had urged plaintiff to dismiss the non-diverse 
employee after expiration of the one-year period and represented that “the 
case has now been pending for more than one year [and] cannot be removed 
even if there is complete diversity.”   
Id. at *1. [63]  
  
Filed Nov. 20, 2015; removed Aug. 7, 2017; remanded Sept. 28, 2017.  
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Hernandez v. State Farm Lloyds, No. DR-16-CV-164-AM/CW, 2017 WL 
8131570 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 19, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded the case, finding that plaintiff did not act in bad 
faith by concealing the amount-in-controversy. The court noted that 
plaintiff’s “original petition and his initial disclosure response indicated 
that he was seeking attorney’s fees and statutory penalties under the 
DTPA and the Texas Insurance Code. At the point of the receipt of the 
disclosure responses where plaintiff indicated he was also seeking 
$62,782.06 in economic damages, it was unequivocally clear and certain 
that [the plaintiff] was seeking a sufficient additional amount to reach the 
$75,000 jurisdictional threshold. Statutory interest alone at eighteen 
percent would amount to $11,000 per year.” Id. at * 3. [67]  
  








J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Caires, 2017 WL 3891663 (D. Conn. 
Sept. 6, 2017).   
  
The case was removed for the third time more than one year after 
commencement. The district court remanded, finding no improper effort 
by the counterclaim plaintiff to defeat diversity jurisdiction. [73]  
  
Filed Dec. 3, 2009; removed for the third time on Aug. 2, 2017; remanded 
Sept. 19, 2017.  
  
Note: Although the case was commenced in 2009, the district court applied 





Johnson v. Janssen Pharm., Inc., No. 4:17-CV-02014-ERW, 2017 WL 
3705233 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 28, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded the case, finding “no indication Plaintiffs acted in 
bad faith to prevent Defendants from removing this action within one year 
of its commencement.” Id. at *2. The court found that the plaintiffs’ joinder 
of non-diverse plaintiffs was not bad faith and was not frivolous under 
existing law predating Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of 
California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). [77]  
  
Filed May 5, 2016; removed July 19, 2017; remanded Aug. 28, 2017.  
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U.S. Bank Trust, N.A. for Wells Fargo Asset Sec. Corp. v. Walbert, 
3:17-cv-00991 (CSH), 2017 WL 3578553 (D. Conn. Aug. 18, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded the case to state court, finding no bad faith on the 
part of the plaintiff and noting that it was clear from the face of the 
plaintiff’s compliant that the plaintiff was seeking more than $75,000. The 
court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1447(c). 
[79]  
  





Schmitz v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17 CV 1860 JMB, 2017 WL 
3433628 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 10, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court held that the plaintiff’s joinder of non-diverse plaintiffs was 
not bad faith and was not frivolous under existing law predating Bristol-
Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017).  
“It is difficult to say that a party has acted in bad faith when the action was 
consistent with the jurisprudence then in force.” Id. at *3. [80]  
  
Filed Sept. 4. 2015; removed June 29, 2017; remanded Aug. 10, 2017.  
  
 
 23.  
  
Young v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17CV0181 ERW, 2017 WL 3310698 
(E.D. Mo. Aug. 3, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded the case, finding that although “[i]t appear[ed] 
highly probable Plaintiffs engaged in forum shopping and sought to avoid 
federal jurisdiction by joining certain plaintiffs from New Jersey and 
California,” such joinder was permissible under existing law. “Plaintiffs 
were not acting in bad faith by pursuing a strategy which proved to be 
successful.” Id. at *2. [83]  
  
Filed May 21. 2015; removed June 29, 2017; remanded Aug. 3, 2017 
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Rantz v. Shield Coat, Inc., No. 17-3338, 2017 WL 3188415 (July 26, 2017) 
(E.D. La. July 26, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. Even 
though the plaintiff could not recover from the two named non-diverse 
corporations because they had been dissolved more than three years prior to 
the filing of the complaint, the court found that the plaintiff did not act in 
bad faith to prevent removal. The court noted that defendants should have 
removed based upon fraudulent/improper joinder prior to expiration of the 
one-year period and further noted that the plaintiff took no action to prevent 
the defendant from ascertaining early in the case that the non-diverse 
defendants had been improperly joined. [87]  
  





Forrest v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17CV-01855-JAR, 2017 WL 
3087675 (E.D. Mo. July 20, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded the case back to state court. The district court held that the 
plaintiff’s joinder of non-diverse plaintiffs was not bad faith and was not 
frivolous under existing law predating Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior 
Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). “Plaintiffs clearly sought to 
secure an advantageous forum in the state court and joined certain Plaintiffs 
for the very purpose of avoiding federal jurisdiction over this case.”  Id. at 
*2. Given that such joinder was permissible at the time, however, plaintiffs 
did not engage in bad faith. [88]  
  





Anglin v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-01844-JAR, 2017 WL 
3087672 (E.D. Mo. July 20, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded the case back to state court. The district court held that the 
plaintiff’s joinder of non-diverse plaintiffs was not bad faith and was not 
frivolous under existing law predating Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior 
Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). [89]  
  
Filed May 29, 2015; removed June 29, 2017; remanded July 20, 2017.  
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Timms v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-01859-JAR, 2017 WL 3087699 
(E.D. Mo. July 20, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded the case back to state court. The district court held that the 
plaintiff’s joinder of non-diverse plaintiffs was not bad faith and was not 
frivolous under existing law predating Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior 
Court of California, 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). [90]  
  





Dunn v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-01846-JAR, 2017 WL 3087673 
(E.D. Mo. July 20, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded, finding no bad faith where the plaintiffs joined parties to 
strategically prevent removal because the plaintiffs’ joinder of parties was 
consistent with existing law. [91]  
  





Ingham v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-1857 SNLJ, 2017 WL 
3034696 (E.D. Mo. July 18, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded, finding no bad faith. Although the “plaintiffs surely secured 
advantageous forums by manipulating the groups of plaintiffs in an attempt to 
prevent federal jurisdiction…, this manipulation was legal within the confines 
of federal statutes and case law at the time and was not done in bad faith.” Id. 
at *2. [92]  
  





Reppell v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-1858 SNLJ, 2017 WL 
3034707 (E.D. Mo. July 18, 2017).    
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded, finding no bad faith where the plaintiffs joined parties to 
strategically prevent removal because the plaintiffs’ joinder of parties was 
consistent with existing law. [93] 
 
Filed Jan. 19, 2016; removed June 29, 2017; remanded July 18, 2017. 
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Livaudais v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-1851 SNLJ, 2017 
WL 3034701 (E.D. Mo. July 18, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded, finding no bad faith where the plaintiffs 
joined parties to strategically prevent removal because the plaintiffs’ 
joinder of parties was consistent with existing law. [94]  
  







Sampson v. Miss. Valley Silica Co., 268 F. Supp. 3d 918 (S.D. Miss. 
2017).    
Plaintiffs filed a wrongful death action against diverse and non-diverse 
defendants and dismissed the non-diverse defendants prior to expiration of 
the one-year period. The diverse defendants removed, but the case was 
remanded because not all of the defendants had joined in the removal. After 
the plaintiffs obtained a jury verdict, they moved to join a declaratory-
judgment action against the non-diverse defendant’s diverse insurer. The 
insurer removed. The district court remanded, finding no bad faith. The 
court noted that the plaintiffs had sued other non-diverse defendants who 
were dismissed prior to expiration of the one-year bar and noted that even if 
the plaintiff had originally included the diverse insurer, the case would not 
have been successfully removed within one year, given that the removing 
defendants failed to comply with the rule of unanimity. [95]   
 





Swann v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 4:17-CV-1845 SNLJ, 2017 WL 
3034711 (E.D. Mo. July 18, 2017).    
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded, finding no bad faith where the plaintiffs joined parties to 
strategically prevent removal because the plaintiffs’ joinder of parties was 
consistent with existing law at the time of joinder. [96]   
 
Filed July 31, 2014; removed June 29, 2017; remanded July 18, 2017.  
    
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss3/2









Jackson v. Bayer Healthcare Pharm., Inc., No. 4:17-cv-01413-JAR (E.D. 
Mo. June 22, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded the case, finding that the plaintiffs’ amended 
complaint adding additional non-diverse plaintiffs did not constitute bad 
faith, given that the parties to the original complaint were not diverse. [104]  
  
Filed Sept. 6, 2013; removed for the second time May 1, 2017; remanded June 





Larue v. Volkswagen Group of Am., Inc., No. 1:17-CV-00001-GNS 2017 
WL 2312480 (W.D. Ky. May 26, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded. It noted that the plaintiff’s claims against the non-
diverse defendants were colorable at the outset of the case, that the plaintiff 
retained experts to support the claims against the non-diverse defendants, 
and that if the plaintiff had prematurely dismissed the non-diverse 
defendants, the jury might have been permitted to allocate fault to the non-
diverse defendants (the empty-chair defendant conundrum). “It is difficult 
to say in this instance that [the plaintiff’s] failure to voluntarily dismiss 
KTC Defendants within one year, before discovery was complete, 
amounted to bad faith.” Id. at *5. [106]  
  





Ryan v. Calcasieu Parish Police Jury, No. 17-cv-287, 2017 WL 3080022 
(W.D. La. May 26, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
removing defendant alleged that the plaintiff had fraudulently misjoined the 
non-diverse defendants and that the plaintiff had acted in bad faith to prevent 
removal. The magistrate recommended remand, finding incomplete diversity 
because the plaintiff had not misjoined the non-diverse defendants. The 
district court accepted the magistrate’s recommendation and remanded the 
case. [107]  
  
Filed Oct. 16, 2014; removed Feb. 17, 2017; remanded July 17, 2017.  
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Fridman v. Safeco Ins. Co., No. 6:16–cv–2020–Orl–37KRS, 2017 WL 
2222790 (M.D. Fla. May 22, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement, after the 
plaintiff amended the complaint to add a bad faith claim against the insurer, 
thereby increasing the amount-in-controversy. The insurer argued that the 
plaintiff’s amendment was in bad faith to prevent removal, citing the JVCA. 
The district court remanded, finding the bad faith exception inapplicable. 
[109]  
  
Filed Apr. 29, 2009; plaintiff amended complaint adding bad faith in 
compliance with state law on Nov. 7, 2016; removed Nov. 18, 2016; 
remanded May 22, 2017.   
  
Note: Although the case was commenced in 2009, the district court applied 





Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 17-71-BAJ-RLB, 2017 WL 
2644259 (M.D. La. May 18, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
removing diverse insurer argued that the plaintiff acted in bad faith by 
amending the pleadings more than two years after commencement to seek 
more than $75,000. The magistrate refused to find bad faith because the 
plaintiff’s original complaint named two nondiverse defendants who 
remained in the case for more than year. Even if the plaintiff had amended the 
complaint prior to expiration of the one-year period, the diverse defendant 
could not have removed given that the plaintiff was still pursuing claims 
against the non-diverse defendants. The district court adopted the 
magistrate’s recommendation and remanded the case. [110]  
  
Filed Apr. 15, 2014; removed Feb. 8, 2017; remanded June 19, 2017.  
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Barajas v. Cont’l Tire of the Ams., LLC, 3:17–CV–00212–BR, 2017 WL 
2213152 (D. Or. May 18, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
defendants argued that the plaintiffs had fraudulently joined non-diverse 
defendants to prevent removal and that removal more than one year after 
commencement was proper under the circumstances. The district court 
remanded, finding that the plaintiffs had not fraudulently joined the non-
diverse defendants and that removal was untimely because it was not filed 
within the requisite thirty-day period. [112]  
  







Jackson v. C.R. Bard, Inc., No. 4:17-CV-974 (CEJ), 2017 WL 2021087 
(E.D. Mo. May 12, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded, finding no bad faith. The court was not “persuaded by [the] 
defendants' argument that the original plaintiffs joined the amended plaintiffs 
in bad faith. Diversity jurisdiction did not lie before or after the amended 
petition. Plaintiffs did not dismiss a diversity destroying party or otherwise 
create complete diversity after the passage of the one-year deadline.” Id. at 
*4. [113]  
  
Filed Feb. 11, 2016; removed for the second time Mar. 16, 2017; remanded 





NPV Realty, LLC v. Nash, No. 8:17–cv–636–T–30AEP, 2017 WL 1735101 
(M.D. Fla. May 4, 2017).   
  
The plaintiff sued a non-diverse insurance agent in state court. More than one 
year after commencement, the plaintiff amended the complaint to add the 
diverse insurer as an additional defendant. The defendant insurer removed. 
The district court remanded, noting that the non-diverse agent was still a 
defendant and that the plaintiff had actively litigated the case against the 
agent. The court did not find that the agent had been fraudulently joined and 
further found that there was no evidence that the plaintiff had acted in bad 
faith to prevent removal. Id. at *3. [115]  
  
Filed July 2, 2015; removed Mar. 16, 2017; remanded May 4, 2017.   
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Parkview Gardens Bldg. Owners Ass’n v. Owners Ins. Co., No. 16-cv-
2673-WJM-CBS, 2016 WL 1611576 (D. Colo. May 3, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded the case, finding that the defendant failed to demonstrate that 
the plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal. The plaintiff had sued a 
diverse insurance company and a non-diverse insurance agency. The plaintiff 
had filed a certificate of review regarding its professional negligence claim 
against the non-diverse agency, propounded interrogatories and a request for 
production, deposed the agent responsible for issuing the policy, and 
appeared at a deposition noticed by the agency. Prior to that deposition, the 
plaintiff and the defendant agency agreed to a settlement. The district court 
remanded the case, finding that the defendant failed to prove that the plaintiff 
acted in bad faith for the purpose of preventing removal. [116]  
  
Filed Dec. 10, 2014; removed for the second time Oct. 28, 2016; remanded 




Dutchmaid Logistics, Inc. v. Navistar, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-857, 2017 WL 
1324610 (S.D. Ohio Apr. 11, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded, finding that the defendant failed to demonstrate that the 
plaintiff acted in bad faith and also failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff 
fraudulently joined the non-diverse defendant. [122]  
  





Brown v. Roundpoint Mortg. Servicing Corp., No.: 3:17–CV–10, 2017 
WL 1102657 (Mar. 24, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded the case, finding that the defendant’s threadbare allegation of 
bad faith was insufficient. [132]  
  
Filed Jan. 11, 2016; removed Jan. 30, 2017; remanded Mar. 24, 2017.  
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El Khoury v. Ilyia, No. 2:16-CV-01426-RAJ, 2017 WL 1089513 (W.D. 
Wash. Mar. 22, 2017).   
  
The plaintiff sued the defendant, alleging that the defendant was a resident of 
Washington state. The defendant removed more than one year after 
commencement, alleging that it was his intent to return to California (and that 
he was therefore a California resident). The court remanded the case, finding 
that “Plaintiffs did not act in bad faith by failing to question Defendant's own 
admission of residency. Defendant repeatedly admitted he was a resident of 
Washington, he owned a home in Washington, and he was domiciled in 
Washington—in fact, for over a year from when this action commenced, 
Defendant asserted his Washington residency.” Id. at *3. The court awarded 
attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1447(c). [133]  
  





Traina v. Liberty Mut. Grp., No. 16-4991 (MAS) (TJB), 2017 WL 957849 
(D. N.J. Mar. 10. 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith and noting that 
both parties were responsible for litigation-related procedural delays in state 
court. [137]  
  





Trokey v. Great Plains Roofing and Sheet Metal, Inc., No. 4:16–cv–01193–
ODS, 2017 WL 722607 (W.D. Mo. Feb. 23, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
defendant argued that the plaintiff acted in bad faith by settling with the non-
diverse defendant more than one year after commencement (after the state 
court denied the non-diverse defendant’s motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim). The district court noted that the claim against the non-diverse 
defendant was a valid claim evidenced by the state court’s ruling and the fact 
that the diverse defendant had asserted a cross-claim against the non-diverse 
defendant. [142]  
  
Filed Sept. 4, 2015; removed Nov. 7, 2016; remanded Feb. 23, 2017.  
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Hubbard v. Diaz, No. 16-3006 (CCC-JBC), 2017 WL 436252 (D. N.J. Jan. 
31, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded, finding that the defendants failed to show that the plaintiff 
was intentionally deceptive regarding the amount of damages. The court 
noted that the complaint contained sufficient allegations from which it could 
be extrapolated that the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000. [150]  
  





Kamal-Hashmat v. Loews Miami Beach Hotel Operating Co., Inc., No. 16-
cv-24864-GAYLES, 2017 WL 433209 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded, finding that the plaintiff actively litigated the claims against 
the jurisdictional spoilers and that the defendant had no clear evidence of the 
plaintiff’s bad faith. [158]  
  





Caires v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 16 Civ. 2694 (GBD) (RLE), 2017 
WL 384696 (Jan. 27, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement (by the pro 
se plaintiff/counter-defendant). The district court remanded, finding 
insufficient evidence of bad faith on the part of the counter-plaintiff. [160]  
  
Filed Dec. 3, 2009; removed Apr, 11, 2016; remanded Jan. 27, 2017.  
  
Note: Although the case was filed in 2009, the district court applied the JVCA.  
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County of Dimmit, Tex. v. Murphy Expl. & Prod. Co., No. SA-16CA-01049-
RCL, 2017 WL 9360841 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 19, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The plaintiff 
amended the state-court complaint more than two years after commencement 
to add the diverse defendant. The diverse defendant removed, arguing that the 
plaintiff had misjoined the claims against the non-diverse defendants and had 
acted in bad faith by waiting so long to add the removing diverse defendant as 
a party. The district court remanded, finding no evidence of bad faith and 
further finding that the plaintiff had not misjoined the defendants. The court 
noted that the plaintiff amended the complaint to add the diverse defendant 
after the diverse defendant’s fault was identified in discovery responses to the 
plaintiff’s interrogatories. The court also noted that there was no evidence that 
the plaintiff was aware that the diverse defendant was potentially liable prior to 
receiving the discovery responses. [164]  
  





Dumistrascu v. Dumistrascu, No. 15-CV-561-JED-FHM, 2017 WL 5241234 
(N.D. Okla. Jan. 13, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded, finding no conduct by the plaintiff that prevented the 
defendant from removing within one year. [168]  
  





Zazueta v. Nationstar Mortg. LLC, No. 3:16-cv-05893-RJB, 2017 WL 74682 
(W.D. Wash. Jan. 9, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded, finding that the plaintiff’s increased settlement demand (made 
after expiration of the one-year period) did not constitute bad faith. The court 
noted that the increased demand for attorneys’ fees was largely caused by 
multiple court filings and hearings that occurred after expiration of the one-
year period. [171]  
    
Filed May 12, 2015; removed Oct. 21, 2016; remanded Jan. 9. 2017.  
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Herron v. Graco, Inc., No. 3:16-CV-00653-NJR-SCW, 2016 WL 7239915 
(S.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
defendant argued that the plaintiff’s dismissal of one non-diverse defendant 
after expiration of the one-year period and the plaintiff’s agreement not to 
collect from the remaining two nondiverse defendants indicated bad faith and 
fraudulent joinder. The district court remanded, finding that the defendant 
failed to demonstrate bad faith and also failed to demonstrate fraudulent 
joinder. The plaintiff indicated that one non-diverse defendant was dismissed 
after it raised strong objections to venue in state court. The plaintiff entered 
into an agreement with the other non-diverse defendants who also raised 
venue objections that the plaintiff would not enforce any judgment against 
them if they agreed to withdraw their venue objection and testify at a 
deposition and at trial. [186]  
  





Hubbard v. Daiz, No. 16-3006 (CCC), 2016 WL 8161624 (D. N.J. Dec. 2, 
2016).   
  
The defendants removed the case more than year after commencement, 
alleging that the plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal by failing to 
timely respond to discovery requests regarding the plaintiff’s alleged damages 
arising from a dog attack. The court found no evidence that the delay was 
caused by anything more than counsel’s carelessness or neglect and noted that 
“Defendants fail[ed] to present any information regarding their attempts to 
secure this discovery after service.” Id. at *2. [190]  
    





Larson v. Fedex Ground Package Sys., Inc., CV 16–105–M–DWM, 2016 
WL 6602639 (D. Mont. Nov. 8, 2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court 
found no bad faith on the part of the plaintiffs in an automobile accident case, 
noting that the plaintiffs actively pursued the case against the state (the 
jurisdictional spoiler) and settled with the state more than one year after 
commencement in response to the state’s agreement to conduct feasibility 
assessments of various speed limits. [191]  
  
Filed Apr. 2015; removed Aug. 11, 2016; remanded Nov. 8, 2016.  
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Bristol v. Ford Motor Co., No. 4:16-CV-01649-JAR, 2016 WL 6277198 
(E.D. Mo. Oct. 27, 2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court 
remanded the case, finding that the defendant failed to prove that the plaintiff 
had not actively litigated the case against the spoiler prior to settling with the 
spoiler after expiration of the one-year period. The court also found no 
evidence that the plaintiff acted for the purpose of preventing removal. [196]  
  







Angus v. John Crane Inc., No. 16-cv-03532-JST, 2016 WL 4423379 (N.D. 
Cal. Aug. 22, 2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court 
remanded the case. It found no evidence that the plaintiff acted in bad faith 
where the plaintiff dismissed the jurisdictional spoiler more than one year 
after commencement once it had reached a $10,000 settlement agreement. 
Instead, the court found that the defendant acted in bad faith by removing just 
prior to commencement of trial in state court. The court awarded attorneys’ 
fees and costs to the plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). [204]  
  









Toro v. CSX Intermodal Terminals, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 320 (D. Mass. 
2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court 
remanded the case, finding that the defendant had not timely removed within 
the relevant thirty-day period and further finding that the defendant’s 
allegation that the plaintiff concealed the amount in controversy in bad faith 
was misplaced because it was clear from the outset that the amount in 
controversy exceeded $75,000. The court awarded attorneys’ fees and costs to 
the plaintiff pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). [207]  
  
Filed May 2014; removed Mar. 2016; remanded Aug. 9, 2016.  
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Heacock v. Rolling Frito-Lay Sales, LP, No. C16-0829-JCC, 2016 WL 
4009849 (W.D. Wash. July 27, 2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement and a few 
weeks before trial was scheduled. The court found no bad faith prevention of 
removal in a case where the plaintiff sued a diverse employer and a non-
diverse employee for injuries arising from the employee’s alleged negligence. 
The court found that the plaintiff actively litigated the case against the 
employee. “Frito Lay's assertions similarly fail to meet the standard of inactive 
litigation discussed by Ninth Circuit district courts. Heacock served Tally with 
two discovery requests and deposed her. Even if Heacock's efforts constitute a 
bare minimum effort to litigate against Tally, that is sufficient to qualify as 
‘active litigation.” Id. at * 4. [210]  
  








Oakland v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., Inc., No. 2:16-cv-00608-RAJ, 
2016 WL 9415202 (W.D. Wash. July 26, 2016).   
  
The case was removed for a second time more than one year after 
commencement. The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiffs 
were to blame for the untimely removal. The court rejected the defendant’s 
argument that it was prevented from conducting discovery while the case was 
in federal court after the first removal and noted that the defendant offered no 
reason why it could not have removed within the one-year period. Id. at *1. 
[211]  
  






Shorraw v. Bell, No. 4:15-cv-03998-JMC, 2016 WL 3586675 (D. S.C. July 5, 
2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court 
remanded the case, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith forum 
manipulation on the part of the plaintiff. The court noted that the plaintiff 
actively litigated the case against the jurisdictional spoiler by retaining an 
expert in the spoiler’s field of expertise and surviving the spoiler’s motion to 
dismiss in state court. [215]  
  
Filed Apr. 13, 2013; removed for the second time Sept. 25, 2015; remanded July 
5, 2016.  
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Iqbal v. Normandin Transit, Inc., No. 15-CV-746-A, 2016 WL 3563218 
(W.D.N.Y. July 1, 2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded, finding that the defendant failed to prove the plaintiff’s bad 
faith by clear and convincing evidence. The court noted that the diverse 
defendants acknowledged that it was “objectively clear in the circumstances 
just a few months after the action was commenced that neither of the non-
diverse municipal defendants named by the plaintiff were potentially liable.” 
Id. at *1. [216]  
   





Young v. White Castle Sys., Inc., No. 4:16-cv-00553-JCH, 2016 WL 3197305 
(E.D. Mo. June 9, 2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. After the 
plaintiff voluntarily dismissed one non-diverse defendant, the diverse 
defendant removed the case, arguing that the remaining non-diverse 
defendant had been fraudulently joined and that the plaintiff acted in bad 
faith. The district court remanded the case, finding that complete diversity 
did not exist because the remaining non-diverse defendant had not been 
fraudulently joined. [222]  
  







Lujan v. Alorica, Inc., EP-15-CV-355-KC, 2016 WL 8857008 (W.D. Tex. 
May 24, 2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded the case, finding that the plaintiff did not act in bad faith 
because the plaintiff’s claim for damages (lost wages) at the time the case was 
filed could not have exceeded $75,000. The court also noted that the defendant 
failed to attempt to discover the amount in controversy until well after one year 
had passed and found that the defendant’s lack of vigilance further supported 
remand. The court awarded the plaintiff attorneys’ fees and expenses pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). [226]  
  
Filed Apr. 25, 2012; removed Nov. 30, 2015; remanded May 24, 2016.  
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White v. Lexington Court Apartments, LLC, No. DKC 16-0427, 
2016 WL 1558340 (D. Md. Apr.  
18, 2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded the case, finding that the plaintiff did not act in 
bad faith to prevent removal. [236]  
  





Ellison v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 177 F. Supp. 3d 967 (S.D. W.Va. 
2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
removing defendant argued that the plaintiff acted in bad faith. The 
district court remanded, finding that the amount in controversy 
requirement was not met. [237]  
  






Bryson v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1:16-CV-28, 2016 WL 
1305846 (E.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2016).  
  
The district court remanded, finding that the defendant failed to 
demonstrate the plaintiff acted in bad faith by dismissing the spoiler 
more than one year after commencement. The spoiler had filed for 
bankruptcy and the bankruptcy proceedings continued until shortly 
before the plaintiff nonsuited the spoiler after reaching a settlement 
agreement approved by the bankruptcy court. [239]  
  
Filed Nov. 6, 2014; removed Jan. 28, 2016; remanded Mar. 31, 2016.   
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Federal Nat’l Mortg. Assoc. v. Milasinovich, 161 F. Supp. 3d 981 
(D. N. Mex. 2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
pro se defendant removed. The district court remanded, finding that 
the defendant failed to demonstrate that the plaintiff acted in bad faith 
to prevent removal. The court awarded plaintiff attorneys’ fees and 
expenses pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). [241]  
  
Filed July 20, 2009; removed for the second time on July 20, 2015; 





Cesarin v. Asbestos Corp., Ltd., No. 15-cv-06056-HSG, 2016 WL 
720684 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 24, 2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded after finding insufficient evidence of bad faith. 
Although the plaintiff dismissed the jurisdictional spoiler more than 
one year after commencement, the plaintiff’s counsel and the 
plaintiff’s private investigator submitted declarations indicating that 
they had continued to search for evidence to support the plaintiff’s 
claim against the spoiler. [251]  
  





Martinez v. Yordy, 16 Civ. 005 (BMC), 2016 WL 8711443 (E.D. 
N.Y. Feb. 19, 2016).  
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded the case finding insufficient evidence that the 
plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal by concealing the 
amount-in-controversy. “[The Court] will not determine that [the] 
plaintiff's failure to provide a bill of particulars was intended to 
prevent removal where [the] defendants did not take action for five 
months and did not move the court to compel that information before 
the statutory time had passed.” Id. at *3. [252]  
  
Filed July 21, 2014; removed Jan. 4, 2016; remanded Feb. 19, 2016.  
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Miami Beach Cosmetic & Plastic Surgery Ctr., Inc. v. UnitedHealthcare 
Ins. Co., No. 1:15-cv-24041-UU, 2016 WL 8607846 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court found that the defendant’s removal was premature because the state 
court had not granted the plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint in a 
manner so as to seek more than $75,000. The court further indicated, 
however, that the plaintiff had not acted in bad faith in failing to seek to 
amend prior to expiration of the one-year period, noting that the plaintiff’s 
explanation was “consistent with a straightforward change in strategy.” Id. at 
*5. [263]  
 





Safety Harbor Centre, Inc. v. Hancock Bank, No: 8:15–cv–2553–T–
36TGW, 2015 WL 13306197 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 28, 2015).  
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith on the part of the 
plaintiff. The court held that the plaintiff had not fraudulently joined the 
jurisdictional spoiler and noted that after hearing the spoiler’s motion to 
dismiss, the state court requested additional briefing, suggesting that the non-
viability of the claims against the spoiler was not as clear as suggested by the 
removing defendant. [267]  
 





ALC Holding v. Federated Ins. Co., No. CV-15-08162-PCT-GMS, 2015 
WL 9312081 (D. Ariz. Dec. 23, 2015).  
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded, finding that the plaintiff disclosed the amount in controversy 
prior to the expiration of the one-year period when the plaintiff moved to 
confirm an appraisal of more than $600,000. [268]   
 
Filed May 6, 2014; removed Aug. 27, 2015; remanded Dec. 23, 2015.  
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McDuffie v. Davidson, No. 1:15-CV-03360-CAP, 2015 WL 10960936 
(N.D. Ga. Nov. 3. 2015).  
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded the case, finding “no proof that [the] plaintiff acted in bad 
faith.” Id. at *2. [279]  
  
Filed Dec. 18, 2014; removed for the second time on Sept. 24, 2015; 








Educ. Mgmt. Servs., LLC v. Cadero, No. 5:15–CV–686 RP., 2015 WL 
6690401 (W. D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2015).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded the case, finding that the plaintiff did not act in bad 
faith. Despite the removing defendant’s contention that the amount-in 
controversy exceeded $75,000, the plaintiff continued to assert that it did 
not. “Defendant may disagree, but disagreement alone does not evince bad 
faith.” Id. at *4. [280]  
  





Johnson v. HCR Manocare LLC, No. 1:15-cv-00189, 2015 WL 6511301 
(N.D.W. Va. Oct. 28, 2015).  
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith on the part 
of the plaintiff. The court noted that the plaintiffs had deposed the 
jurisdictional spoiler and found that the plaintiff’s counsel had not engaged 
in systemic forum manipulation by dismissing jurisdictional spoilers on the 
eve of trial in other similar cases because the plaintiff’s counsel contended 
such dismissals were part of counsel’s trial strategy in those cases. [281]  
  
Filed July 14, 2014; removed Oct. 26, 2015 (approximately one week before 
trial); remanded Oct. 28, 2015.  
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In re Boston Scientific Corp., No. CV 15-06764, et al., 2015 WL 6456528 
(C.D. Cal. Oct. 26, 2015).   
  
This opinion involves mesh-implant litigation. The plaintiff filed suit in state 
court and joined sixty-one plaintiffs who were diverse from the defendant 
and three plaintiffs who were not diverse from the defendant. The defendant 
removed, alleging fraudulent misjoinder. The district court remanded the 
case. The state court severed the plaintiffs’ claims and the defendant 
removed the 62 cases involving diverse plaintiffs more than one year after 
commencement. The district court remanded 62 separate cases, finding that 
the plaintiffs had not engaged in bad faith by joining nondiverse plaintiffs in 
the original action. Although the state court found that the plaintiffs’ claims 
were misjoined and severed the claims, the state court did not find that the 
joinder was fraudulent or in bad faith. In addition, the district court observed 
that the defendant could have obtained severance and removal within one 
year of commencement but failed to do so. “Defendant has also not pointed 
to any conduct preventing it from seeking severance prior to July 2015, 
when it eventually attempted to sever the plaintiffs' claims. Additionally, 
there is no evidence before the Court indicating that Defendant could not 
have sought severance and removed the action within the one-year time 
limit.” Id. at *6. [283]  
  
Filed July 12, 2013; removed Aug. 28. 2013 based upon fraudulent 
misjoinder; remanded; claims severed in state court Aug. 5. 2015; removed 
for the second time more than one year after commencement; remanded Oct. 







In re Boston Scientific Corp., No. CV 15-6666 PA (PLAx), et al., 2015 WL 
5822582 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2015).   
  
This opinion involves mesh-implant litigation. One case was filed in state 
court on July 12, 2013 and involved the joinder of 66 plaintiffs, the large 
majority of whom were diverse from the defendant. The other case was filed 
in state court on December 20, 2013 and involved the joinder of 43 
plaintiffs, the large majority of whom were diverse from the defendant. The 
defendant removed both cases. The district court remanded both cases. By 
order dated August 5, 2015, the state court severed all of the plaintiffs’ 
claims. The defendant then removed 102 of the claims brought by diverse 
plaintiffs. The district court remanded 102 separate cases, finding that the 
plaintiffs had not engaged in bad faith by joining non-diverse plaintiffs in 
the original actions. The district court refused to find bad faith on the part of 
the plaintiffs, noting that their joinder of non-diverse plaintiffs in the 
original state court action was not egregious or fraudulent. [293]  
  
Filed July 12, 2013 & Dec. 20, 2013; removed; remanded; claims severed in 
state court on Aug. 5, 2015; removed for the second time between Sept. 1, 
2015 and Sept. 4, 2015; remanded Sept. 20, 2015.  
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Alvarez v. Areas USA LAX, LLC, No. CV 15-5033-JFW (PLAx), 2015 WL 
5050520 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 2015).  
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded the case, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith on the part 
of the plaintiff. The court held:   
Not only did Plaintiff claim that the amount in controversy 
exceeded $25,000 (which is a standard allegation, and not 
nefarious as Defendant suggests), Plaintiff claimed that he “has 
suffered and continues to sustain substantial losses in earnings and 
other employment benefits” and that he “has suffered humiliation, 
emotional distress, and mental and physical pain and anguish,” and 
sought, for example, back pay, front pay, damages for emotional 
distress, punitive damages, and attorneys’ fees. . .  In fact, given 
the nature and broad range of damages sought in Plaintiff’s 
Complaint, Defendant may have been entitled to remove solely 
based on the face of the Complaint, without any discovery. 
Regardless, Defendant was certainly on notice that there was a 
very strong likelihood that Plaintiff’s damages would exceed 
$75,000. Despite this notice and for some unknown reason, 
Defendant never specifically asked Plaintiff whether he sought 
more than $75,000 in damages, never asked Plaintiff to stipulate 
that he sought less than $75,000 in damages, and never directly 
raised the issue of removal with Plaintiff. 
Id. at *3.  
  
The court further held, “More importantly, if Defendant had truly believed that 
Plaintiff’s responses to its discovery requests were in any way insufficient or 
made in bad faith to prevent removal, Defendant could have and should have 
filed a motion to compel discovery well within a year of the commencement of 
this action.” Id. at *3. [299]  
  








Gastelum v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., No. 2:15–cv–00126–JAD–VCF, 2015 
WL 4928021 (D. Nev. Aug. 18, 2015).  
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith on the part of the 
plaintiff. The court noted that the defendant had largely directed the 
progression of the case from the outset. [361]  
  
Filed Oct. 16, 2013; removed for the third time Jan. 22, 2015; remanded Aug. 
18, 2015.  
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Ramirez v. Johnson & Johnson, No. 2:15-CV-09131, 2015 WL 4665809 
(S.D.W.Va. Aug. 6, 2015).  
  
The plaintiff sued diverse manufacturers of transvaginal surgical mesh and 
non-diverse doctor for injuries arising from complications after implantation. 
The defendants removed more than one year after commencement and 
argued that the plaintiff fraudulently joined the non-diverse doctor and acted 
in bad faith to prevent removal. The district court remanded, finding 
insufficient evidence of bad faith. The court noted that the non-diverse 
doctor remained a defendant almost three years after commencement and 
further noted that the plaintiff had litigated her claim against the non-diverse 
defendant by propounding discovery requests and retaining an expert whose 
report addressed the non-diverse doctor’s conduct. [366]  
  





Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Franklin, No. 6:15–cv–1038–Orl–
37GLK, 2015 WL 4478127 (M.D. Fla. July 21, 2015).  
  
Bank sued the defendant for foreclosure in state court. The defendant 
removed more than one year after commencement, alleging federal question 
and diversity jurisdiction. The district court remanded, finding no 
jurisdiction and further finding that the plaintiff’s conduct did not warrant 
equitable tolling. In so ruling, the court cited the JVCA’s “bad faith” 
requirement for removal more than year after commencement. [374]  
  
Filed in 2008; removed Jun. 24, 2015; remanded July 21, 2015).  
  





Nationstar Mortg., LLC. V. DeMers, No. 3:14cv494/MCR/CJK, 2015 WL 
4430990 (N.D. Fla. July 17, 2015). 
    
  
The plaintiff sued the defendant for debt under a promissory note and 
mortgage. The defendant removed more than one year after commencement. 
The district court remanded, finding no evidence that the plaintiff acted in 
bad faith to prevent the defendant from removing. [376]  
  
Filed Jan. 2010; removed Sept. 19, 2014; remanded July 17, 2015.   
  
Note: Although the case was filed in 2010, the district court applied the JVCA.  
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Fruge v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. L.P., No. 2:14-CV-2382, 2015 WL 
4134992 (W.D. La. July 7, 2015).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court affirmed the magistrate’s memorandum ruling and remanded the case, 
finding insufficient evidence of bad faith. It noted that the plaintiff ardently 
pursued the clams against the non-diverse defendants and kept them in the 
case well after the one-year period expired. It also noted that if the non-
diverse defendants had been fraudulently joined (as argued by the removing 
defendant), the defendant should have removed the case within the one-year 
period. [378]  
  








McHugh v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC, No. 4:15–cv–00046 (CDL), 
2015 WL 4067599 (M.D. Ga. July 2, 2015).  
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded the case, finding that it was not removed within 30 days and 
that it was removed more than one year after commencement with no 
evidence that the plaintiffs prevented removal in bad faith. The district court 
found that the defendant’s counsel was aware of the plaintiff’s demand for 
more than $75,000 almost nine months before the case was removed. The 
district court ordered the defendant to pay more than $2,400 in expenses and 
fees to the plaintiffs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). [379]  
  





Birkner v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., No. SA–15–CA–172–OLG, 2015 
WL 13048731 (W. D. Tex. June 5, 2015).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded the case after finding insufficient evidence that the plaintiff 
acted in bad faith. The court noted that the plaintiff’s interrogatory responses 
revealed the nature of the case within the one-year period. [385]  
    
Filed Jan. 2, 2014; removed Mar. 15, 2015; remanded June 5, 2015.  
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Matherne Instrumentation Specialists, Inc. v. Mighty Enters., Inc., No. 
15–1159, 2015 WL 3505032 (E. D. La. June 3, 2015).  
  
The plaintiff corporation sued diverse manufacturer and non-diverse retail 
seller of lathes alleging fraud and unfair and deceptive trade practices. The 
plaintiff amended the complaint to add the individual diverse owner of the 
manufacturer. The diverse defendants removed after obtaining an email 
through discovery written by the president of the non-diverse retail seller 
indicating that it was in full cooperation with the plaintiff in attempting to 
place the blame on the diverse manufacturer. The removing defendants 
argued that the email demonstrated collusion between the plaintiff and the 
retail seller and that the plaintiff did not intend to collect upon any 
judgment that might be entered against the retail seller. The district court 
remanded, finding that the defendant could not even prove that the plaintiff 
fraudulently joined the retail seller by a preponderance of the evidence. 
The court further held that the relevant inquiry was whether the plaintiff 
intended to obtain a judgment against the non-diverse defendant, not 
whether the plaintiff intended to collect upon such judgment. [386]  
  







Tallman v. HL Corp. (Shenzhen), No. 14–5550(WHW)(CLW), 2015 WL 
3556348 (D. N.J. May 27, 2015).  
  
The diverse defendant first removed the insurance indemnity action 
alleging that the plaintiff fraudulently joined the in-state defendant. The 
district court remanded after finding no fraudulent joinder. After 
conducting additional discovery, the defendant removed a second time 
more than one year after commencement. The district court remanded a 
second time, finding that the removing defendant failed to demonstrate bad 
faith. The removing defendant alleged that the in-state defendant was not 
the supplier of the product in question. The district court noted some 
evidence to support the plaintiff’s allegations. [389]  
  
Filed Mar. 17, 2014; removed for the second time Apr. 1, 2015; remanded 
May 27, 2015).   
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Moris v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, No. 14–4981 (SRN/SER), 2015 WL 2373457 
(D. Minn. May 18, 2015).  
  
The plaintiff sued various entities for the wrongful death of his wife after she 
died from injuries sustained while operating her Chrysler minivan. The 
defendants removed. The plaintiff moved to remand. The parties stipulated to 
remand and agreed to the dismissal of Chrysler Canada without prejudice 
subject to the plaintiff’s right to refile against Chrysler Canada at the close of 
discovery. After discovery, the plaintiff amended the complaint to add 
Chrysler Canada. Chrysler Canada then removed more than one year after 
commencement. The district court remanded, finding no bad faith on the part 
of the plaintiff given the parties’ stipulation that the plaintiff could re-file the 
claim against Chrysler Canada after the close of discovery. [393]  
  
Filed in 2013; removed for the second time on Dec. 11, 2014; remanded May 





Lare v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 15–1231, 2015 WL 2116490 (E.D. 
Pa. May 6, 2015).  
  
The plaintiffs filed pro se action against their homeowner’s insurer seeking 
less than $50,000 pursuant to their insurance policy. The case proceeded to 
arbitration and the arbitrator awarded plaintiffs more than $35,000. The insurer 
appealed the arbitration award and demanded a jury trial. Facing the prospect 
of a jury trial, the plaintiffs retained counsel who amended the complaint more 
than two weeks prior to the expiration of the one-year period to add a claim for 
insurance bad faith. The amended complaint alleged that the insurer’s frivolous 
appeal of the arbitration award constituted bad faith and sought extra-
contractual and punitive damages in addition to the contractual damages that 
were sought in the original complaint. The defendant insurer removed after 
expiration of the one-year period. The district court remanded the case, finding 
that the defendant had not demonstrated deceptive conduct by the plaintiffs, 
noting that the plaintiffs’ amended complaint was primarily motivated by the 
insurer’s appeal of the arbitration award and further noting that the plaintiffs’ 
amended complaint was filed two weeks before expiration of the one-year 
policy, leaving the defendant sufficient time to remove within one year. [397]  
  
Filed Mar. 4, 2014; removed Mar. 11, 2015; remanded May 6, 2015.  
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Mintz & Gold LLP v. Daibes, No. 15 Civ. 1218(PAE), 2015 WL 2130935 
(S.D. N.Y. May 6, 2015).  
  
Law firm sued its client in state court seeking more than $75,000. More than 
four years later, the appellate court entered an order directing the trial court 
to enter partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Two days later, 
the defendant removed based upon diversity jurisdiction and asserted bad 
faith on the part of the plaintiff. The district court remanded, finding no 
evidence that the plaintiff acted in bad faith, given that the case was 
removable based upon the original complaint. The court further noted that 
the defendant was apparently engaged in improper forum shopping given 
that it removed the case immediately after the trial court had been ordered to 
enter summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The district court awarded 
the plaintiff costs pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and sanctioned the 
defendant’s lawyer pursuant to Rule 11. [399]  
  
Filed Apr. 11, 2011; removed Feb. 19, 2015; remanded May 6, 2015.   
  





Delaney v. CasePro, Inc., No. 9:14–cv–4355–DCN, 2015 WL 1862871 (D. 
S.C. Apr. 23, 2015).   
  
The plaintiff sued a diverse defendant and an in-state defendant. After the in-
state defendant was granted summary judgment more than one year after the 
case was filed, the diverse defendant removed. The district court remanded 
the case, finding that no evidence of bad faith was presented and noting that 
bad faith will not be presumed simply because summary judgment was 
granted to the non-diverse defendant. [403]  
  







Rulis v. LA Fitness, No. 13–1582, 2015 WL 1344745 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 24, 
2015).   
  
The state court granted summary judgment to the non-diverse defendant. The 
diverse defendant then removed more than one year after commencement. 
The district court remanded the case, finding that the plaintiff’s failure to 
engage in discovery with respect to the non-diverse defendant within the 
one-year period did not signal bad faith given that the state court discovery 
deadline was set well after expiration of the one-year period. [421]  
  
Filed Feb. 27, 2013; removed for the second time on Jan. 20, 2015; remanded 
Mar. 24, 2015.  
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Gonzales S. Tex. Elec. Corp. v. Jeffrey C. Stone, Inc., No. H–14–2216, 2014 
WL 7072437 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 12, 2014).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court found no evidence that the plaintiff manipulated the forum, noting that a 
party other than the plaintiff created complete diversity by dismissing its 
claims against the plaintiff. Note that this case is unusual because the original 
defendant was realigned as a plaintiff after dismissal of claims against him. 
Third-party defendants actually removed the case and argued that the original 
defendant (later realigned as a plaintiff) had prevented removal jurisdiction. 
[443]  
  





Hamilton San Diego Apartments, LP v. RBC Capital Mkts., LLC, No. 
14cv01856 WQH (BLM), 2014 WL 7175598 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2014).   
  
The plaintiff dismissed the non-diverse defendant more than two months after 
expiration of the one-year period. The diverse defendant removed more than 
one month later. The district court remanded, finding that the defendant had 
not demonstrated bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. The court held that the 
plaintiff’s lawyer had plausible explanations for the failure to pursue 
discovery from the non-diverse party and for the timing of non-diverse 
party’s dismissal. [445]  
  








Campbell v. R.E. Garrison Trucking, Inc., No. 8:14–cv–2270–T–23MAP, 
2014 WL 6801827 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 2, 2014).  
  
The plaintiff sued the defendant in state court for damages in excess of 
$15,000. The defendant removed. The district court remanded, finding no 
evidence to support the defendant’s assertion that the amount in controversy 
exceeded $75,000. The defendant removed a second time, after expiration of 
the one-year period, and argued that the plaintiff had acted in bad faith. The 
district court remanded the case finding no evidence to support bad faith and 
further finding that the amount in controversy requirement had not been met. 
[451]  
  
Filed Aug. 27, 2013; removed for the second time Sept. 11, 2014; remanded 
Dec. 2, 2104.   
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WBCMT 2007-C33 Office 7870, LLC v. Breakwater Equity Partners LLC, 
No. 1:14–CV–588, 2014 WL 6673712 (Nov. 24, 2014).   
  
The plaintiff brought breach-of-contract claims against various borrowers who 
owned the property at issue. The plaintiff also named the county treasurer as a 
defendant in his individual capacity. After settling with the borrowers, the 
plaintiff filed a motion to amend the complaint almost a month before 
expiration of the one-year period. The court granted the plaintiff leave to 
amend after expiration of the one-year period and the plaintiff field amended 
the complaint naming four new diverse defendants. The amended complaint 
did not name the non-diverse treasurer. The defendants removed. The district 
court remanded, finding no bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. The court held 
that the plaintiff had not fraudulently joined the in-state treasurer and that, 
therefore, even if the plaintiff had brought suit against the diverse defendants 
prior to the expiration of the one-year period, removal would not have been 
proper due to the non-diverse treasurer’s presence as a defendant. [453]  
  





Escalante v. Burlington Nat. Indem., Ltd., No. 2:14–CV–7237–ODW 
(JPRx), 2014 WL 6670002 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2014).  
  
The plaintiffs filed a complaint against non-diverse the defendants and a 
Cayman Island citizen. The plaintiffs spent more than a year effectuating 
process on the foreign defendant. After the expiration of the one-year period, 
the non-diverse defendants moved for summary judgment. The plaintiffs 
dismissed the non-diverse parties and the foreign defendant removed. The 
district court remanded, finding no bad faith on the part of the plaintiffs. The 
court found that the plaintiffs had not fraudulently joined the non-diverse 
defendants because the plaintiffs had been misled to believe that they had a 
cause of action against the non-diverse defendants. The court noted that even if 
the plaintiffs had been able to serve the foreign defendant prior to expiration of 
the one-year period, removal would not have been proper because the non-
diverse defendants were still parties to the litigation at that time. [454]  
  
Filed Jan. 16, 2013; removed Sept. 16, 2014; remanded Nov. 24, 2104.  
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Houlik v. Santander Consumer, USA, Inc., No. 14–1101–KHV, 2014 WL 
6632951 (D. Kan. Nov. 21, 2104).  
  
The plaintiffs borrowed money to purchase a pick-up truck. After the pick-up 
truck was wrongfully repossessed, the plaintiffs sued the diverse lender and 
the non-diverse entity the lender had hired to repossess the plaintiffs’ truck. 
Although the non-diverse defendant had not answered or entered an 
appearance, the plaintiffs had not filed a motion for default judgment. The 
diverse defendant removed after expiration of the one-year period, arguing that 
the plaintiff had acted in bad faith by abandoning the claim against the non-
diverse defendant and by concealing the true amount in controversy. The 
district court remanded after finding no bad faith. The plaintiffs demanded 
more than $75,000 in their initial petition and had not abandoned their claim 
against the non-diverse defendant. The plaintiffs’ attorney explained that, 
pursuant to state law, it was much more efficient in a multi-party case to delay 
the default judgment hearing on damages until trial against the remaining 
party. [456]  





Aguayo v. AMCO Ins. Co., 59 F. Supp. 3d 1225 (D. N. Mex. 2014).   
  
The district found that the plaintiffs did not engage in improper strategic 
joinder by naming non-diverse defendants and retaining some in the lawsuit 
beyond the one-year period. This is one of the most thorough opinions 
addressing the bad faith exception. For a thorough discussion of the case, see 
supra notes 187-211. and accompanying text. [460]   





Bajaba, LLC v. Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC, No. 14–CV–4057, 
2014 WL 5363905 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 21, 2014).   
  
The plaintiff sued a diverse seller of a steel building and the seller’s 
non-diverse authorized dealer and builder. More than two years later, 
the plaintiff moved to non-suit the nondiverse defendants for lack of 
service. The diverse defendant then removed. The district court 
remanded, finding no bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. The court 
noted that the plaintiffs had attempted to locate and serve the non-
diverse defendants. The defendant moved the district court to 
reconsider. The district court denied the motion. See Case No. 5 in 
Table E. [464]   
No dates.  
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Hall v. Leisure Time Prods., Inc., No. 3:14-CV-465, 2014 WL 5019687 (E.D. 
Va. Oct. 7, 2014).  
  
The plaintiff sued several defendants, including one non-diverse LLC, for 
injuries allegedly caused by hardware used to support a child’s swing set. 
After the nondiverse LLC’s designated representative testified by deposition 
after expiration of the one-year period that it had no responsibility for the 
product at issue, the plaintiff non-suited the non-diverse defendant. The 
diverse defendants removed. The district court remanded, finding 
insufficient evidence of bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. The court noted 
that the plaintiff had not strategically withheld any information from the 
defendants and that the defendants could have alleged fraudulent joinder as a 
basis for removal from the outset. The court further noted that the diverse 
defendant had ample opportunity to engage in discovery prior to the 
expiration of the one-year period in order to establish the non-diverse LLC’s 
lack of responsibility. [468]  
  
Filed Mar. 4, 2013; removed for the second time on June 25, 2014; remanded 





Sanchez v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A, Inc., No. 14–CV–702 JAP/GBW, 
2014 WL 10298033 (D. N. Mex. Oct. 6, 2014).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded, finding that the plaintiff had not fraudulently joined the 
non-diverse defendant and further finding no evidence of bad faith on the 
part of the plaintiff. [469]  
  
Filed June 10, 2013; removed Aug. 8, 2014; remanded Oct. 6, 2014.   
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Day v. W. World Ins. Co., No. 14–00348–BAJ–SCR, 2014 WL 4373301 
(M.D. La. Sept. 3, 2014).   
  
The plaintiffs sued diverse defendants, including in-state defendants, for 
damages sustained in a tractor-trailer accident. More than four years later 
and shortly before trial was set, the plaintiffs added an additional diverse 
excess insurer who then removed, arguing that complete diversity existed 
because the plaintiffs had reached settlement agreements with the in-state 
defendants. The court applied the Tedford equitable exception, which it said 
was governed by the same standards as the JVCA amendment, and found 
that the defendants had not demonstrated bad faith. Although the newly 
added defendant argued that plaintiffs should have added it as party sooner, 
the court noted that removal would have been improper at an earlier point 
because the plaintiffs had pending viable claims against the in-state 
defendants. [475]  
  
Filed Feb. 5, 2010; removed June 3, 2014; remanded Sept. 3, 2014.  
  
Note: The case was filed in 2010. The court applied the Tedford equitable 





Tran v. Thompson, No. 14–263–SDD–SCR, 2014 WL 4161784 (M.D. La. 
Aug. 19, 2014).   
  
Parents sued school board, school employee, and two insurers after their 
daughter injured herself falling from a wheelchair while receiving 
instruction from the school employee. The plaintiffs settled with the school 
board, school employee, and one insurer. Before the dismissal order was 
entered, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint naming four additional 
defendants. The defendants removed, arguing that the amended complaint 
was a new cause of action and also arguing bad faith on the part of the 
plaintiffs. The district court remanded. The court applied the Tedford 
equitable exception, which it said was governed by the same standards as 
the JVCA amendment, and found that the defendants had not demonstrated 
bad faith. The court noted that even if plaintiffs had added the additional 
four defendants at an earlier point, the case would not have been removable 
given that the plaintiffs were pursuing viable claims against the in-state 
defendants. [479]  
  
Filed Aug. 21, 2008; removed May 1, 2014; remanded Aug. 19, 2014.  
  
Note: The case was filed in 2008. The court applied the Tedford equitable 
exception and found no bad faith.  
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HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A. v. DeGeorge, No. 3:14–cv–217–J–32JBT, 2014 
WL 3721273 (M.D. Fla. July 28, 2014).   
  
The plaintiff bank sued the defendant in state court for an alleged breach of a 
credit card agreement and sought $51,129.38 in damages plus interest. The 
district court remanded the case the first time, finding that the pro se 
defendant had failed to establish bad faith and had further failed to establish 
the jurisdictional amount. The district court remanded a second time, again 
finding that the defendant failed to establish any bad faith or the required 
amount in controversy. [482]  
  
Filed Sept. 24, 2009; removed for a second time; remanded July 28, 2014.  




Green v. Hyundai Power Transformers USA, Inc., No. 2:14–cv–00014–
MEF–TFM, 2014 WL 2862894 (M.D. Ala. June 24, 2014).   
  
Employee sued employer and Korean drill press manufacturer for injuries 
sustained while using the drill at work. After expiration of the one-year 
period, the plaintiff dismissed the non-diverse employer after it settled the 
plaintiff’s workers’ compensation claim. Although the plaintiff immediately 
sought the assistance of a company in serving foreign entities, the plaintiff 
did not serve the Korean manufacturer until after expiration of the one-year 
period. The district court remanded, finding that the plaintiff did not act in 
bad faith so as to delay service on the foreign manufacturer. [491]    
  






Public Serv. Towers, Inc. v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 28 F. Supp. 3d 1313 
(M.D. Ga. 2014).   
  
The plaintiff sued the defendant in federal court, alleging that the defendant’s 
retaining wall encroached on its property. The case was remanded after the 
plaintiff determined it was unlikely to satisfy the amount in controversy 
requirement – in part, due to the declining property values. More than five 
years later, the defendant removed, claiming the amount in controversy 
requirement was met based upon its receipt of a settlement demand for 
$160,000. The district court remanded finding no evidence that the plaintiff, 
who had originally filed the case in federal court, made any misrepresentation 
regarding the amount in controversy, given that the property values had 
declined. [492]  
  
Filed July 3, 2008; removed Apr. 16, 2014; remanded June 24, 2014.   
  
Note: The case was filed in 2008. The district court applied the Tedford 
equitable exception and found no bad faith forum manipulation.  
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Estate of Morris v. Mid-Century Ins. Co., No. 4:13CV2134, 2014 WL 
2803477 (N.D. Ohio June 19, 2104).  
  
The plaintiff sued diverse insurer and in-state adjuster for breach of contract 
and breach of the duty of good faith. The case was removed based upon 
fraudulent joinder. The district court denied the plaintiff’s motion to 
remand. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding no fraudulent joinder. After 
the case was remanded, the state court dismissed the plaintiff’s claims 
against the adjuster for failure to state a claim and the diverse insurer 
removed more than one year after commencement. Although the court 
refused to recognize a common law exception to the one-year bar, the court 
found that the plaintiff had not acted in bad faith given that the Seventh 
Circuit had decided that the adjuster had not been fraudulently joined in 
light of the fact that state law was less than clear with respect to an 
adjuster’s liability. [495]  
  
Filed Aug. 1, 2011; removed the first time based upon alleged fraudulent 
joinder of the adjuster; remanded based upon the appellate court’s finding 
no fraudulent joinder; removed for the second time on Sep. 26, 2013; 
remanded June 19, 2014.  
  
Note: The case was filed in 2011. The court refused to recognize an equitable 





In re Zoloft Prods. Liability Litig., MDL No. 2342, et al., 2014 WL 
2445799 (E.D. Pa. May 29, 2014).  
  
The plaintiff sued an in-state drug manufacturer and added a diverse drug 
manufacturer five years later, by which time the original defendant had 
changed citizenship and was no longer a citizen of the forum state. The 
newly added defendant removed. The JVCA did not apply. The court held 
that even if it were to recognize an equitable exception, the defendant had 
failed to prove bad faith prevention of removal. [498]  
  
Filed in 2007; removed in late 2012 or early 2013; remanded May 29, 2014.  
  
Note: The case was filed in 2007. The court held that even if it were to 
recognize an equitable exception, the plaintiff had not acted in bad faith.  
  
    
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2019






NKD Diversified Enters., Inc. v. First Mercury Ins., No. 1:14–cv–00183–
AWI–SAB, 2014 WL 1671659 (Apr. 29, 2014).   
  
The plaintiffs sued a diverse insurer for breach of contract and breach of the 
duty of good faith and a non-diverse insurer for negligent misrepresentation. 
More than one year after commencement, the plaintiffs dismissed the non-
diverse defendant and the diverse defendant removed. The district court 
remanded after finding that the defendant failed to demonstrate bad faith on 
the part of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs stated a claim against the non-diverse 
party and propounded discovery. Moreover, the plaintiffs explained that they 
determined to dismiss the non-diverse defendant after obtaining admissions 
from the diverse defendant that made their theory of recovery against the non-
diverse defendant unnecessary. The district court rejected the defendant’s 
argument that the plaintiffs only conducted minimal discovery with respect to 
the non-diverse defendant. [508]  
  







Petrie v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. H–14–411, 2014 WL 1621781 (S.D. 
Tex. Apr. 22, 2014).  
  
The plaintiffs sued diverse and non-diverse parties for breach of contract and 
unfair debt collection related to a foreclosure. The defendants removed, 
asserting federal question jurisdiction and diversity jurisdiction based upon 
alleged fraudulent joinder of the nondiverse party. The case was remanded. 
The state court judge denied summary judgment to the non-diverse party but 
allegedly commented at the hearing that he did not believe the plaintiffs would 
be able to prevail on their claims against the non-diverse defendant in front of 
a jury. The plaintiffs then non-suited the non-diverse defendant and the 
remaining diverse defendants removed for the second time, arguing bad faith 
on the part of the plaintiffs. The district court remanded, finding no bad faith 
because the plaintiffs’ decision to non-suit the non-diverse defendant was in 
reaction to the state court judge’s comment and their decision not to incur 
additional discovery expenses on a weak claim. [513]  
  
Filed May 1, 2012; removed for the second time Feb. 19, 2014; remanded Apr. 
22, 2014.  
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Highfield v. The Kroger Co., No. 1:14-CV-649-AT, 2014 WL 12115990 
(N.D. Ga. Apr. 16, 2014).    
The plaintiff sued a diverse grocery store owner for injuries arising from a slip-
and-fall. The defendant removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith. “In response 
to Defendant's request for an itemized list of expenses and special damages 
related to the case, Plaintiff submitted the names of nine healthcare providers 
and listed approximately $47,500 of expenses owed to two of the providers. 
Plaintiff indicated he was ‘still obtaining’ medical expenses for the remaining 
seven providers, and noted that expenses were ‘still accruing’ for two 
providers.” Id. at *1. The court found that the plaintiff’s discovery responses 
made nine months prior to expiration of the one-year period and the fact that 
the plaintiff was alleging a head injury should have put the defendant on notice 
that damages might exceed $75,000. [515]   





Xiong v. Travelers Home & Marine Ins. Co., No. 13–CV–790–JED–FHM, 
2014 WL 12706999 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 9, 2014).    
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded the case, finding insufficient evidence of bad faith. The court 
noted that the plaintiff attempted to serve the non-diverse defendant, that the 
defendant did not propound discovery regarding the plaintiff’s claims against 
the non-diverse defendant until after the one-year period expired, and that the 
defendant did not support its argument that the plaintiff had a duty to disclose a 
settlement agreement with the non-diverse defendant. The record does not 
indicate when the plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement with the non-
diverse defendant. The plaintiff indicated that the release had not yet been 
executed, that the nondiverse defendant had not been dismissed, and that the 
non-diverse defendant had not paid the settlement amount. [517]   





McDonald-Lerner, M.D. v. Neurocare Assocs., P.A., No. RWT 14-cv-0942, 
2014 WL 1356602 (D. Md. Apr. 4, 2014).    
Upon learning that the plaintiffs intended to dismiss the non-diverse defendants 
after expiration of the one-year period, the diverse defendants removed and 
asserted bad faith. The district court remanded, finding insufficient evidence of 
bad faith. The court noted that the plaintiffs contended that the timing for the 
dismissal was based upon the defendants’ failure to cooperate in responding to 
discovery requests. The court also noted that the non-diverse defendants had 
not yet been dismissed and that complete diversity did not yet exist. The court 
also noted that the case was removed just six weeks before trial was scheduled. 
[519]   
Filed Feb. 25, 2013; removed Mar. 26, 2014; remanded Apr. 4, 2014.  
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Mansilla-Gomez v. Mid-South Erectors, Inc., No. 0:14–cv–00308–JFA, 
2014 WL 1347485 (D. S.C. Apr. 3, 2014).   
  
The plaintiff sued the defendant and the defendant removed more than one year 
after commencement, asserting that the plaintiff concealed his legal citizenship 
and residency from the defendant because no such information was included in 
his state court complaint and because the plaintiff denied requests for admission 
within the one-year period and did not timely respond to other discovery. The 
district court remanded, finding that the defendant failed to prove bad faith. It 
noted that the plaintiff was not required to include citizenship or residency 
information in the state court complaint and further found that the requests for 
admission were compound requests that could have yielded a variety of 
responses. The court further noted that the plaintiff’s responses regarding legal 
citizenship may have been motivated by reasons other than bad faith prevention 
of removal. [520]  
  





Grabicki v. Bays, No. 13–CV–0406–TOR, 2014 WL 535044 (E.D. Wash. 
Feb. 10, 2014).   
  
Trustee for bankruptcy estate sued the defendants. The defendants removed 
more than one year after commencement. The district court remanded the case, 
finding no evidence of bad faith and no evidence that the bankruptcy trustee 
had conspired with the state court to prevent the defendants from filing for 
removal. [530]  
  





Kidwai v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg. Ass’n, No. SA–13–CV–972–XR, 2014 WL 
252026 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2014).  
  
The plaintiff sued diverse and non-diverse mortgage entities in state court. The 
state court dismissed the non-diverse defendant more than one year after 
commencement and the diverse defendant removed. The district court remanded, 
finding that the plaintiff had asserted potentially viable claims against the non-
diverse defendant and further finding that the plaintiff pursued the claims against 
the non-diverse defendant and was not solely responsible for delay in the 
resolution of the non-diverse defendant’s motion for summary judgment. [533]  
  
Filed Aug. 24, 2012; removed Oct. 17, 2013; remanded Jan. 22, 2104.  
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Ehrenreich v. Black, 994 F. Supp. 2d 284 (E.D. N.Y. 2014).   
  
The plaintiffs sued the defendants for personal injury in state court. The 
plaintiffs were driving or occupying the middle car in a three-car accident. The 
non-diverse defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that he was the 
lead driver and was rear-ended. The plaintiffs responded with an affidavit 
stating that the lead driver was driving while intoxicated and stopped abruptly. 
The court dismissed the non-diverse driver and the diverse defendant then 
removed. The district court remanded the case, finding that the non-diverse 
driver was not fraudulently joined and further finding that the plaintiffs had 
actively prosecuted the case against the non-diverse driver before and after the 
one-year period. [534]  
  





Markham v. Home Depot USA, Inc., No. CV 13–8431–GHK (JCGx), 2014 
WL 117102 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 10, 2014).  
  
The plaintiff sued Home Depot in state court and Home Depot removed. The 
district court remanded the case after the plaintiff amended the complaint to 
add non-diverse defendants. Home Depot stipulated to the plaintiff’s 
amendment. More than one year later,  the plaintiffs dismissed the non-diverse 
defendants after learning that Home Depot was contractually responsible for 
the maintenance of the floor that caused the plaintiff’s injuries. Home Depot 
removed. The district court remanded, finding that Home Depot failed to 
prove bad faith. The court further found that by consenting to the amended 
complaint Home Depot had implicitly acknowledged that the non-diverse 
defendants were not fraudulently joined for the purpose of destroying 
diversity. [538]  
  
Filed June 7, 2011; removed for the second time Nov. 14, 2013; remanded Jan. 
10, 2014.  
  
Note: Although the case was filed in 2011, the district court applied the JVCA 
.  
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Bader v. Schmidt Baking Co., No. 13–5697 (RBK/KMW), 2014 WL 
116365 (D. N.J. Jan. 10, 2014).    
The plaintiff, a bakery employee, sued a co-employee and the employer for 
damages arising from an accident in which the co-employee struck the 
plaintiff in the knee with a hand truck. The plaintiff responded to some 
discovery and was deposed within the one-year period. After expiration of the 
one-year period, and in response to a request for a statement of damages, the 
plaintiff claimed damages of $1.2 million. The defendants removed. The 
defendants had previously twice requested a statement of damages from the 
plaintiff but failed to follow-up when the plaintiff did not respond within five 
days as required by state procedural rules. The district court remanded, 
finding that the defendants had not demonstrated bad faith. Noting that within 
the one-year period, the plaintiff had disclosed information indicating that (i) 
his lost wages were almost $45,000; (ii) his worker’s compensation carrier 
already had a lien for more than $30,000 for amounts paid; and (iii) the scope 
of his medical treatment to date and the need for future medical treatment. 
The court concluded that the defendants could have easily determined that the 
amount in controversy requirement was met within the one-year period based 
upon existing discovery and information. [539]   







Bennett v. Miller, No. CIV 13–1016, 2014 WL 60092 (D.  S.D. Jan. 7, 
2014).    
The plaintiff sued the defendant in state court to foreclose on a contract for 
deed. The defendant removed more than one year after commencement, 
claiming to have received an updated discovery response from the plaintiff 
demonstrating that the amount in controversy was more than $75,000. The 
district court remanded the case finding that the defendant had not shown that 
the plaintiff acted in bad faith or that the amount in controversy requirement 
had been met. Instead, the court found that the defendant had acted in bad 
faith and awarded attorneys’ fees to the plaintiff. [541]    





Maldonado v. Yokohama Tire Corp., No. 2:13–CV–300, 2013 WL 
5967044 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 8, 2013).   
The plaintiff passenger sued the non-diverse driver and the diverse tire 
manufacturer after he was injured in a single-vehicle tire de-tread accident. 
The tire manufacturer removed the case more than one year after 
commencement, alleging that the plaintiff fraudulently joined the non-diverse 
driver. The district court remanded the case finding that the tire manufacturer 
failed to prove that the plaintiff fraudulently joined the driver in bad faith. 
[551]       
No dates included.  
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125.  
  
HSBC Bank Nevada, N.A., v. DeGeorge, No. 3:12–cv–1192–J–32MCR, 
2013 WL 4734099 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 3, 2013).  
  
The plaintiff bank sued the defendant in state court for an alleged breach of a 
credit card agreement and sought $51,129.38 in damages plus interest. The 
defendant removed the case more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded the case, finding that the defendant had failed to 
establish bad faith and had further failed to establish the jurisdictional 
amount. [571]  
  
Filed Sept. 24, 2009; removed Oct. 20, 2012; remanded Sept. 23, 2013.   
  






Bush v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., No. 13–0550–CV–W–ODS, 2013 
WL 3755776 (W.D. Mo. July 16, 2013).  
  
State Farm removed more than one year after the case was commenced in 
state court. The district court found that State Farm had “no basis for arguing 
any party acted in bad faith.” Id. at 1.[580]  
  
Filed Aug. 1, 2011; removed Apr./May 2013; remanded July 16, 2013.   
  






Nele v. TJX Cos., Inc., No. 11–07643, 2013 WL 3305269 (E.D. Pa. July 1, 
2103).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court found no bad faith manipulation on the part of the plaintiff, given that 
the non-diverse defendant had not been fraudulently joined. [587]  
  
Filed Mar. 28, 2007; removed Dec. 15, 2011; remanded July 1, 2013.  
  
Note: Although the case was filed in 2011, the district court applied the 
JVCA.  
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Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 13–CV–0607JLR, 2013 WL 
3242529 (W.D. Wash. June 24, 2013).  
  
State Farm removed more than one year after the case was commenced in 
state court and argued that the plaintiff acted in bad faith because the 
plaintiff’s counsel had assured defense counsel that he would not object to 
removal. The plaintiff’s counsel responded that there was no such agreement. 
The district court found no basis to warrant removal after expiration of the 
one-year period. [591]  
  





Kulaas v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. C13–485RSM., 2013 WL 
2627138 (W.D. Wash. June 11, 2013).  
  
A pro se plaintiff sued his insurer for $50,000 allegedly owed to him pursuant 
to his Underinsured Motorist Coverage. Five months later, the plaintiff 
retained counsel, who began conducting discovery regarding the claims. 
More than fourteen months after commencement of the case, the plaintiff 
filed an amended complaint adding claims for bad faith and other extra-
contractual claims that brought the amount in controversy above $75,000. 
The defendant then removed, arguing that the only logical explanation for the 
timing of the plaintiff’s amended complaint was plaintiff’s bad faith 
manipulation of removal jurisdiction. The district court granted the plaintiff’s 
motion to remand, finding that the JVCA did not apply to the case at hand 
because the case had been commenced before the effective date of the JVCA. 
The court further found that the defendant’s conclusory assertions failed to 
establish bad faith on the part of the plaintiff and further observed that the 
“plaintiff's care in determining a factual and legal basis for the additional 
claims [before amendment of the complaint] suggests proper practice, not bad 
faith.” Id. at *3. [592]  
  
Filed Dec. 29, 2011; removed Mar. 15, 2013; remanded June 11, 2013.  
  
Note: The case was filed in 2011. The court refused to recognize an equitable 
exception but further found that the plaintiff had not acted in bad faith.  
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Mahaffey v. Hosp. Housekeeping Sys., Ltd., No. 3:13CV150 DPJ-FKB, 
2013 WL 7863752 (S.D. Miss. May 2, 2013).   
  
The district court applied the Tedford equitable exception and found removal 
untimely. The court found insufficient evidence that the plaintiff attempted to 
manipulate removal, noting that the plaintiff pursued the claim against the 
non-diverse party for more than two years and only agreed to dismiss the 
spoiler in exchange for its agreement to dismiss its interlocutory appeal. [604]  
  
Filed Dec. 28, 2010; removed March 13, 2013; remanded May 2, 2013.  
  
Note: The district court noted the JVCA did not apply but applied the Tedford 






Vielma v. ACC Holding, Inc., No. EP–12–CV–501–KC, 2013 WL 
3367494 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 16, 2013).   
  
The plaintiff sued the defendant for employment discrimination pursuant to 
state law. The plaintiff’s lawyer stated at the plaintiff’s deposition that the 
plaintiff was not seeking more than $75,000. More than one month before 
expiration of the one-year period, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint 
indicating that, pending the EEOC’s issuance of a right to sue letter, the 
plaintiff intended to add a claim of retaliation based upon events that 
transpired the day after the plaintiff’s deposition. The plaintiff’s amended 
complaint did not limit the damages sought to less than $75,000. Shortly after 
expiration of the one-year period, the plaintiff filed a second amended 
complaint asserting the original claims as well as the retaliation claim. The 
second amended complaint did not limit the plaintiff’s damages. More than 
one month later, the plaintiff’s counsel mailed defense counsel a letter, noting 
that the second amended complaint did not limit the damages sought. The 
defendant removed within 30 days of receipt of the letter. The court held that 
the plaintiff’s original complaint was removable despite the plaintiff’s 
allegation that the plaintiff was not seeking more than $75,000 because the 
value of the claims, which included claims for back pay, front pay, benefits 
and attorneys’ fees, exceeded $75,000, noting that the plaintiff’s annual 
salary was $87,000. The court observed that the plaintiff’s limitation of 
damages in the initial pleading was not binding under Texas law. The court 
granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand, finding no basis to warrant the 
Tedford equitable exception because there was insufficient evidence of forum 
manipulation by the plaintiff and again emphasizing that the case was clearly 
removable based upon the original complaint. [610]  
  
Filed Oct. 18, 2011, removed Jan. 3, 2013, remanded Apr. 16, 2013.   
  
Note: The district court noted the JVCA did not apply but applied the Tedford 
equitable exception.  
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Kuepper v. Terragroup Corp., No. CV 13–00264–RGK (MRWx), 2013 
WL 12205042 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2013).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded the case finding no evidence of bad faith. It noted that 
“Plaintiff consistently answered that he [was] unable to ascertain the true 
amount in controversy, given Defendant's refusal to provide Plaintiff with the 
Detailed General Ledger summarizing all transaction records and Plaintiff's 
limited financial knowledge.” Id. at *2. [611]  
  
Filed Sept. 6, 2011; removed for the second time Jan. 14, 2013 (just three 
weeks before trial); remanded May 2, 2013.  
  
Note: Although the case was filed in 2011, the district court applied the 








WMCV Phase, LLC v. Tufenkian Carpets Las Vegas, No. 2:12–cv–
01454–RCJ–PAL, 2013 WL 1007711 (D. Nev. Mar. 12, 2013).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court 
found that the plaintiff did not act in bad faith by waiting more than one year 
to add the removing defendant because the evidence indicated that the 
plaintiff had only recently learned through discovery that the removing 
defendant may have been an alter ego of the other defendants. The court 
further held that there was not complete diversity because, contrary to the 
removing defendant’s allegations that LLC’s are treated like corporations for 
purposes of citizenship, LLCs are citizens of every state in which their 
owner/members are citizens. 2012 WL 5198479 (D. Nev. Oct. 18, 2012). In 
this opinion, the district court awarded the plaintiff attorneys’ fees pursuant 
to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), finding that the defendant had no objectively 
reasonable basis upon which to remove. [614]  
  
Filed June 26, 2009; removed Aug. 16, 2012; remanded Oct. 18, 2012.  
  
Note: Although the case was filed in 2009, the district court applied the 
JVCA.  
  
    
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol71/iss3/2








Medley v. Infantino, LLC, No. 12–3877, 2013 WL 857369 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 
1, 2013).  
  
The plaintiff brought a wrongful death claim against the diverse corporation 
that had manufactured the allegedly defective infant carrier in which her 
child was being carried when the child died. The plaintiff also sued two retail 
stores and the non-diverse managers of those stores and alleged that she 
purchased two infant carriers for her twins, one at each store, but had no way 
of knowing which carrier was being used at the time of the child’s death. The 
plaintiff alleged that both retailers were subject to liability based upon the 
alternative liability theory recognized in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 
More than two years later, the state court granted summary judgment to the 
retailers and their managers, after which the diverse manufacturer removed. 
The district court granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand, finding that the 
one-year limitation applied because the case was commenced before the 
JVCA became effective. The court went on, however, to dismiss defendant’s 
allegations of bad faith forum manipulation by the plaintiff. The court found 
that, contrary to the defendant’s assertion otherwise, the plaintiff had not 
abandoned her claims against the non-diverse defendants after passage of the 
one-year deadline for removal. The court observed that the plaintiff pursued 
discovery from the non-diverse defendants and continued to actively oppose 
their motions for summary judgment well after the one-year deadline. The 
court awarded the plaintiff’s motion for sanctions pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1447(c), finding that the defendant’s allegation of bad faith forum 
manipulation by the plaintiff was not objectively reasonable. [616]   
Filed June 7, 2010, removed July 10, 2012, remanded Mar. 1, 2013.   
Note: The case was filed in 2010. The court noted that the JVCA 





Corinthian Marble & Granite, Inc., v. T.D. Bank, N.A., No. 12–cv–3744, 
2013 WL 272757 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 24, 2013).   
  
The court acknowledged that the JVCA did not apply but then held that it 
would determine whether the equitable exception to the one-year bar applied. 
The court found no basis for an equitable exception, rejecting the defendant’s 
argument that the plaintiffs had not vigorously pursued the case against the 
non-diverse defendant and also rejecting the defendant’s argument that the 
plaintiff manipulated the one-year bar. The court noted that the non-diverse 
defendant was dismissed by court order three months after the expiration of 
the one-year period. Finally, the court observed that even if the non-diverse 
defendant had been fraudulently joined, the defendant failed to remove 
within 30 days. [628]   
Filed Mar. 28, 2011; removed July 30, 2012; remanded Jan. 24, 2013.   
Note: The case was filed in 2011. The district court applied the Tedford 
equitable exception.  
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Firewheel Surgical Sales, LLC v. Exact Surgical, Inc., No. 3:12–CV–
1971–L, 2013 WL 139548 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2013).  
  
The plaintiff sued a diverse defendant and a non-diverse defendant, and then 
more than two years later amended the complaint to drop the non-diverse 
defendant and add another diverse defendant who then removed. The 
defendants acknowledged that the case was not governed by the JVCA but 
argued that removal more than one year after commencement of the case 
should be permitted based upon the policy behind the statute. The court 
rejected this argument but then applied the Tedford equitable exception and 
found insufficient evidence of forum manipulation. The court also found that 
the removing defendant failed to demonstrate the amount in controversy. [633]  
  
Filed Jan. 28, 2010; removed June 21, 2012; remanded Jan. 11, 2013.  
  
Note: The case was filed in 2010. The district court applied the Tedford 
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Table B  
Cases in Which the District Court Found Bad 
Faith Forum Manipulation by the Plaintiff (24 Total) 
 
 
 1.  
  
Hoyt v. Lane Constr. Corp., No. 4:17-CV-780-A, 2017 WL 4481168 (N.D. 
Tex. Oct. 5, 2017). 
 
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to remand, finding bad faith on the part of 
the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs sued a diverse defendant and two non-diverse 
defendants, alleging that their construction activities negligently caused a pool 
of water on the highway which caused an accident, killing their husband and 
father. Within one year of commencement, the state court granted summary 
judgment to one of the non-diverse defendants. Two days after expiration of 
the one-year period, the plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the remaining non-
diverse defendant. The diverse defendant then removed. The plaintiffs 
attempted to explain the timing of the dismissal by stating that they had been 
involved in discussions with the remaining non-diverse defendant and 
determined to dismiss the non-diverse defendant prior to trial for strategic 
reasons. The court found the plaintiffs’ affidavit conclusory and lacking in 
detail regarding the timing of dismissal. The court also found evidence that the 
plaintiffs had known for months that the evidence would not support a claim 
against the remaining non-diverse defendant. The court did not address the 
extent to which the voluntary/involuntary rule applied in light of the summary 
judgment in favor of the other non-diverse defendant. The court noted that the 
plaintiffs’ complaint did not allege any claim against the remaining nondiverse 
defendant and did not allege that it was responsible for the plaintiffs’ injuries.  
[55] 
  
Filed Sept. 20, 2016; summary judgment granted in favor of one diverse 
defendant on May 17, 2017; plaintiff non-suited remaining non-diverse 
defendant on Sept. 22, 2017; removed Sept. 27, 2017.  
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Vallecillo v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg. Fin., Inc., No. 5:16-CV-935-DAE, 
2017 WL 9935522 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 18, 2017).   
 
The plaintiffs sued a diverse bank for fraud, negligence, abuse of the elderly, 
and misrepresentation. In response to discovery conducted within the one-year 
period, thre plaintiffs admitted that the amount in controversy did not exceed 
$75,000. The plaintiffs offered to settle the case for less than $75,000 
throughout the early stages of litigation. More than two years after 
commencement, the plaintiffs disclosed that they were seeking $175,000 in 
damages. Defendant removed. The district court found bad faith on the part of 
the plaintiffs. It rejected the plaintiffs’ explanation for the timing of their 
increased demand, finding the plaintiffs’ explanation that they had erred in 
acting pro se insufficient to negate the inference of bad faith that arises from an 
increased demand outside of the one-year period. In so ruling, the court cited 
no precedent for its holding that an inference of bad faith arises when the 
plaintiff increases his or her demand more than one year after commencement. 
[69]   
 





Massey v. 21st Century Centennial Ins. Co., No. 2:17-cv-01922, 2017 WL 
3261419 (S.D. W.Va. July 31, 2017).   
  
The plaintiff sued non-diverse driver and her diverse UM insurance carrier. 
Almost two years after commencement, the plaintiff settled with the driver and 
the insurer removed. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to remand, 
finding that the plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal. The court noted 
that the plaintiff never served the driver, never propounded discovery to the 
driver, and did not depose the driver. The court also noted that the plaintiff left 
a settlement offer outstanding beyond the one-year mark to prevent removal 
because the plaintiff’s counsel sought confirmation from the insurer that it 
would not attempt to remove if the plaintiff accepted the driver’s settlement 
offer. [84]  
  
Filed May 21, 2015; removed Mar. 17, 2017.   
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Perrin v. Dillard’s Inc., No. 3:17-cv-00201-DRH-DGW, 2017 WL 2984128 
(S.D. Ill. July 13, 2017).   
  
The plaintiff filed a personal injury slip-and-fall case against the defendant as 
an arbitration proceeding in state court (where, for purposes of jurisdiction, the 
amount-in-controversy may not exceed $50,000). The plaintiff characterized 
her original complaint as one seeking damages for, what was believed to be at 
the time, a soft tissue back injury. Not long after suit was filed, and while the 
case was still on the arbitration docket, the defendant propounded an 
interrogatory asking the dollar amount of damages sought, and the plaintiff 
responded that the amount was within the jurisdictional limit for the arbitration 
docket. During the arbitration proceedings (prior to expiration of the one-year 
period), the plaintiff testified that she had learned from her physician that she 
had suffered three herniated discs and that her surgeon believed she would 
benefit from back surgery. The plaintiff then moved to have the case 
transferred to the law docket because the amount-in-controversy exceeded the 
jurisdictional amount of the arbitration docket. The plaintiff did not supplement 
her prior interrogatory response. The court found that the plaintiff acted in bad 
faith to prevent removal by “deliberately failing to disclose an amount in 
controversy in excess of the jurisdictional requirement within the 1-year 
timeframe following the commencement of the action. The court's decision is 
chiefly grounded in the fact that no information regarding increased damages 
surpassing the $75,000.00 mark was communicated to defendant” within one 
year of commencement. Id. at *6. [97]  
  





Partin v. Marmic Fire & Safety Co., Inc., No. 16–CV–647–JED–FHM, 
2017 WL 2931401 (N.D. Okla. July 10, 2017).   
  
Although the case was removed more than one after commencement, the 
plaintiff did not argue that removal was untimely because of the one-year bar. 
Instead, the plaintiff argued that removal was untimely because the case was 
not removed within the 30-day time period and further argued that removal 
was improper because the amount-in-controversy was not met. Although the 
court was not required to find bad faith (given that the defendant had not 
raised it), the court characterized the plaintiff’s counsel’s efforts to avoid 
revealing the amount-in-controversy as improper gamesmanship. [99]  
  
Filed May 11, 2015; removed Oct. 19, 2016.  
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In re: Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), No. 16-cv-02408, 2016 WL 
4264193 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 11, 2016).  
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court 
found no basis for the plaintiffs’ joinder of the jurisdictional spoiler. The court 
did not address the fact that the defendant could have removed much earlier, 
given the lack of merit in support of the plaintiff’s claim. [205]  
  





Taylor v. Foremost Ins. Co., No. 5:15-CV-00164 (LJA), 2016 WL 
11083156 (M.D. Ga. June 24, 2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court 
found bad faith where the plaintiff amended the complaint to increase the 
damages sought pursuant to a property insurance policy from $73,500 to 
$150,000 more than one year after commencement in state court. Despite the 
fact that the plaintiff had sent a demand letter prior to filing suit in which the 
plaintiff valued the claim at the policy limits of $150,000, the court found that 
the plaintiff acted in bad faith to prevent removal. [219]  
  





Heller v. Am. States Ins. Co., No. CV 15-9771 DMG (JPRx), 2016 WL 
1170891 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2016).   
  
The plaintiff dismissed the non-diverse defendant without prejudice more than 
one year after commencement in an apparent response to the state court’s order 
to show cause why the non-diverse defendant had not been served. The diverse 
defendant removed. The federal district court denied the plaintiff’s motion to 
remand. It held that the plaintiff’s failure to demonstrate diligent efforts to 
serve the non-diverse defendant within one year and the plaintiff’s inconsistent 
explanation for why the spoiler had not been dismissed earlier constituted bad 
faith. [244]  
  
Filed May 21, 2014; removed Dec. 18, 2015.  
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Calvary Baptist Church v. Church Mut. Ins. Co., No. CIV-15-1283-
M, 2016 WL 543239 (W.D. Okla. Feb. 10, 2016).   
  
The district court found bad faith on the part of the plaintiff where the 
plaintiff indicated it was seeking less than $75,000, was unresponsive to 
the defendant’s discovery requests regarding damages, and clarified 
that it was seeking damages of $90,503.66 more than one year after 
commencement. [257]  
  





Chavez v. Time Warner Cable LLC, No. CV 12–5291–RGK (RZx), 
2016 WL 7647559 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 2016), aff’d, 728 F. App’x 645 
(9th Cir. 2018).   
  
The district court applied the Tedford equitable exception and found 
that the plaintiff acted in bad faith by amending the complaint to seek 
additional damages after expiration of the one-year period. [262]  
    
Filed Jan. 7, 2011; removed June 18, 2012.  
  
Note: The JVCA did not apply but the court made findings regarding 





Godoy v. WinCo Holding, Inc., No. 5:15-CV-01397-ODW-SP, 2015 
WL 6394474 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 2015).   
  
On the eve of trial and just after having lost its motion for summary 
judgment in state court, the defendant removed the case more than one 
year after commencement. The district court denied the plaintiff’s 
motion to remand, finding that the plaintiff had acted in bad faith by 
naming a jurisdictional spoiler as a defendant even though the claim 
against the spoiler was administratively time-barred. Although the court 
observed that the defendant could have removed within one year based 
upon fraudulent joinder, it held that the defendant had “no affirmative 
duty to do so.” Id. at *3. [284]  
  
Filed Feb. 28, 2014; removed July 13, 2015.  
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Comer v. Schmitt, No. 2:15-CV-2599, 2015 WL 5954589 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 
14, 2015).   
  
The district court found bad faith where the plaintiff settled with the 
jurisdictional spoiler prior to expiration of the one-year period but did not 
dismiss the spoiler or inform the removing defendant of the settlement until 
after expiration of the one-year period. Counsel for the non-diverse 
defendant had informed counsel for the diverse defendant that the plaintiff 
would not consummate the settlement agreement because the plaintiff did not 
want the diverse defendant to remove. [288]  
  





Van Tassel v. State Farm Lloyds, No. 4:14–CV–2864, 2015 WL 4617241 
(S.D. Tex. July 31, 2015).   
  
The plaintiff sued State Farm Lloyds, Inc. and an in-state insurance adjuster 
in state court on Nov. 15, 2012. State Farms Lloyds, a different entity than 
State Farm Lloyds, Inc. and the actual insurer, answered the complaint and 
removed the case, arguing that the adjuster had been improperly joined. The 
district court found that the adjuster was improperly joined because the 
claims against him were identical to the claims against the insurer. The 
district court then retained jurisdiction of the case and discovery proceeded 
and revealed that State Farm Lloyds, rather than State Farm Lloyds, Inc., was 
the proper defendant. The plaintiff filed a second motion to remand, 
indicating that he intended to sue State Farm Lloyds, Inc. and that State Farm 
Lloyds had never been made a party to the case and therefore had no 
standing to remove. The district court remanded the case, finding that the 
plaintiff had not substituted State Farm Lloyds for State Farm Lloyds, Inc. 
and further finding that State Farm Lloyds, Inc. was not diverse. After 
remand and in response to a motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff filed 
an amended petition substituting State Farm Lloyds for State Farm Lloyds, 
Inc., after which State Farm Lloyds removed. The district court found an 
exception to the one-year bar based upon the plaintiff’s misrepresentations 
and delay in substituting the real party in interest. [371]  
  
Filed Nov. 15, 2012; removed Oct. 8, 2014.    
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Mitchell v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., No. 14–2766, 2015 WL 1608670 (E.D. 
La. Apr. 10, 2015).   
  
The plaintiff sued her insurance company for breach of contract and bad faith 
and alleged that it failed to pay her for the property damage to the contents of 
her building. More than one year after commencement, the plaintiff 
responded in opposition to the insurer’s motion for summary judgment and 
alleged that she was owed more than $70,000 for her remaining property 
damage claims. The district court found that the plaintiff acted in bad faith to 
prevent removal because the plaintiff had responded to an earlier 
interrogatory by indicating that the amount in controversy did not exceed 
$50,000. The court noted that the plaintiff provided no explanation for her 
delay in notifying the insurer of the amount of her claim. [406]  
  





Woods v. Georgia Pacific, LLC, No. 14–CV–1062, 2015 WL 1538227 
(Apr. 7, 2015).   
  
The plaintiff sued the defendant in state court and did not include allegations 
regarding the plaintiff’s citizenship. The defendant attempted to discover the 
plaintiff’s citizenship via discovery requests for six months but the plaintiff 
did not respond to such requests until after expiration of the one-year period. 
The district court found that the defendant’s removal ten days after learning 
the plaintiff’s citizenship was timely based on the plaintiff’s bad faith. [410]  
  




Hiser v. Seay, No. 5:14-CV-170, 2014 WL 6885433 (W.D. Ky. Dec. 5, 
2014).   
  
The plaintiffs sued diverse and non-diverse defendants for injuries sustained 
in an automobile accident. The plaintiff settled with the non-diverse 
defendants after expiration of the one-year period and the diverse defendants 
removed. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motion to remand, finding 
that they acted in bad faith. The plaintiffs’ counsel admitted that he did not 
finalize the settlement terms until after expiration of the one-year period in an 
effort to keep the case in state court. [450]  
  
Filed Dec. 19, 2012; removed Aug. 26, 2014.  
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Hill v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 51 F. Supp. 3d 1277 (M.D. Fla. 
2014), aff’d, 693 Fed. Appx. 855 (11th Cir. 2017).   
  
The plaintiff sued a diverse defendant in state court for slander and tortious 
interference and demanded damages less than $75,000. After expiration of 
the one-year period, the plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to add 
another party as a nominal plaintiff and to demand more than $75,000. The 
defendant removed. The district court found that the plaintiff acted in bad 
faith in the absence of any explanation for the sudden increase in damages. 
[467]  
  





Consol. Grain & Barge, Inc. v. Anny, No. 11–2204, et at., 2014 WL 
1364736 (E.D. La. Apr. 7, 2014).  
  
After ARTCO purchased land in Louisiana, it discovered that Anny had 
constructed a road and fence on the property and demanded that he cease 
and desist activity on its property. Anny then filed a lawsuit against the 
heirs of Albert Dubourg, who had been listed as the owner of the adjacent 
property in a survey.  Anny claimed to have inherited property adjacent to 
Dubourg’s property from the Estate of Martin. Anny sought a declaratory 
judgment that some of the adjacent property previously owned by Dubourg 
had been acquired by the estate by virtue of acquisitive prescription. 
ARTCO then brought a separate action against Anny in state court for 
trespass. Anny’s wife then intervened in his lawsuit, asserting claims 
against Anny and the heirs of Dubourg, asserting that she had purchased 
the property in question from the estate. Anny’s wife then added ARTCO 
as an additional defendant to her claims. ARTCO removed the case. The 
court disregarded the claims by Anny and his wife against the heirs of 
Dubourg, finding there was no evidence that Dubourg ever held title to the 
property. The court then realigned Anny’s wife as a plaintiff despite her 
claim against Anny and found complete diversity. The court found that 
Anny’s wife acted in bad faith because she could have intervened in the 
other states lawsuit to assert her interest in the property but failed to do so.  
[518]  
  
Filed Aug. 9, 2011; removed more than one year later.  
  
Note: Although the case was filed in 2011, the district court applied the 
JVCA.  
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Lawson v. Parker Hannifin Corp., No. 4:13-cv-923-O, 2014 WL 1158880 
(N.D. Tex. Mar. 20, 2014).  
  
The plaintiff sued her diverse former employer and a non-diverse former co-
employee and brought state law claims for sexual harassment, unlawful 
retaliation, assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. 
The employer removed based upon diversity. The district court remanded 
based upon the presence of the non-diverse former co-employee. More than 
fifteen months after commencement of the case, the plaintiff filed a notice of 
non-suit against the non-diverse former co-employee, after which the diverse 
employer removed. The court found that the plaintiff acted in bad faith 
because: (i) the plaintiff did not serve the non-diverse defendant until seven 
months after filing the complaint; (ii) the plaintiff did not take a default 
judgment against the non-diverse defendant; (iii) the plaintiff did not serve 
the non-diverse defendant with any discovery requests; (iv) the plaintiff 
nonsuited the non-diverse defendant approximately fifteen months after 
discovery; and (v) the non-diverse defendant was not required to pay plaintiff 
any money as settlement. [523]  
  





Forth v. Diversey Corp., No. 13-CV-808-A, 2013 WL 6096528 (W.D.N.Y. 
Nov. 20, 2013).   
  
The plaintiffs sued diverse defendants and a non-diverse defendant for 
injuries allegedly arising from one plaintiff’s exposure to chemicals. After the 
plaintiffs stipulated to a discontinuance with respect to the non-diverse 
defendant more than one year and six months after commencement, the 
diverse defendants removed. The district court held that the defendant must 
prove bad faith by clear and convincing evidence and further held that such 
evidence had been presented. The president of the non-diverse defendant had 
submitted an affidavit stating that he informed the plaintiffs’ attorney about 
six months after commencement that his company was not a proper defendant 
and that plaintiffs’ attorney assured him that the company would be released. 
The plaintiffs argued that their attorney determined not to dismiss the non-
diverse defendant based upon the president’s pre-answer representations and 
further determined that additional discovery was needed prior to dismissal. 
After briefly discussing the case with the non-diverse defendant’s attorney, 
who represented that her client did not sell the product at issue, the plaintiffs 
filed a stipulation of discontinuance. The district court noted that the 
plaintiffs did not controvert the affidavit of the non-diverse defendant’s 
president and further noted that they conducted no discovery before agreeing 
to the discontinuance. The court found plaintiffs’ explanation for the timing 
of the dismissal to be implausible. [548]  
  
Filed Jan. 18, 2012; removed Aug. 6, 2013.  
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Patel v. Kroger Co., No. 1:13-CV-02901-JOF, 2013 WL 12068988 
(N.D. Ga. Nov. 12, 2013).   
  
The court found that the plaintiff acted in bad faith by failing to respond to 
the defendant’s request for a settlement demand within the one-year period. 
The court did not articulate why the plaintiff had a duty to respond to 
defendant’s request. Nor did the court find that the plaintiff had provided 
inaccurate information in response to interrogatories regarding incurred 
medical expenses. The court suggested that the defendant had no duty to 
investigate the amount in controversy. [550]  
  







Carey v. Allstate Ins., No. 2:13–cv–2293, 2013 WL 5970487 (W.D. La. 
Nov. 7, 2013).   
  
The plaintiffs sued Allstate for breach of contract. Allstate removed, and 
the case was remanded because the amount-in-controversy requirement 
was not met. Allstate moved for summary judgment. In an attempt to 
survive Allstate’s motion, the plaintiffs amended their complaint to add 
additional claims, including one for statutory penalties and attorney’s fees. 
Allstate removed a second time, arguing that the plaintiffs acted in bad 
faith in failing to amend their complaint prior to expiration of the one-year 
period. The district court found that the plaintiffs had acted in bad faith by 
failing to amend their complaint so as to add additional claims establishing 
the amount-in-controversy until after expiration of the one-year period. 
[552]  
  
Filed before 2012; removed July 17, 2013.   
  
Note: Although the JVCA amendments did not apply, the court applied the 
Tedford equitable exception and found bad faith.  
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Thompson v. Belk, Inc., No. 1:13–cv–1412–WSD, 2013 WL 5786587 (N.D. 
Ga. Oct. 28, 2013).   
  
The plaintiff sued the defendants for injuries sustained when the plaintiff 
tripped and fell in their store. The plaintiff then voluntarily dismissed the 
complaint and the plaintiff, represented by new counsel, refiled it within six 
months. The defendants removed the case after receiving discovery responses 
regarding the amount of the plaintiff’s damages. Pursuant to state law, cases 
dismissed without prejudice and refiled within six months are deemed to have 
commenced on the date the first action was commenced. Thus, the 
defendants’ removal was after expiration of the one-year period. The district 
court found that the plaintiff acted in bad faith by concealing the amount-in-
controversy during the one-year period. The court rejected the plaintiff’s 
argument that she should not be held responsible for her prior counsel’s 
failure to timely respond to discovery in the original action. [554]  
  
Filed Nov. 22, 2011; removed Apr. 26, 2013.   
  
Note: The case was commenced before 2012. The court applied the bad faith 





Cameron v. Teeberry Logistics, 920 F. Supp. 2d 1309 (N.D. Ga. 2013).   
  
The plaintiff, who had been injured in a collision, sued diverse defendants in 
state court on Nov. 9, 2011, and alleged that the amount at issue was less than 
$50,000. The plaintiff sought damages for pain and suffering, lost wages, and 
medical expenses. On May 31, 2012, the plaintiff supplemented discovery 
responses by providing the defendants with work excuse disability slips for 
Nov. 26, 2011 through May 31, 2012. The plaintiff also attached an inventory 
of medical expenses totaling more than $62,000. Shortly thereafter, the 
plaintiff sent the defendants a copy of a July 9, 2012 physician consult in 
which her doctor recommended surgery. On August 9, 2012, the plaintiff 
again supplemented her discovery responses and indicated her medical 
expenses totaled more than $91,000. Thus, within the one-year period, the 
plaintiff supplemented her discovery responses to indicate medical expenses 
of more than $91,000, past lost wages (in an unspecified amount), and the 
need for future surgery (at an unspecified cost). On November 13, 2012, the 
plaintiff’s counsel sent a settlement demand letter for $575,000. The parties 
unsuccessfully mediated the case in December 2012. The day after mediation 
failed, the defendants removed. Despite the information provided by the 
plaintiff prior to the expiration of the one-year period, the trial court held that 
the case did not become removable until the defense received the $575,000 
demand letter and further held that the plaintiff acted in bad faith in failing to 
amend the complaint to seek more than $50,000. [625]  
  
Filed Nov. 9, 2011; removed Dec. 12, 2012.   
  
Note: Although the case was filed in 2011, the district court applied the JVCA.  
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Table C  
Cases That Were Removed More Than One Year After 
Commencement and Resolved Without Findings Regarding Bad 
Faith (179 Total) 
  
 
 1.  
  
Allen v. ESA Mgmt., LLC., 2018 WL 2948534 (S.D. Cal. June 13, 2018).   
  
The district court remanded the case, finding that the one-year bar applies to 
later-added defendants. [3]  
  
 
 2.  
  
Nunez v. U.S. Xpress Leasing, Inc., 2018 WL 2770458 (W.D. La. June 8, 
2018).   
  
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable because an unserved 
defendant may remove at any time pursuant to 28 U.C.S. § 1446(b)(1). [4]  
  
 
 3.  
  
Taylor v. United Road Servs., Inc., 2018 WL 2412326 (E.D. Cal. May 29, 
2018).   
  
The district court noted that the one-year bar on removal does not apply to 
CAFA cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b). [7]  
  
 
 4.  
  
Homestreet Bank v. Caba, 2018 2709371 (D. Haw. May 17, 2018).   
  
The defendants removed pursuant to federal questions jurisdiction and raised 
diversity jurisdiction in their response to plaintiff’s motion to remand. 
Defendants did not allege bad faith on the part of the plaintiffs. [12]  
  
 
 5.  
  
Joo Yun Chung v. Safeway, Inc., 2018 WL 1794720 (D. Haw. Apr. 16, 
2018).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court 
denied plaintiff’s motion to remand but did not reach the question of bad 
faith. [22]  
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 6.  
  
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Fla. v. ADCAHB Med. Coverages, Inc., 2018 
WL 3599009 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2018).   
  
Insurer sued judgment debtors and settled with them in exchange for their 
rights under an insurance policy. Insurer then filed a supplemental complaint 
against the diverse insurance company more than one year after 
commencement. The diverse insurer removed. The district court remanded, 
finding the one-year bar applicable because the claim against the diverse 
insurer was not an independent action. [28]  
 
 7.  
  
Druivenga v. Hillshire Brans Co., 2018 WL 1115935 (N.D. Iowa Mar. 1, 
2018).   
  
Although the case was removed more than one year after the complaint was 
filed, the district court found that, for purposes of determining whether the 
thirdparty defendant timely removed within one year, the date on which the 
thirdparty complaint was filed commenced the relevant one-year period. [30]  
  
 
 8.  
  
Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Assoc. v. White, 2018 WL 650372 (D. Conn. 
Jan. 31, 2018).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded the case, finding that removal based upon diversity was 
improper because the defendant was a citizen of the forum state. Given the 
lack of removal jurisdiction, it was not necessary for the district court to 
address plaintiff’s alleged bad faith. [35]  
  
 
 9.  
  
Lare v. Caldwell, 2018 WL 573474 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2018).   
  
Pro se defendant removed more than one year after commencement.  The 
district court remanded the case, noting that defendant did not allege that 





Jaligam v. Pochampally, 2018 WL 417559 (E.D. La. Jan. 12, 2018).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
remanded the case, finding no evidence that plaintiff acted in bad faith and 
noting that the defendant did not allege that plaintiff acted in bad faith. [40]  
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Ossello v. Swift Rock Fin., Inc., 2017 WL 4842371 (D. Mont. Oct. 26, 
2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement but based 





Lilly v. Dollar Gen. Corp., 2017 WL 4836539 (M.D. La. Sept. 18, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement but the 
plaintiff did not move to remand based upon untimely removal.  The court 
noted that the timeliness of removal is procedural and is waived if not timely 





Florida Health Science Ctr., Inc. v. GEICO, 2017 WL 3720880 (M.D. 
Fla. Aug. 7, 2017).   
  
This case was removed more than one year after commencement. The case 
involved the intra-district split within Florida district courts over whether the 
filing of the initial claim for coverage or the later filing of the insurance bad 
faith claim triggers the one-year period in which to remove. The district court 
remanded, finding that the bad faith claim could not be removed separately 
from the civil action in which it was filed and further finding that the one-
year period was triggered by the initial filing – not the filing of the claim for 





Ossello v. Swift Rock Fin., Inc., 2017 WL 3276884 (D. Mont. July 27, 
2017).   
  
The case involved the issue of when the one-year period begins to run. The 





Shaffer v. Green Earth Techs., Inc., 2017 WL 2628883 (W.D. Tex. June 
19, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement, but the 
district court found the one-year bar inapplicable because the bar applies only 
to cases that are not initially removable. “[T]his case was initially removable 
when Plaintiff filed it, and the one-year limitation simply does not apply for 
that reason.” Id. at *3. [105]  
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Scott v. Perma-Pile, Inc., 2017 WL 2656189 (W.D. La. May 24, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court denied plaintiff’s motion to remand, finding that the one-year bar did 





Todesco v. Wainright, 2017 WL 1375286 E.D. La. April 17, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than year after commencement, but removal was 
based on federal question jurisdiction. The case was remanded due to lack of 





La Forte v. Allstate Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 2017 WL 5642469 (S.D. Fla. 
April 7, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The issue 
was whether an insurance bad faith claim may be removed as a separate 
action after coverage has been determined. The district court remanded, 
finding that “the removal of a bad faith claim is untimely unless it occurs 
within one year after the commencement of the underlying action in which 





Alber v. Geico Gen. Ins. Co., 2017 WL 1045504 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 20, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The issue 
was whether plaintiff’s insurance bad faith claim could be removed as a 
separate action. The district court found removal proper but then vacated the 






Ala. Mun. Workers Comp. Fund, Inc. v. P.R. Diamond Prods., 
Inc., 234 F. Supp. 3d 1165 (N.D. Ala. 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district found the one-year bar inapplicable to cases that were initially 
removable. [146]  
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Shannon v. Bayview Loan Servicing, LLC, 2017 WL 534348 (D. Or. 
Feb. 8, 2017).   
  
The case removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded. The removing defendants did not allege bad faith on the 




Washington v. GEICO, 2017 WL 490541 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2017).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. It 
addressed whether an insurance bad faith claim may be removed as a 





Bank of Am. NA v. Koola, 2016 WL 7469595 (D. S.C. Dec. 28, 2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement but the 
JVCA did not apply because the case was commenced before Jan. 6, 2012. 
The court found the Tedford equitable exception inapplicable, noting that 
“[d]efendant slept on his right of removal—if this case ever was 
removable—and equity does not favor those who sleep on their rights.” Id. 





JPMorgan Chase Bank v. Farah, 2016 WL 8674607 (D. N.J. Dec. 16, 
2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded the case, noting that the defendant had not alleged 





Fields v. Expedited Logistics Sols. LLC, 2016 WL 7173370 (D. 
S.C. Dec. 9, 2016).   
  
There was a question whether removal was more than one year after 
commencement. The court remanded the case without determining 
the issue because the removing defendant failed to establish 
complete diversity based on fraudulent joinder.  [187]  
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Yoder v. Williams, 2016 WL 7165723 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement, but the 
district court concluded that the relevant one-year period began when the 
claim was filed by the intervening plaintiff. [188]  
  
27.   
Westmoreland v. Wawona Packaging Co., LLC, 2016 WL 7165959 
(E.D. N.Y. Dec. 8, 2016).   
  
Although the case was removed more than one year after commencement, 
the court did not address the alleged bad faith on the part of the plaintiff 




AMI Global Meeting Sols., Inc. v. Fin. Brand, LLC, 2016 WL 9347150 
(S.D. Fla. Oct. 28, 2016).  
  
The district court found that the one-year bar was inapplicable to the instant 





Higgins v. Philadelphia Indem. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 6304740 (N.D. Okla. 
Oct. 27, 2016).   
  
The case was remanded more than one year after commencement. The 
removing defendant did not argue bad faith on the part of the plaintiff but 
instead argued that the case could be removed pursuant to the Tedford 
equitable exception based upon factors other than bad faith forum 
manipulation by the plaintiff. The district court remanded the case, rejecting 




Lee v. Allstate Indem. Co., 2016 WL 6246911 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 26, 2016).   
  
The court remanded the case, fining that it was removed more than one year 
after commencement. In so ruling, the court fund that the plaintiff’s 
amendment to add an insurance bad faith claim was part of the original 
lawsuit subject to the one-year bar. Defendant had argued that the relevant 
one-year period began when the insurance bad faith claim was filed. [197]   
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Eclipse Aesthetics LLC v. Regenlab USA, LLC, 2016 WL 4800342 (N.D. 
Tex. Sept. 12, 2016).   
  
The court found that the one-year bar was inapplicable to the instant case 





Gates at Williams-Brice Condo. Assoc’n v. Quality Built, LLC, 2016 
WL 4646258 (D. S.C. Sept. 7, 2016).   
  
The court remanded the case without addressing the one-year bar because it 





Thompson v. Target Corp., 2016 WL 4119937 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 2, 2016).   
  





Gates at Williams-Brice Condo. Assoc’n v. Lexington Ins. Co., 2016 WL 
4035450 (D. S.C. July 28, 2016).   
  
The district court remanded the case finding that counterclaim defendant 





Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Cioffi, 2016 WL 3962818 (D. Mass. July 21, 
2016).  
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded, finding that a counterclaim defendant may not 





Air Comfort Co., Inc. v. Carrier Corp., 2016 WL 3951158 (S.D. Ala. 
July 20, 2016).   
  
The case was properly removed based upon federal question jurisdiction. 
After dismissal of the federal question claim, the court remanded the 
remaining claims. [213]  
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Rosenberg v. Webber, 2016 WL 3125155 (D. Md. June 3, 2016).  
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded, finding that removal was “untimely under the 30-
day general filing requirement and the one-year deadline applied to diversity 
jurisdiction cases.” Id. at *3. The court further found that it should abstain 





MBLH Props., Ltd. v. Vulcan Constr. Materials, LP, 2016 WL 
10933058 (E.D. Tex. May 13,2 016).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The 
district court remanded the case, finding that the case commenced in state 
court upon filing. The removing defendant did not argue bad faith on the 
part of the plaintiff but instead argued that the case commenced upon 





Kitchell v. OSF Okla., Inc., 2016 WL 1651825 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 25, 
2016).  
  
The district court remanded the case, noting that the removing defendant 





Stigleman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2016 WL 1611577 (C.D. Ill. Apr. 
22, 2016).  
  
The district court remanded the case, rejecting defendant’s argument that the 
oneyear bar was inapplicable to the second removal. The removing 





Boomerang Recoveries, LLC v. Guy Carpenter & Co., LLC, 2016 WL  
1594954 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 21, 2016).   
  
The court remanded the case (which was apparently removed more than one 
year after commencement), finding that the forum defendant had not been 
fraudulently joined. [233]   
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Gonzalez v. Starwood Hotels, 2016 WL 1611576 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 
2016).  
  
Although it appears the case was removed more than one year after 
commencement, the district court did not address application of the one-year 





South Cent. Coal Co. Inc. v. Houston Specialty Ins. Co., 2016 WL 
9414095 (E.D. Okla. Apr. 19, 2016).   
  
The district court remanded the case, finding that the one-year bar applied. 
The removing defendant apparently ignored the one-year bar and did not 





BAC Home Loans Servicing v. Claudet, 2016 WL 1743353 (M.D. Fla. 
Apr. 13, 2016).  
  
The case was removed more than six years after commencement. The 
magistrate recommended remand. The district court judge accepted the 
recommendation and remanded.  2016 WL 1732675 (M.D. Fla., May 02, 





H. v. Pfizer Inc., 2016 WL 1247480 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2016).   
  





Lopez v. Allied Packing & Supply, Inc., 2016 WL 1176395 (N.D. Cal. 
Mar. 28, 2016).   
  
The district court remanded the case. The defendant removed more than one 
year after commencement but argued unsuccessfully that the one-year time 
period started over when plaintiff amended the complaint to include a 





Breiding v. Wilson Appraisal Servs., Inc., 2016 WL 1175257 (N.D. Va. 
2016).  
  
The district court remanded the case, finding no federal question or diversity 
jurisdiction. [245]  
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Combs v. Shapiro & Burson LLP, 2016 WL 1064459 (D. Md. Mar. 14, 
2016).  
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded the case, finding removal was procedurally improper without 





Graveline v. Reynolds, 2016 WL 3573039 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 19, 2016).   
  
The federal district court remanded the case based on considerations other 





In re Engle Progeny Cases Tobacco Litig., 2016 WL 1402908 (M.D. Fla. 
Feb. 16, 2016).   
  
The federal district court remanded the case. The case was removed more 
than one year after commencement but the removing defendant did not argue 





Ross v. Lee, 2016 WL 521529 (W.D. Va. Feb. 5, 2016).  
  
The district court found that the one-year bar didn’t apply because the case 





Johnson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 277768 (M.D. Fla. 
Jan. 22, 2016).   
  
The court found that plaintiff’s insurance bad faith claim was removable as a 
separate cause of action upon the filing of the claim and found the one-year 





Card v. Safeco Ins. Co., 2016 WL 8904950 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 18, 2016).  
  
The federal district court remanded the case because the removing defendant 
improperly removed only one of several claims. [261]  
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Newton v. Comcast of Md., LLC, 2016 WL 94250 (D. Md. Jan. 7, 
2016).   
  
The district court denied plaintiff’s motion to remand. It did not address 
bad faith. It appears that the plaintiff did not argue untimely removal in the 





Smith v. Farmers Ins. Co., 2015 WL 13260403 (D. N. Mex. Dec. 17, 
2015).   
  
The district court denied the motion to remand, finding that the claim at 






Clark v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2015 WL 7272305 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 18, 
2015).  
  
The district court remanded the case but did not consider whether the 
defendant’s removal was timely because plaintiff waived timeliness by 





Deutsch Bank Nat’l Co., v. Brader, 2015 WL 9872070 (S.C. Oct. 28, 
2015).   
  
The magistrate recommended remand because complete diversity was not 
established. The magistrate judge noted that the plaintiff did not raise the 
timeliness of defendant’s removal and therefore waived any such 





Reeves v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 2015 WL 6438898 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 
22, 2015).   
  
This case involved an attempted removal by the plaintiff proceeding in 





Carmona v. Johnson & Johnson, 2015 WL 13229429 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 19, 
2015).  
  
The district court denied plaintiff’s motion to remand, finding removal 
timely on grounds other than plaintiff’s bad faith. [286]  
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Skelton v. Johnson & Johnson, 2015 WL 13236734 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 
2015).  
  
The district court denied plaintiff’s motion to remand, finding removal timely 





Gumbodete v. Ayati-Ghaffari, 2015 WL 13297960 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 6, 
2015).  
 
 The district court remanded the case based upon lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction and untimeliness after it was removed by a pro se litigant. It 
does not appear that the removing defendant alleged bad faith on the part 





Gore v. Robertson, 2015 WL 5749459 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2015).   
  
The district court found that plaintiff’s products liability claim against GM 
(asserted in an amended pleading) commenced on a different date than the 
date plaintiff filed a negligence complaint against other defendants. Thus, 





Nguyen v. Sam’s West, Inc., 2015 WL 5092689 (D. Nev. Aug. 27, 2015).   
  
The district court denied plaintiff’s motion to remand but did not address bad 





Handshumaker v. Vangilder, 2015 WL 5032054 (D. Kan. Aug. 25, 2015).   
  
The district court found the one-year bar did not prohibit removal because 
it found that the garnishment action triggered a new one-year period in 





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052377 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [301]  
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In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050530 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071920 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071878 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).   
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071892 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052403 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071924 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050536 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  










In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052406 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050538 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071835 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052391 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050529 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050524 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050532 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [315]  
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In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050543 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071919 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071875 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050540 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071850 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052392 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071860 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071916 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [323]  
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In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071917 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052393 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071877 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071909 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052407 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071876 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071914 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071885 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [331]  
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In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071923 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071879 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050535 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050531 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050534 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050522 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071922 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [338]  
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In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052387 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050523 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).   
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5057667 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050541 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050542 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052410 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071921 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052399 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [346]  
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In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071925 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071918 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071926 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052381 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5050527 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071881 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





 In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071900 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  
The district court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [353]  
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In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052397 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071880 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052383 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052378 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5052402 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
  





In re Johnson & Johnson cases, 2015 WL 5071869 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 24, 
2015).  
 





HSBC Bank USA Nat’l Assn. v. Bobrowski, 2015 WL 4506824 (M.D. Fla.  
Jul. 23, 2015).   
  
The district court remanded the case without addressing bad faith, finding no 
federal question or diversity jurisdiction. [372]  
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Brace v. AIG Centennial Ins. Co., 2015 WL 3793792 (M.D. Fla. Jun. 18, 
2015).  
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. It was 
remanded based upon defendant’s failure to remove within 30 days of notice 





Countrywide Mortg. v. Lowe, 2015 WL 3562646 (M.D. Fla. Jun. 5, 2015).  
  
The case was removed more than three years after commencement. The district 
court remanded the case based on its untimely removal but noted that the 





Canizales v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2015 WL 2183783 (May 8, 2015).   
  
The case was apparently removed more than one year after commencement. 
The district court remanded, finding no fraudulent joinder. It noted that neither 





Brown v. Rivera, 2015 WL 2153437 (C.D. Cal. May 6, 2015).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded, noting that the defendant did not even attempt to show that the 





Morgan v. Mumma, 2015 WL 2070227 (M.D. Pa. May 4, 2015).   
  
The defendant removed in 2015 after judgment was entered against defendant 
in estate proceedings that had begun in 1986. The district court remanded the 
case, finding removal untimely. The defendant apparently did not assert 





Millennium Chems., Inc. v. Fried, Frank, Harris, Shriver & Jacobsen 
LLP, 2015 WL 1959039 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 30, 2015).   
 
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded the case for lack of complete diversity without determining 
whether removal was timely. [401]  
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Bank of Am., N.A. v. Lebreton, 2015 WL 2226266 (D. N.M. Apr. 20, 2105).  
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The court 
found that the one-year bar was procedural rather than jurisdictional and had 





Wilson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 2015 WL 1422569 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2015).   
  
The case was removed case after expiration of the one-year period. The district 
court remanded the case, finding that the amount in controversy did not exceed 





Columbian Chems. Co. v. AIG Specialty Ins. Co., 2015 WL 12755709 
(N.D. W. Va. Mar. 27, 2015).   
  
Although the case was removed more than one year after it was filed, the 
district court found that the third-party defendant removed within one year of 





Perez v. Summers, 2015 WL 1887273 (S.D. W.Va. Mar. 20, 2105).   
  
The case was removed case after expiration of the one-year period. The 
magistrate judge recommended that the district court remand because only 
defendants may remove. The district court adopted the report and 





Mims v. Deepwater Corrosion Servs., Inc., 2015 WL 1185817 (S.D. Tex. 
Mar. 16, 2015).   
  
The defendant removed the Jones Act claim after expiration of the one-year 
period. The district court remanded, finding that removal of the Jones Act 





Flahaut v. Johnson, 2015 WL 1137602 (D. Utah Mar. 12, 2015).   
  
The defendant removed after expiration of the one-year time period. The 
district court remanded the case, finding incomplete diversity and untimely 
removal. The court did not specifically consider any argument that the plaintiff 
acted in bad faith. [425]  
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Aurora Loan Servs., L.L.C. v. Milasinovich, 2015 WL 11111303, (D. N. 
Mex. Feb. 17, 2015).   
  
The district court remanded the case based in part on the one-year bar. The 





S.D. Wheat Growers Ass’n v. Chief Indus., Inc., 2014 WL 7537066 (D. S.D. 
Dec. 22, 2104).   
  
Although the case was removed more than year after commencement, the 
district court found that the one-year bar did not apply because the case was 





Willison v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 2014 WL 7005267 (W.D. Okla. 
Dec. 11, 2014).   
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement. The district 
court remanded, finding removal untimely because it did not comply with the 
applicable thirty-day limit. The district court did not consider the issue of bad 





Joynt v. Volusia Cty., 2014 WL 6908433 (M.D. Fla. Dec. 8, 2014).   
  
The defendant excess insurer removed after expiration of the one-year period 
and while case was on appeal to state appellate court. The district court 
remanded the case, finding that the plaintiff had not fraudulently joined the in-





IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. v. Cokeing, 2014 WL 12618118 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 30, 
2014).   
  
The pre se defendants removed more than six years after commencement. The 
district court remanded finding removal based upon diversity untimely. It does 





Citibank, N.A. v. Lebreton, 2014 WL 11512597 (D. N. Mex. Oct. 16, 2014).   
  
The district court remanded the case after the defendant removed pro se. The 
defendant had not alleged bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. [466]  
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Garcia v. Target Corp., 2014 WL 4105228 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 19, 2014).   
  
The plaintiff sued Target for personal injury and Target removed after 
expiration of the one-year period but did not allege or prove bad faith. The 





First Bank and Trust v. Jones, 2014 WL 4072116 (E.D. La. Aug. 13, 2014).   
  
The defendant removed after expiration of the one-year period. The district 
court remanded without addressing the issue of bad faith. Apparently, 
defendant had not asserted plaintiff’s bad faith as justification for the untimely 





Creadeur v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 2014 WL 2999261 (W.D. La. Jul. 3, 
2014).  
  
The defendants removed after expiration of the one-year time period, arguing 
that the “revival exception” applied. The district court remanded, finding that 
the “revival exception” inapplicable and finding the removal untimely as a 





IKB Intern S.A. in Liquidation v. J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., 2014 WL 
2933043 (S.D. N.Y. June 27, 2014).   
  
The district court remanded the case. The removing defendant did not allege 




Caliaro v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2014 WL 1779265 (M.D. Fla. 
May 5, 2014).  
  
Plaintiff sued non-diverse uninsured motorist for negligence and her diverse 
UM insurer for breach of contract. Plaintiff settled with the non-diverse 
motorist and then amended her complaint to include a bad faith claim against 
the insurer. The bad faith claim was stayed pending resolution of UM 
coverage. After partial judgment was entered against the UM insurer on the 
claim for coverage, the court lifted the stay on the bad faith claim and the 
insurer removed, claiming that it removed the case within 30 days of 
commencement of the bad faith claim, which it argued was commenced only 
after the stay was lifted. The district court remanded, finding that the bad faith 
claim was commenced when it was included in the amended complaint and 
further finding that defendant failed to remove within 30 days of the case 
becoming removable. The court did not address the issue of bad faith on the 
part of the plaintiff. [503]  
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Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Harrington, 2014 WL 1767592 (D. N.J. May 2, 
2014).  
  
Pro se defendant removed the case for second time years after commencement. 
The district court remanded the case, finding that removal was untimely and 
that the case lacked diversity. The district court did not address the issue of bad 





Noyes v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 2014 WL 2111695 (M.D. Fla. 
Apr. 30, 2014).  
  
Plaintiff sued diverse and non-diverse defendants. Diverse defendant removed 
more than one year after commencement, arguing that the plaintiff had 
fraudulently joined the non-diverse defendant. The district court remanded, 
after reconsidering its earlier order (Noyes v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 
3 F. Supp. 3d 1356 (M.D. Fla. Mar. 13, 2014). See case # 151 below. Although 
the court found that the plaintiff fraudulently joined the non-diverse defendant, 
the court found the removal untimely since it was not filed within 30 days of 





Jenkins v. Movin on Transp., Inc., 2014 WL 1653248 (N.D. Okla. Apr. 24, 
2014).  
  
The case was removed more than one year after commencement based on 
federal question jurisdiction. The district court remanded because defendant 





Noyes v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 3 F. Supp. 3d 1356 (M.D. Fla.  
2014).   
  
The district court denied plaintiff’s motion to remand, finding that the plaintiff 
had acted in bad faith by fraudulently joining a non-diverse party. The court 
reversed its ruling on reconsideration, finding that defendant’s removal was 
untimely because the fraudulent joinder was evident from the outset. Noyes v. 
Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 2014 WL 2111695 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 30, 2014). 
See case # 149 above. [525]  
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KUM & GO, L.C. v. Veeder-Root Co., 2014 WL 11514687 (S.D. Iowa Feb. 
24, 2014).  
  
The court found the one-year bar inapplicable because the complaint was 





Estate of Kerr v. S. Cal. Reg’l Rail Auth., 2014 WL 1606316 (C.D. Cal. 
Jan. 29, 2014).   
  
The case was remanded after the district court found no federal question 





GeoVantage, Inc. v. SimWright, Inc., 2014 WL 183667 (Jan. 16, 2014).  
  
Defendant removed more than one year after commencement. The district court 
remanded for failure to timely remove within 30 days and did not address the 





Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 2014 WL 60044 (W.D. Va. Jan, 7, 2014).  
  
Plaintiff sued Wal-Mart in state court and demanded $70,000. Plaintiff served 
defendant nine months after filing the complaint and did not respond to 
discovery or defendant’s request for a settlement demand until after expiration 
of the oneyear period. Plaintiff then made a settlement demand of $200,000, 
after which defendant removed. Although the court found that the plaintiff 
acted in bad faith in refusing to respond to discovery within one year, the court 
further found that plaintiff’s ad damnum request for $70,000 was in good faith. 
The court noted that plaintiff assured the court that he would not amend his 
complaint to demand a greater amount and further noted that the parties had 
reached a tentative settlement agreement at $45,000 that was not finalized due 
to concerns regarding responsibility for Medicare liens. Thus, the court 
determined that the amount in controversy requirement was not met and 





Yalda v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., 2013 WL 12072532 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 1, 
2013).   
  
The court found the one-year bar inapplicable. [553]  
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Powell ex rel. Powell v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2013 WL 5377852 
(E.D. Pa. Sept. 26, 2013).   
  
After expiration of the one-year period, defendants removed the case for a 
second time based upon diversity. When ruling on plaintiff’s motion to 
remand, the district court considered whether an equitable exception to the 
one-year bar should be applied under the circumstances and found that it did 
not. The removing defendant had not alleged bad faith on the part of the 
plaintiff as a basis for an equitable exception, but instead argued that the 





Fong v. Beehler, 2013 WL 5194023 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2013).   
  
The district court remanded the case based upon untimely removal but not 





Hamptons at Metrowest Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Mt. Hawley Ins. Co., 2013 
WL 4854770 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 10, 2013).   
  
The case was remanded based upon the district court’s finding that it could not 
assert jurisdiction over an ancillary proceeding given that action was still 





Cammarota ex rel. Hallock v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 2013 WL 
4787305 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 9, 2013).   
  
Defendant removed a second time after expiration of the one-year period and 
argued that the equitable exception should apply. The only basis for an 
equitable exception urged by defendant was its lack of responsibility for any 
delay in removal. Defendant did not allege bad faith on the part of the plaintiff. 
The district court remanded, finding no basis for the application of an equitable 





First Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Hunter, 2013 WL 12092558 
(N.D. Ga. Aug. 2, 2013).   
  
The district court remanded the case but did not address bad faith. The 
court rejected defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s amended complaint 
revived defendant’s right to remove. [577]  
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Barroso v. Allstate Prop. and Cas. Ins. Co., 958 F. Supp. 2d 1344 (M.D. Fla. 
Aug. 1, 2013).   
  
The plaintiff sued a diverse insurer and amended the complaint to add a claim 
for insurance bad faith after expiration of one-year period. The district court 
remanded, finding that the insurance bad faith claim was not a separate and 





Hamptons at Metrowest Condo. Ass’n, Inc. v. Nationwide Prop. & Cas. Ins. 
Co., 2013 WL 3974675 (M.D. Fla. Jul. 31, 2013).   
  
The district court remanded the case but did not address bad faith. The court 
rejected defendant’s argument that plaintiff’s amended complaint revived 





Jordan v. Lowery, 2013 WL 3479655 (E.D. Okla. July 10, 2013).   
  
The defendants removed, relying upon the JVCA even though it clearly did not 
apply to the case.  The district court remanded based upon the one-year bar. It 
refused to recognize an equitable exception and therefore made no findings 





Duffield v. Penn Life Corp., 2013 WL 2607480 (S.D. W.Va. June 11, 2013).   
  
The plaintiffs brought a wrongful death claim against the decedent’s diverse 
employer and the decedent’s alleged supervisor, a non-diverse defendant. The 
diverse employer removed the case the first time, alleging that the non-diverse 
defendant had not been the decedent’s supervisor and that therefore his joinder 
was fraudulent. The court granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand, in part based 
upon affidavit testimony that the non-diverse defendant was a foreman on the 
job with supervisory capacity. Upon remand back to state court, the parties 
engaged in discovery. Fifteen months after remand, the diverse employer 
removed a second time, again arguing fraudulent joinder and further arguing 
that retroactive application of the JVCA was appropriate even though the JCVA 
itself clearly indicates that it applies to cases commenced on or after the date of 
passage of the JVCA. The district court granted the plaintiffs’ second motion to 
remand, observing that, after the first remand, the defendants had six months in 
which to conduct discovery in an effort to support their fraudulent joinder 
allegations but failed to do so and “missed the one-year deadline by over nine 
months.” The court noted that, pursuant to Fourth Circuit precedent, removal 
after one year was absolutely barred by the earlier version of the statute. [593]  
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Hamptons at Metrowest Condo. Ass'n, Inc. v. Park Ave. at Metrowest, 
Ltd., 2013 WL 2477236 (M.D. Fla. June 10, 2013).   
  
The district court adopted the magistrate’s report and recommendation and 
remanded the case because the defendant failed to demonstrate the amount in 





JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat’n Ass’n v. Hayes, 2103 WL 2407121 (D. S.C. 
June 3, 2013).  
  
A pro se in-state defendant removed a foreclosure action more than one year 
after commencement of the case and argued that removal was proper pursuant 
to the bad faith exception in the JVCA. The magistrate recommended that the 
case be remanded because the defendant was an in-state defendant, making 
removal based upon diversity improper. The magistrate also noted that the “bad 
faith” exception to removal of diversity cases did not apply because the case 





Ludwig v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 2013 WL 2406320 (M.D. Fla. June 3, 
2013).   
  
The court remanded the case after finding that the case was commenced more 
than one year prior to removal when plaintiff filed a complaint for insurance 





Rader v. Safeco Ins. Co. 2013 WL 10186944 (N.D. Fla. May 21, 2015).   
  
Plaintiff sued insurer and then later added a claim for bad faith. Defendant 
removed. The district court remanded, finding that the bad faith claim was not a 





Cotton Cloud, Inc. v. Covein Licensing, LLC. 2013 2154386 (D. Nev. May 
17, 2013).   
  
The district court remanded, finding removal untimely because the notice of 
removal was not filed within the applicable 30-day time period. [601]  
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Calchas LLC v. Toucet, 2013 WL 12094327 (Apr. 29, 2013).   
  
The district court remanded the case. The removing defendant did not allege 




Ingram v. Forbes Co., LLC, 2013 WL 1760202 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2013).  
  
Plaintiff brought a premises liability claim against a diverse store and a non-
diverse store manager. More than three years after commencement, the state 
court granted summary judgment to the store manager, after which the 
remaining diverse defendants removed, apparently arguing that the JVCA’s 
bad faith exception applied and that plaintiff had fraudulently joined the store 
manager. The district court granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand, noting 
that the JVCA did not apply to the case. The court further observed that the 
diverse store should have been able to establish the store manager had no 
personal responsibility for the incident within one year and could have 
removed based upon fraudulent joinder at that juncture. Thus, the district court 
determined that even if the equitable exception were to be recognized, it would 
not apply to the instant case because the defendant did not timely preserve the 





Brioli v. Premier Buick Pontiac GMC, 2013 WL 1314865 (W.D. Pa. 
Mar. 28, 2013).  
  
Plaintiff sued a diverse car dealer in state court for compensatory and 
punitive damages arising from her purchase of an allegedly defective 
vehicle. Plaintiff alleged that defendant was aware of the vehicle’s 
numerous infirmities prior to her purchase and that she had been unable 
to remedy the defects. More than one year later and less than one 
month before trial, plaintiff filed a pre-trial statement claiming 
compensatory and punitive damages in excess of $335,000. Defendant 
then removed just two days before trial. The trial court granted the 
plaintiff’s motion to remand, finding that the one-year limitation was 
absolute because the JVCA was inapplicable to the case given that the 
case was commenced before the JVCA was passed. [612]  
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Denman Tire Corp. v. Tornel, 2013 WL 12119663 (Feb. 28, 2013).   
  
The third-party defendant removed. The defendant moved for remand but did not 
challenge the removing third-party defendant’s invocation of the Tedford 





Auld v. Sun West Mortg. Co., Inc., 2013 WL 656891 (D. Kan. Feb. 22, 2013).  
  
The district court remanded the case holding that: (i) a plaintiff cannot remove, 
and (ii) removal was untimely because it was after the 30-day time period and 






Richfield Hosp. Inc. v. Charter One Hotels and Resorts, Inc., 2013 WL 
561256 (D. Colo. Feb. 14, 2013).   
  
Plaintiff sued defendants in state court. Defendants removed. The district court 
remanded, finding that the defendants failed to demonstrate complete diversity 
and the amount in controversy. After the one-year deadline, the defendants 
removed a second time arguing that the plaintiff manipulated removal in bad 
faith by concealing its damages until after expiration of the one-year period. The 
district court granted the plaintiff’s motion to remand, finding that the “bad 
faith” exception was clearly inapplicable given that the case was commenced in 




Posey v. McKesson Corp., 2013 WL 361168 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2013).   
  
The district court remanded the case based, in part, upon the one-year bar, 






Summit Contractors, Inc. v. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co., 2013 WL 12153593 
(M.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2013).   
  
The district court found third-party defendants’ removal of the third-party claim  
timely, finding that the relevant date of commencement was the date on which 
the third-party claim was filed. [627]  
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Thykkuttathil v. Keese, 2013 WL 208931 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 17, 2013).   
  
The district found that plaintiff waived application of the one-year bar because 
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Table D  
Cases That Did Not Involve Removal Based Upon Diversity   
More Than One Year After Commencement  
(283 Total)   
  
1. Martinsville Corral, Inc. v. Soc’y Ins., 2018 WL 2463213 (S.D. Ind. 
June 1, 2018). [5]  
2. Cox v. Air Methods Corp., 2018 WL 2437056 (S.D. W. Va. May 30, 
2018). [6]  
3. Shirk v. Gonzales, 2018 WL 2411601 (D. N. Mex. May 29, 2018). 
[8]  
4. Tharpe v. Affinion Benefits Grp., LLC, 2018 WL 3352940 (S.D. 
Tex. May 22, 2018). [9]  
5. Bernal-Diaz v. MXD Grp., Inc., 2018 WL 3193245 (D. N.J. May 21, 
2018). [10]  
6. Hagan v. Leon, 2018 WL 2292756 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2018). [11]  
7. Torres v. Johnson & Johnson, 2018 WL 2271019 (D. Mass. May 17, 
2018). [13]  
8. White v. Allstate Ins. Co., 2018 WL 2244721 (S.D. Miss. May 16, 
2018). [14]  
9. Jian-Ming Zhao v. RelayRides, Inc., 2018 WL 2096854 (May 7, 
2018). [15]  
10. Moon v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 2018 WL 2041736 (May 2, 
2018). [17]  
11. Davis v. Clayman, 2018 WL 1959805 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 16, 2018). 
[19]  
12. Brumfield v. Merck & Co., Inc., 2018 WL 1955216 (E.D. N.Y. 
Apr. 25, 2018). [20]  
13. Adkins v. Kroger Ltd. P’ship I, 2018 WL 1611592 (E.D. Ky. Apr. 
3, 2018). [23]  
14. Thomas v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 2018 WL 1548897 
(W.D. La. Mar. 14, 2018). [27]  
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15. Manesh v. Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co., 2018 WL 1887291 (W.D. 
Tex. Mar. 2, 2018). [29]  
16. Martinsville Corral, Inc. v. Soc’y Ins., 2018 WL 1069440 (S.D. Ind. 
Feb. 23, 2018). [31]  
17. Flynn v. Target Corp., 2018 WL 773889 (W.D. N.Y. Feb. 8. 2018). 
[33]  
18. Narayan v. Compass Grp. USA, Inc., 2018 WL 746402 (E.D. Cal. 
Feb. 6, 2018). [34]  
19. Edison Ranch, Inc. v. Mosaic Potash Carlsbad, Inc., 2018 WL 
582578 (D. N. Mex. Jan. 26, 2018. [36]  
20. Estate of Martin ex rel. Jozwiak v. Metlife Ins. Co. USA, 2018 WL 
563835 (W.D. Ky. Jan. 25, 2018.) [38]  
21. Kaitlin Youell v. Magellan Health Servs. of N.M., Inc., 2018 WL 
344959 (D. N. Mex. Jan. 9, 2018). [41]  
22. Jian-Ming Zhao v. RelayRides, Inc., 2017 WL 6336082 (N.D. Cal. 
Dec. 12, 2017). [42]  
23. Sleezer v. Podzic, 2017 WL 6025328 (N.D. Okla. Dec. 5, 2017). 
[43]  
24. Archila v. Integon Nat’l Ins. Co., 2017 WL 5633103 (D. R.I. Nov. 
21, 2017). [45]  
25. Byrd v. Norman, 2017 WL 5986470 (M.D. La. Nov. 17, 2017). 
[48]  
26. Vincent v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2018 WL 5297949 (N.D. W. Va. 
Nov. 13, 2017). [49]  
27. Basic Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Dynex Capital, Inc., 2017 WL 
5197145 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 7, 2017). [50]  
28. Bayview Loan Servicing LLC v. Farzan, 2017 WL 5047900 (D. 
N.J. Nov. 3, 2017). [51]  
29. Nevils v. CIT Bank, N.A., 2017 WL 4616905 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 16, 
2017). [54]  
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30. Nw. Ry. Museum v. Indian Harbor Ins. Co., 2017 WL 446661 
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2017). [56]  
31. Mary v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 7735066 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 
5, 2017). [57]  
32. Padilla v. Am. Modern Home Ins. Co., 282 F. Supp. 3d 1234 (D. N. 
Mex. 2017). [60]  
33. Franklin v. Lanter, 2017 WL 7194850 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 29, 2017). 
[61]  
34. Marzette v. Charter Commc’ns, LLC, 2017 WL 4273305 (W.D. 
Ky. Sept. 26, 2017). [64]  
35. Pho An, LLC v. Capital One, N.A., 2017 WL 4231137 (E.D. La. 
Sept. 25, 2017). [65]  
36. Kaiser v. Fed Ex Cargo Claims Dep’t, 2017 WL 4480743 (D. 
Minn. Sept. 21, 2017). [66]  
37. Ford v. Jolly Shipping, Inc., 2017 WL 4451148 (S.D. Ala. Sept. 19, 
2017). [68]  
38. Villenurve v. New River Shopping Ctr., LLC, 2017 WL 5147659 
(M.D. La. Sept. 14, 2017). [71]  
39. Chapman v. Trinity Highway Prods., LLC, 2017 WL 3923554 
(N.D. Ga. Sept. 7, 2017). [72]  
40. Cherry v. Stallworth, 2017 WL 3868220 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 5, 2017. 
[74]  
41. Hall v. Capers, 2017 WL 7805413 (S.D. Miss. Sept. 5, 2017. [75]  
42. Macho v. First Nat’l Ins. Co. of Am., 2017 WL 3712906 (W.D. 
Wash. Aug. 29, 2017). [76]  
43. Lighthouse Prop. Ins. Corp. v. Rogers, 2017 WL 3634593 (D. S.C. 
Aug. 22, 2017). [78]  
44. Hoarau v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 2017 WL 3328078 (D. Ariz. Aug. 
4, 2017). [82]  
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45. Allison v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2017 WL 225992 (E.D. 
Pa. July 31, 2017). [85]  
46. Leon v. Great Lakes Reinsurance (UK) SE, 2017 WL 7735212 (S.D. 
Tex. July 11, 2017). [98]  
47. Hughes v. Flicker, 2017 WL 5643240 (S.D. Fla. Jul. 10, 2017). [100]  
48. Petropolous v. FCA US, LLC, 2017 WL 2889303 (S.D. Ca. Jul. 7, 
2017). [101]  
49. Pylant v. Sedgwick Claims Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 2017 WL 3446536 
(M.D. La. June 29, 2017). [102]  
50. Mendoza v. J.P. Morgan Mortg. N.A., 2017 WL 2778250 (S.D. Tex. 
June 27, 2017). [103]  
51. Koerner v. GEICO Cas. Co., 2017 WL 2180357 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 
2017). [111]  
52. Russo v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 2017 WL 1832341 (M.D. Pa. May 
8, 2017). [113]  
53. Lopez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 1550520 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 
28, 2017). [117]  
54. Perez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 1550517 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 
28, 2017). [118]  
55. Heyman v. Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 2017 WL 3274452 (W.D. Ky. 
Apr. 27, 2017). [119]  
56. Battaglia v. Shore Parkway Owner LLC, 249 F. Supp. 3d 668 (E.D. 
N.Y. 2017). [121]  
57. Murray v. Murray, 2017 WL 1351407 (S.D. W.Va. Apr. 10, 2017). 
[123]  
58. Dewey v. Geico Ins. Agency, Inc., 2017 WL 1316941 (D. Mont. Apr. 
7, 2017). [125]  
59. Lopez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 5202883 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 
6, 2017). [126]  
60. De La Torre v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 5202880 (W.D. 
Tex. Apr. 6, 2017). [127]  
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61. Molina v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 5244451 (W.D. Tex. 
Apr. 6, 2017). [128]  
62. Chaparro v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 1738401 (W.D. Tex. 
Apr. 6, 2017). [129]  
63. Gaither v. Beam Partners, LLC, 2017 WL 121766 (E.D. Ky. Mar. 31, 
2017). [130]  
64. Bellman v. NXP Semiconductors USA, Inc., 248 F. Supp. 3d 1082 
(D. N. Mex. 2017). [131]  
65. Lobley v. Guebert, 2017 WL 1901796 (W.D. Ky. Mar. 22, 2017). 
[134]  
66. Kier v. Lowery, 2017 WL 1015319 (N.D. Okla. Mar. 15, 2017). 
[136]  
67. Patty v. FCA US, LLC, 2017 WL 950491 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2017). 
[138]  
68. Jones v. G2 Secure Staff, LLC, 2017 WL 877293 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 
2017). [139]  
69. Stiny v. Northrop Grumman Sys. Corp., 2017 WL 787114 (D.C. Cal. 
Mar. 1, 2017). [140]  
70. Kriete Family Ins. Trust v. Pac. Life Ins. Co., 2017 WL 3273580 
(E.D. Wis. Feb. 24, 2017). [141]  
71. Avila Metro. Lloyds Ins. Co. of Tex., 2017 WL 1232529 (N.D. Tex. 
Feb. 21, 2017). [142]  
72. Wilson v. Badejo, 2017 WL 663544 (E.D. Tenn. Feb. 17, 2017). 
[144]  
73. Perry v. Safeco, 2017 WL 655172 (E.D. Va. Feb. 16, 2017). [145]  
74. Picaretta v. Chief Oil & Gas, LLC, 2017 WL 468229 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 
3, 2017). [149]  
75. Prado v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3274897 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 
31, 2017). [151]  
76 Poblano v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3274896 (W.D. Tex. 
Jan. 31, 2017). [152]  
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77. Perez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3274894 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 
31, 2017). [153]  
78. Munoz v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 5178044 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 
31, 2017). [154]  
79. Rodriguez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3275573 (W.D. Tex. 
Jan. 31, 2017). [155]  
80. Gutierrez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3274358 (W.D. Tex. 
Jan. 31, 2017). [156]  
81. Garcia v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3275563 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 
31, 2017). [157]  
82. Chavez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3274899 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 
27, 2017). [159]  
83. Flores v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3275565 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 
261, 2017). [161]  
84. Vargas v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 5240901 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 
26, 2017). [162]  
85. Vasquez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 515069 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 
24, 2017). [163]  
86. Sarabia v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3274913 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 
19, 2017). [165]  
87. de la Torre v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3275567 (W.D. Tex. 
Jan. 18, 2017). [166]  
88. Sandoval v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3275570 (W.D. Tex. 
Jan. 18, 2017). [167]  
89. Medina v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3288513 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 
11, 2017). [169]  
90. Martinez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3309096 (N.D. Tex. 
Jan. 11, 2017). [170]  
91. Avalos v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3275564 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 
9, 2017). [172]  
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92. Ramirez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 5244796 (W.D. Tex. 
Jan. 9, 2017). [172]  
93. Contreras v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3274901 (W.D. Tex. 
Jan. 6, 2017). [173]  
94. Juarez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 5150680 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 
4, 2017). [174]  
95. Saenz v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2017 WL 3274891 (W.D. Tex. Jan. 
3, 2017). [176]  
96. Hernandez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2016 WL 10537607 (W.D. Tex. 
Dec. 22, 2016). [178]  
97. Hernandez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2016 WL 10520960 (W.D. Tex. 
Dec. 22, 2016). [179]  
98. Navarro v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2016 WL 9414126 (W.D. Tex. 
Dec. 22, 2016). [180]  
99. Maldonado v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2016 WL 10537554 (W.D. 
Tex. Dec. 22, 2016). [181]  
100. Gutierrez v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2016 WL 9414114 (W.D. Tex. 
Dec. 21, 2016). [182]  
101. Garcia v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2016 WL 9414123 (W.D. Tex. 
Dec. 21, 2016). [183]  
102. Woodside Credit, LLC v. Placencia, 2016 WL 9778194 (D. N.Mex. 
Dec. 19, 2016). [184]  
103. Magana v. Allstate Vehicle & Prop. Ins. Co., 2016 WL 10935219 
(S.D. Tex. Nov. 2, 2016). [193]  
104. Barton v. Hurricane Assocs., LLC, 2016 WL 6123371 (M.D. Fla. 
Oct. 20, 2016). [198]  
105. Craig v. MTD Prods. Co., 2016 WL 6090899 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 18, 
2016). [199]  
106. Alvidres v. Allstate Texas Lloyd’s, 2016 WL 9415195 (S.D. Tex. 
Oct. 4, 2016). [200]  
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107. Three Pirates, LLC v. Shelton Bros., Inc., 2016 WL 6534523 (D. 
Or. Sept. 27, 2016). [201]  
108. Jasper v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2016 WL 4207996 (Aug. 10, 
2016). [206]  
109. Amadu v. Bradshaw, 2016 WL 3676474 (D. N.J. July 11, 2016). 
[214]  
110. Miller v. Draftkings, Inc., 2016 WL 3693467 (E.D. Tenn. June 30, 
2016). [217]  
111. W. Healthcare, LLC v. Nat’l Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 2016 WL 
4098753 (N.D. Tex. June 29, 2016). [218]  
112. Enters. v. Allen, 2016 WL 3512176 (E.D. N.Y. June 22, 2016). 
[220]  
113. Bazan v. Lloyds, 2016 WL 3397643 (S.D. Tex. June 21, 2016). 
[221]  
114. Team Express Distrib. LLC v. Junction Sols., Inc., 2016 WL 
3081020 (W.D. Tex. May 31, 2016). [225]  
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Bank of New York v. Consiglio, 2017 WL 9480197 (D. Conn. Oct. 2, 
2017).   
  
The magistrate recommended remand, finding that defendant’s allegations of 
plaintiff’s “gamesmanship” do not relate to an improper effort to defeat 
diversity jurisdiction, but rather to the merits and conduct of the state court 
foreclosure action.” Id. at *4. The magistrate’s report and recommendation 
were adopted, 2017 WL 4948069 (D. Conn. Nov. 1, 2017). See Case No. 14 





Caires v. JPMorgan Chase Bank N.A., 2016 WL 8673145 (S.D. N.Y. 
Nov.  
4, 2016).   
  
The magistrate recommended remand, finding that the removing 
counterplaintiff failed to demonstrate bad faith forum manipulation by the 
counterdefendant. The magistrate’s report and recommendation were 






Lopez v. Allied Packing & Supply, Inc., 2016 WL 3068392 (N.D. Cal. 
June 1, 2016).   
  
The district court denied plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1447(c). The district court had previously remanded the case. 2016  





Calkins v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 2016 WL M.D. Fla. May 10, 2016).   
  
The opinion addressed plaintiff’s motion to amend the complaint after the 
case had been removed more than one year after commencement. [230]  
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Bajaba, LLC v. Gen. Steel Domestic Sales, LLC, 2015 WL 3448422 
(W.D. Ark. May 29, 2105).   
  
Plaintiff sued diverse seller of a steel building and the seller’s non-diverse 
authorized dealer and builder. More than two years later, plaintiff moved to 
non-suit the non-diverse defendants for lack of service. The diverse 
defendant then removed. The district court remanded, finding no bad faith 
on the part of the plaintiff. The court noted that plaintiff had attempted to 
locate and serve the non-diverse defendants. Defendant moved to 
reconsider and the district court affirmed its remand. This opinion ruled 
upon defendant’s motion to reconsider its earlier order remanding the case. 
2014 WL 5363905 (W.D. Ark. Oct. 21, 2014). See Case No. 102 in Table 
A.  [387]  
 
 6.  
  
Gore v. Robertson, 2015 WL 11112415 (M.D. La. May 27, 2015).   
  
This is the magistrate’s report and recommendation which was rejected by 
the district court. 2015 WL 5749459 (M.D. La. Sept. 30, 2015). See Case 





Fruge v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co. L.P., 2015 WL 4131353 (W.D. 
La. Mar. 30, 2015).   
  
This opinion contains the magistrate’s memorandum order, which was 
affirmed by the district court. (W.D. La. July 7, 2015). See Case # 85 in 





Wiles v. Cat, 2014 WL 12591891 (N.D. W. Va. June 27, 2014).   
  
The case was commenced in 2011 and removed in 2013. The district court 





Darragh v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Is. Co., 2014 WL 4791992 (M.D. Fla. 
Apr. 29, 2014).   
  
The magistrate judge recommended denial of the motion to remand. It 
found plaintiff’s bad faith insurance claim was a separate and independent 
claim that was timely removed. The district court rejected he magistrate’s 
report and recommendation in part and remanded the case, finding that the 
bad faith claim was not timely removed because it was part of the case that 
was commenced eight years earlier in state court.  2014 WL 4791993 
(M.D. Fla. Sept. 24, 2014). [507]  
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Housing & Tax Consultants, LLC v. Olsen, 2013 WL 6074129 (N.D. 
Okla. Nov. 18, 2013).   
  
The case was commenced before 2012, so the district court found the “bad 





Verduzco v. Ford Motor Co., 2013 WL 5739094 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 22, 
2013).   
  





Allen v. Resto, 2013 WL 5532785 (E.D. La. Oct. 4, 2013).   
  
The court ruled on plaintiff’s motion to reconsider dismissal of plaintiff’s 
case. [560]  
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